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ARTICLES
A CONTINUUM APPROACH TO SYSTEMIC
RISK AND TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL
Cheryl D. Block
This Article highlights differences between principle and practical
implementation of prudential financial regulation and resolution rules for
failing financial institutions. In principle, prudential regulation gradually
enhances enforcement along a risk-based continuum. Under this approach,
systemically important financial institutions, which pose greater potential
threats to economic stability, theoretically should be more strictly regulated
than other financial entities. In reality, however, regulators often opt not to
fully enforce prudential financial regulations against such large institutions,
a practice sometimes referred to as regulatory forbearance. In ironic
contrast, rules for resolving failing financial institutions have increasingly
restricted regulators’ options, often limiting them to a binary choice
between allowing the entity to fail and providing a government “bailout.” In
reality, however, regulators have flexibly responded to failing institutions
along a continuum ranging from little or no intervention to public rescue.
Despite Dodd-Frank’s attempt to limit this “reality,” regulators are likely to
continue the flexible exercise of their resolution authority.
In this Article, I argue that a continuum-based approach is important for
both prudential regulation and the resolution of failing firms. With respect
to regulation, this approach should ensure proper implementation of
existing gradually enhanced prudential regulatory rules. With respect to
resolution, this approach acknowledges and accepts the range of existing
and potential government responses to failing financial institutions. Rather
than pretend to rid the system of bailouts, policy makers should develop an
equitable and transparent process and substantive criteria for allocating risk
in the event of systemically important financial institution failures.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress responded to the Great Recession of 2007–20091 by addressing a wide array of financial issues in its historic and sweeping Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)2
Among other things, Dodd-Frank created a new Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection, 3 adopted anti-predatory lending rules,4 and provided
1. After the media began using the term, the Associated Press granted its official blessing,
adding “Great Recession” to its official stylebook. ASS. PRESS, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
STYLEBOOK AND BRIEFING ON MEDIA LAW 125 (2011). According to the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER), the recession that began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009
was the longest of any U.S. recession since World War II. NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
DETERMINATION OF THE DECEMBER 2007 PEAK IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1–2 (2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/dec2008.pdf; NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, BUSINESS CYCLE
DATING COMMITTEE (2010), available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html.
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
3. Id. § 1011.
4. Id. §§ 1400–1498.
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new regulatory authority with respect to over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives
contracts and hedge fund advisors 5 More important for purposes of this
Article, Congress responded to the economic crisis with financial reforms
focused on large banks, bank holding companies (BHCs), and nonbank
financial institutions, all of which might present systemic economic risk.
Dodd-Frank was enacted in a political climate fraught with voter frustration
over lax regulatory oversight of the financial industry and anger at
taxpayer-funded bailouts of companies considered “too-big-to-fail”
(TBTF) 6 To appease angry voters, Dodd-Frank’s preamble emphatically
declared an end to TBTF policies and promised “to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts.”7 Though perhaps politically efficacious, this
questionable statutory rhetoric alone hardly justifies Dodd-Frank’s status as
landmark legislation.8
Rather, Dodd-Frank’s significance with respect to systemic risk
regulation is its provision for new and enhanced monitoring, supervision,
and enforcement tools designed to prevent or minimize potential systemwide economic harms, and its expansion of regulatory authority over large,
interconnected nonbank financial institutions. Consistent with financial
reform legislation more generally, Dodd-Frank’s approach includes two
categories of response. First, prudential financial regulation reform—the
regulatory response9—theoretically addresses the problem of systemic risk
5. Id. §§ 711–774 (regulation of derivatives); id. §§ 1570–1580 (regulation of hedge fund
advisors).
6. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Democrats Seize on Oversight, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2010, at
A1 (referring to increased confidence among Democrats about prospects for financial regulatory
reform given “voter anger at big banks and bailouts”); Jim Puzzanghera, Debate Begins on Final
Overhaul Reform: Sides Must Reconcile Differing Bills Passed in House, Senate, CHI. TRIB., June
11, 2010, at C31 (quoting Rep. Paul Kanjorski as saying, “[f]eelings of anger, frustration and rage
justifiably hang over this proceeding because of the recklessness of financial whiz kids, the
greediness of Wall Street bankers and the shortsightedness of our economic regulators”).
7. Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). As he signed
the legislation, President Obama asserted: “There will be no more tax-funded bailouts, period.”
President Obama Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, in 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 617 (July 21, 2010) (emphasis added).
8. See Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 149, 154–55 (2010) [hereinafter Block, Measuring Bailout Cost] (arguing that “no bailout”
claims are not credible precommitment devices). See also Jonathan R. Macey & James P.
Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120
YALE L.J. 1368, 1389 (2011) (“[T]here is reason to believe that the Dodd-Frank Act actually will
increase the probability that financial institutions in general, and insurance companies in
particular, will be bailed out in the future.”); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J.
435, 439 (2011) (“Bailouts are an inevitable feature of modern economies, in which the
interconnectedness of firms means that the entire economy bears the risk of an individual firm’s
failure. . . . Any prefixed resolution regime will be abandoned whenever it cannot provide
acceptable distributional outcome. In such cases, bailouts are inevitable.”).
9. For purposes of this Article, I use the term “prudential regulation” as a combined reference
to: (1) monitoring and supervision rules, which deal with government access to information, bank
examination, and related regulatory enforcement; and (2) prudential rules, which impose
substantive mandates, such as minimum capital and liquidity reserve requirements. My focus on
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through a long-term, forward-looking lens, subjecting regulated entities to
ex ante substantive requirements or restrictions designed to maintain
financial stability and general confidence in the economy, and more
specifically, to mitigate or prevent system-wide economic harms.10 Second,
the resolution response emphasizes ex post rules on the scope and limits of
government authority to intervene in the event of imminent or actual
systemic financial crisis.11
Commentary on Dodd-Frank to date has given it mixed reviews.12 On
the other hand, most commentators have found at least some praiseworthy
details among the Act’s thousands of pages.13 In any event, if for no other
systemic risk is not to minimize the importance of other prudential regulation functions, including
protecting consumers from fraud, abuse, and discriminatory lending practices, and correcting for
information asymmetries that result in imbalanced bargaining power.
10. One illustration of Dodd-Frank’s ex ante regulatory response is its “Authority to Require
Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies.” Dodd-Frank Act § 113,
124 Stat. 1398 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323). For more detailed discussion, see infra notes 140–
79 and accompanying text. Additional Dodd-Frank regulatory responses provide enhanced
regulatory authority for hedge funds, Dodd-Frank §§ 401–419, 124 Stat. 1570–80 (codified in
scattered section in 15 U.S.C.) (Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds), and derivatives and
other swap markets, id. §§ 721–774 (Regulation of Swap Markets). Although insurance
companies will continue to be regulated primarily by the states, the definition of “U.S. nonbank
financial company,” id. § 102(a)(4)(B), is broad enough to permit the new Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) to subject certain insurance companies to Federal Reserve Board
prudential standards. Id. § 113(a).
11. Perhaps the most significant of Dodd-Frank’s ex post responses is its new “Orderly
Liquidation Authority,” id. §§ 201–216, designed “to provide the necessary authority to liquidate
failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States
in a manner that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.” Id. § 204(a) (emphasis added).
For an overview of these and other aspects of the Act, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., THE NEW
FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED)
CONSEQUENCES (2010) [hereafter SKEEL, NEW FINANCIAL DEAL]. For further discussion on the
meaning of “resolution” and the distinction between resolution and regulation, see infra notes
186–211 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Tyrell Williams Lecture: Key Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act
for Independent Regulatory Agencies, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2011) (Dodd-Frank
“establishes pivotal new powers for the Financial Stability Oversight Council, reduces gaps and
omissions that had proven quite problematic, and enacts some substantive limits, . . . which
should, in fact, reduce financial risk”). Cf. SKEEL, NEW FINANCIAL DEAL, supra note 11, at 8
(“Unless its most dangerous features are arrested, the legislation could permanently ensconce the
worst tendencies of the regulatory interventions during the recent crisis as long-term regulatory
policy.”).
13. Bernard S. Sharfman, Using the Law to Reduce Systemic Risk, 36 J. CORP. L. 607, 615–16
(2011) (praising regulation of capital ratios, but arguing that this approach in Dodd-Frank is
“incomplete because it is backward-looking”). See also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank
Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951,
1009 (2011) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank] (recognizing “valuable improvements” from
new rules applicable to systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), but noting that “those
provisions are unlikely to prevent future failures of SIFIs with the attendant risk of governmental
bailouts for systemically significant creditors.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After DoddFrank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 802 (2011) [hereinafter Coffee] (arguing that “[a]lthough greater regulatory
oversight [as provided in Dodd-Frank] is certainly desirable, . . . exclusive reliance upon it is
unrealistic”).

2012]

A Continuum Approach

295

reason than that insufficient time for assessment has passed, few would
claim complete success for Dodd-Frank’s financial reforms. Various
aspects of the Dodd-Frank reforms undoubtedly will be scrutinized, praised,
criticized, and empirically tested for years to come. While this Article
focuses particular attention on systemic risk regulation and resolution
authority, its purpose is not to comprehensively review Dodd-Frank’s
systemic risk-related measures, provide a thorough analysis and critique of
any specific Dodd-Frank titles or provisions, or to debate any particular
regulatory models.
Instead, this Article argues more generally that regulators and
legislators have suffered from a collective practical tendency to approach
the problem of regulating potential or imminent system-wide economic
harm, and the solutions when such harms arise, in black and white terms.14
This frequently binary reality of financial regulation and resolution of
systemic risk is especially striking given its inconsistency with formal and
informal regulatory and resolution principles. Prudential regulation
principles reflected in statutory and regulatory language generally impose
progressively more stringent supervision and regulatory enforcement
actions against financial institutions as risk levels increase or the economic
health of the regulated entity declines. In other words, prudential regulators
acknowledge and purport to apply a risk-based continuum approach. In
practice, however, these principles are often disregarded with respect to
large, systemically important institutions. Moreover, Dodd-Frank’s
prudential regulation reforms adopt a binary classification, which now
includes one set of “ordinary” rules, and a separate category of special rules
applicable to systemically important institutions. The underlying logic is
that certain characteristics can identify financial entities so large or
interconnected that their failures would pose systemic threats to financial
stability. Financial entities on the systemic risk side of this magic line, often
referred to as systemically important financial institutions, or “SIFIs,”
theoretically should be subject to heightened prudential regulation.15
Government options with respect to resolution authority also tend to be
presented starkly. Prior to Dodd-Frank, the Treasury Department
complained that large, interconnected financial companies during a
financial crisis faced “only two untenable options: obtain emergency
funding from the US government [bailout] . . . , or file for bankruptcy . . .
.”16 Responding to this concern, Dodd-Frank established new authority for
14. For purposes of this Article, I loosely consider congressional regulatory response as a
reaction to “the problem,” and the resolution response as an attempt at a “solution.”
15. For further discussion of SIFIs, see infra notes 140–46, 176–79 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 76 (2010) [hereinafter TREAS. REFORM
REPORT]. The Treasury Report further concluded that, “[n]either of these options is acceptable for
managing the resolution of the firm efficiently and effectively in a manner that limits the systemic
risk with the least cost to the taxpayer.” Id.
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regulators to make a formal “systemic risk determination”17 with respect to
a large financial company that poses “a significant risk to the financial
stability of the United States,”18 after which the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) is appointed as receiver and required to proceed with
an “orderly liquidation” of the entity.19 Committee reports accompanying
the legislation explain that the “orderly liquidation authority” (OLA)
provision was designed “to give the U.S. government a viable alternative to
the undesirable choice . . . between bankruptcy of a large, complex financial
company that would disrupt markets and damage the economy, and [a]
bailout . . . that would expose taxpayers to losses and undermine market
discipline.”20
Just as it established a binary classification of systemically important
financial institutions subject to enhanced prudential supervision and other
financial institutions that are not, Dodd-Frank for resolution purposes
similarly imagines a point—identified by a “systemic risk determination”—
beyond which the actual or imminent default of a particular large financial
entity presents an economic stability threat so severe that the institution
should be subject to a special OLA regime.21 By adding orderly liquidations
and purporting to eliminate the bailout option, Dodd-Frank apparently just
substitutes one binary choice (bankruptcy vs. bailout) for another
(bankruptcy vs. orderly dissolution). Binary approaches to the problem
(systemic risk or not) and structural options for the solution (bankruptcy vs.
bailout, or bankruptcy vs. orderly liquidation) fail to capture nuances on
both sides. With respect to the problem, “systemic risk” is not a precise
term, but a concept embodying several distinct dimensions more usefully
analyzed along a continuum. With respect to the solution, “bankruptcy” and
“bailout” themselves are broad terms; bankruptcies may be resolved in
many different ways, and the term bailout—to the extent that it can be
defined—encompasses an even broader array of possibilities. Even broadly
defined, the terms “bailout” and “bankruptcy” fail to capture the full range
of risk allocation mechanisms that should be considered in developing
coherent rules and norms for resolving actual or potentially imminent
business insolvencies. Although the debate appears to be about public
17. Dodd-Frank Act § 203, 124 Stat. 1450 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383) (procedural
mechanisms for systemic risk determination with respect to struggling financial company). For
discussion of “systemic risk determinations,” see infra notes 277–86 and accompanying text.
18. Dodd-frank Act § 204(a), 124 Stat. 1454 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384). The definition of
“financial company” includes bank holding companies, nonbank financial companies supervised
by the Federal Reserve Board, and certain companies predominantly engaged in activities
determined to be financial in nature or incidental thereto by the Federal Reserve Board. Id.
§ 201(a)(11).
19. Id. § 204. For further discussion of the new “orderly liquidation authority,” see infra notes
275–301 and accompanying text.
20. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010).
21. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1450 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383) (listing
required contents of systemic risk determination recommendation).
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(bailout) vs. private (bankruptcy) resolution of business failures, I argue
that business resolution devices cannot be readily classified as one or the
other, but rather belong on a private-public continuum.
My objective with this Article is first to highlight differences between
principle and practical implementation of prudential regulation and
resolution rules. A close look at these differences exposes an odd twist. In
principle, even though general prudential regulatory rules reflect a gradual
risk-based continuum approach, their implementation with respect to large
systemically important institutions has often been through regulatory
forbearance. 22 Particularly when confronted with lobbying pressure from
very large banks, regulators have opted for inaction. In ironic contrast,
statutory and regulatory resolution rules over time have increasingly
restricted regulators’ options, often apparently leaving regulators to make a
binary choice between letting the entity fail and providing a major
government rescue or “bailout.” In reality, however, regulators have
adopted a range of government strategic responses to imminent or actual
large private business failures. In the end, resolution authority is binary in
principle, but actually implemented along a private-public continuum.
Despite Dodd-Frank’s attempt to limit this “reality,” I conclude that
regulators are likely to continue to exercise their resolution authority in a
more flexible manner along this continuum than might otherwise appear
from formal and statutory rules.
I contend that a continuum-based approach is important for both
regulation and resolution. On the regulation side, this approach suggests
better implementation of the risk-based principles already in place and
assurance that new enhanced prudential regulatory rules will be properly
implemented. On the resolution side, it means understanding that resolution
authority reflects government policy with respect to allocating large
financial entity failure risks. Rather than to focus on and pretend to rid the
system of bailouts, regulators should acknowledge the range of existing and
potential government responses to risk allocation, and work toward
developing an equitable and transparent process and substantive criteria for
making allocative choices in the case of systemically important financial
institution failures.
Part I of this Article focuses first on the contrast between principle and
reality in the systemic risk-related prudential regulation of banking
institutions, followed by a similar analysis with respect to nonbank financial
institutions. I conclude—at least with respect to large financial
institutions—that prudential regulation reality is much closer to a binary
model than prudential financial regulatory principles would suggest. Part I
also includes an analysis of related Dodd-Frank reforms, arguing that they
have done little to alter this principle-reality divide. Part II begins by
22. See infra notes 44–71 and accompanying text.
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distinguishing prudential regulation from resolution, focusing on resolution
as a risk allocation mechanism. After briefly discussing bank and nonbank
financial institution resolution rules, Part II follows with an analysis of
Dodd-Frank’s impact on systemic risk-related resolution authority. Here,
too, I find a divide between reality and practical implementation of systemic
risk-related resolution rules. Part III develops a private-public continuum
for risk allocation, and concludes with a discussion of implications.
I.

REGULATORY RESPONSE TO SYSTEMIC RISK: PRINCIPLE
VERSUS REALITY
A. PRUDENTIAL BANK REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
1. Primary Bank Regulators23

History, politics, and turf battles over regulatory authority since the
Civil War have contributed to the existing U.S. banking and financial
regulation system, a complex patchwork quilt incorporating multiple federal
and state regulators with sometimes overlapping jurisdiction.24 Within this
complex landscape, three federal agencies now dominate bank regulation
and resolution authority. First, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), established in 186325 remains the primary agency responsible for regulating nationally chartered banks. 26 Second, the Federal

23. This section provides only brief background information. Detailed discussion of the U.S.
financial regulatory system overall, or the three primary federal bank regulators in particular, is
beyond the scope of this Article.
24. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL REGULATION:
A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S.
FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 48, (2009) [hereinafter GAO, FINANCIAL REGULATION]
(describing U.S. regulatory system as a “fragmented and complex system of federal and state
regulators”). See also Rose Marie Kushmeider, The U.S. Financial Regulatory System:
Restructuring Federal Bank Regulation, 17 FDIC BANKING REV. 1 (2005) (referring to a U.S.
“highly decentralized system that has muddled along more or less in its present form since the
New Deal reforms of the 1930s . . . . [A] confusing system that no one building a system anew
would want to duplicate”). For a chart and description of the various bank regulators and their
responsibilities, see MARK JICKLING & EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RES. SERV., R40249, WHO
REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 6–7 (2009). This report
provides a useful overview, with the caveat that Dodd-Frank has since abolished the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS), transferring some of its oversight responsibilities to the OCC and others
to the Federal Reserve and the FDIC. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 312–313, 124 Stat. 1521–23 (codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 5412–5413).
25. National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863), repealed by and replaced with
National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (establishing the OCC as a bureau within the
Treasury Department). OCC also recently inherited regulatory responsibility for savings and thrift
institutions from the OTS, when the latter was eliminated by the Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 312–313,
124 Stat. 1521–1523 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5412–5413).
26. The OCC is responsible for approving charters and acting as primary regulator for
nationally-chartered banks. 12 U.S.C. § 27.
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Reserve, established in 1913, 27 regulates state-chartered Federal Reserve
member banks and BHCs.28 Finally, legislation creating the federal deposit
insurance system in 1933,29 added the FDIC as a third major bank regulator
with primary regulatory authority over non-Federal Reserve member state
banks.30 Of course, each of the three major bank regulators is concerned
with the economic health of the particular banking institutions within their
supervisory jurisdiction.31 Given its unique responsibility for administering
the federal deposit insurance fund, however, the FDIC’s exercise of its
regulatory powers must focus particular attention on protecting and
minimizing costs to the deposit insurance fund.32 As federal deposit insurer,
the FDIC has additional special supervision and enforcement powers
enabling it to fulfill its mandate to protect depositors and the deposit
insurance fund.33

27. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in 12
U.S.C. § 343 (2006)). The 1913 Act created a Federal Reserve System incorporating: (1) a central
Board of Governors in Washington, D.C.; (2) twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks; and (3)
member banks. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 12 (9th ed. 2010) [hereinafter PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS].
Perhaps most important, the Act establishes the Federal Reserve Bank as the U.S. central bank
responsible for formulating and implementing monetary policy. For an overview of the Federal
Reserve’s functions, see id. at 1 (identifying major responsibilities as: (1) monetary policy; (2)
bank supervision and regulation; (3) “last resort” lending and systemic-risk containment; and (4)
serving as the federal government’s fiscal agent). See also PAULINE SMALE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS20826, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 1 (2005).
28. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841–1849) (making Federal Reserve the primary regulator for bank holding
companies); PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 27, at 59 (describing financial entities subject
to Federal Reserve supervision and regulation). The general definition of a “bank holding
company” is “any company which has control over any bank or over any company that is or
becomes a bank holding company.” 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1).
29. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3).
31. For discussion of rules to promote uniformity and consistency among bank regulators, see
infra notes 39–43and accompanying text.
32. Prior to 2006, the FDIC had been administering two separate insurance funds: (1) the Bank
Insurance Fund (BIF) for commercial bank deposits; and (2) the Savings Account Insurance Fund
(SAIF) for thrifts. The two funds were merged to create the current Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF).
Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 2102, 120 Stat. 9 (2006)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821). For further discussion of the FDIC’s unique regulatory focus, see
infra notes 229–32 and accompanying text.
33. See generally PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 27, at 60–61 (providing an overview
of federal banking agencies’ supervisory and regulatory responsibilities and noting that the FDIC
has “special examination authority to determine the condition of an insured bank or savings
association for insurance purposes”). See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (requiring FDIC approval with
respect to certain mergers and acquisitions of insured depository institutions).
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2. Prudential Bank Regulation
a. General Risk Continuum Principle
Ideally, prudential bank regulation would eliminate bank problems
before they posed systemic threats to regional or national financial stability.
Toward this end, federal bank regulators are empowered with flexible
enforcement tools to tailor specific standards and enforcement requirements
for individual banks based upon performance risk evaluations or other
concerns. 34 For example, federal banking agencies are authorized to
establish capital adequacy requirements applicable to specific banking
institutions that are higher than standards otherwise provided in regulations
as the “agency, in its discretion, deems to be necessary or appropriate in
light of the particular circumstances of the banking institution.”35 Enforcement options available to bank regulators range from seeking informal
written commitments from bank managers to correct deficiencies,36 to formal compliance agreements, 37 to cease and desist orders, and mandatory
prompt corrective action (PCA) measures.38
To promote greater uniformity and consistency in financial regulators’
application of these flexible tools, and to “insure progressive and vigilant
supervision,”39 Congress in 1978 created the interagency Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), which was directed to “establish
uniform principles and standards and report forms” to be used by all
financial regulatory agencies for conducting financial institution
examinations.40 Pursuant to this directive, the FFIEC established a uniform
rating system, with six component measures used to classify financial
34. See, e.g., OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK SUPERVISION PROCESS:
COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 22 (2007) [hereinafter OCC HANDBOOK] (“[F]ollowing risk
evaluations, examiners tailor supervisory activities to the risks identified.”). See also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-499T, FINANCIAL REGULATION: REVIEW OF REGULATORS’
OVERSIGHT OF RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AT A LIMITED NUMBER OF LARGE, COMPLEX
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 10 (2009) [hereinafter GAO, RISK MANAGEMENT REVIEW]
(combination of ongoing on and off-site supervision “allows for timely adjustments to the
supervisory strategy of the examiners as conditions change within the institution”).
35. 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2).
36. GAO, RISK MANAGEMENT REVIEW, supra note 34, at 14. For a good description of
various capital requirement enforcement tools available to bank regulators, see Julie Anderson
Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 IND. L. J. 645, 658–64
(2012) [hereinafter Hill].
37. 12 C.F.R. § 308.303.
38. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-612, BANK REGULATION: MODIFIED
PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION FRAMEWORK WOULD IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS 8–9 (2011)
[hereinafter GAO, PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION]. For further discussion of PCA, see infra notes
97–116 and accompanying text.
39. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95630, § 1002, 92 Stat. 3641, 3694 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3301).
40. Id. § 1006(f) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3305). The FFIEC’s members include representatives
from each of the federal supervisory agencies and a representative state regulator. Id. § 1004(a)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3303(a)).
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institutions into categories,41 ranging from “Composite 1,” indicating strong
performance in every respect, to “Composite 5,” indicating “critically
deficient operating performance.” 42 Bank examiners use these classifications as guidance in determining when to exercise progressively more
aggressive supervision and enforcement tools.43
b. Regulatory Practices Inconsistent With Continuum
Principle
i) Agency Forbearance: Regulation by Inaction
Prudential bank regulation rules explicitly adopt a progressive approach
applying increasingly strict supervision and enforcement standards as bank
health deteriorates along a risk-based continuum. In practice, however,
various structural, political, and budgetary features of the regulatory system
create incentives for regulators to opt for forbearance or to otherwise assist
troubled banks in lieu of initiating early intervention measures. In fact,
banking regulators often choose not to exercise their early intervention
authority, a practice referred to as “regulatory forbearance.”44 As a practical
matter, such forbearance allows regulators to use prudential regulatory
discretion as a resolution tool.45
Forbearance options include informal case-by-case decisions,46 written
forbearance agreements between the regulatory agency and a particular

41. The six-component rating system, commonly referred to as CAMELS, considers: (1)
Capital adequacy; (2) Asset quality; (3) Management; (4) Earnings; (5) Liquidity; and (6)
Sensitivity to market risk. Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,021,
67,026–29 (Dec. 19, 1996) (modifying rating system initially adopted in 1979).
42. Uniform Rating System for Information Technology, 64 Fed. Reg. 3109, 3111–12 (Jan. 20,
1999). These efforts at uniformity have not been entirely successful. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 36,
at 658–68, 707–08 (describing agency differences in capital adequacy regulations and concluding
that “different bank regulators may not have similar standards for . . . imposing higher individual
bank minimum capital requirements”).
43. See, e.g., OCC HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 68–70, (composite 1: no cause for
supervisory concerns; composite 2: informal and limited supervisory action; composite 3: formal
or informal supervisory action may be necessary; composite 4: close supervision, and, in most
cases, formal enforcement action; composite 5: ongoing supervisory attention).
44. See, e.g., PHILIP F. BARTHOLOMEW, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE COST OF FORBEARANCE
DURING THE THRIFT CRISIS 2 (1991) [hereinafter CBO, COST OF FORBEARANCE] (defining
forbearance as “the discretionary practice of not enforcing an existing rule”); Richard Scott
Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 317, 322 (1993) [hereinafter Carnell, Perverse Incentives] (defining
forbearance as “failing to take timely and appropriate action to reduce the risk an unhealthy
institution poses to the deposit insurance fund”).
45. See infra notes 203–11 and accompanying text (fuzzy boundary between regulation and
resolution), and notes 391–95 (prudential regulatory discretion as an ex post response tool to assist
failing firms).
46. See, e.g., FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES – LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISIS OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 46 (1997) [hereinafter
FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES] (describing discretion-based, case-by-case forbearance).
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financial institution,47 and informal regulatory practices or formal programs
applicable to a particular class of financial institutions.48 Regulatory forbearance perhaps reached its zenith during banking crises in the 1980s,
when large numbers of insolvent and marginally solvent banks were
permitted to remain open through regulatory agency forbearance
programs. 49 In addition to such regulatory forbearance policies, Congress
during the 1980s also established statutory forbearance programs to assist
struggling banks.50
In fairness, though the “forbearance” label is often used pejoratively,51
regulators sometimes opt not to exercise early intervention authority in the
case of troubled banks, reasoning in good faith that inaction is the wiser
policy. Regulators may choose forbearance, for example, on the theory that
a struggling bank’s problems are merely temporary, or that the bank’s
circumstances can be corrected with less intrusive and potentially disruptive
measures. 52 In 1986, for example, the OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC
jointly issued a policy statement outlining a capital forbearance policy to
“support basically sound, well-managed banks in weathering what is
expected to be a difficult but transitional period.”53
47. Regulators during the 1980s savings and loan and thrift crisis, for example, frequently used
formal forbearance agreements to encourage healthy banks to acquire insolvent banks without
concern that the merged insolvent bank would cause the acquirer to violate minimum capital
requirements. To expedite the processing of an enormous number of forbearance requests, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 1986 issued a public memorandum with guidance to
applicants, indicating circumstances under which such forbearance would, would not, or might be
granted. Memorandum from Francis M. Passarelli, Dir. of the Office of Examinations and
Supervision, Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., to Principal Supervisory Agents (March 7, 1986),
available at 1986 FHLBB Lexis 288.
48. See FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES, supra note 46, at 46–50 (describing broad-based
“class-of-bank” regulatory agency forbearance for savings and loans).
49. Id. at 46–47. See also, supra note 47 (describing extensive use of forbearance agreements
as incentives for healthy bank acquisitions of insolvent banks).
50. See, e.g., The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 404, 101
Stat. 552, 609 [hereinafter CEBA] (establishing forbearance policies for “troubled but wellmanaged and viable” thrift institutions).
51. See FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES, supra note 46, at 46 (“[F]orbearance has taken on
such pejorative connotations that various uses of the term need to be distinguished.”) For purposes
of this Article, the discussion of “forbearance” does not emphasize inaction resulting from
regulators’ unawareness of risk. In the recent crisis, for example, some innovative risk-spreading
mechanisms initially were very profitable. Regulators with insufficient information to assess these
risks had little reason to intervene with respect to high-risk, but profitable, entities in a growing
economy. For a brief description of this political economy-focused explanation for regulatory
inaction, see Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: DoddFrank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG.
151, 177–78 (2011).
52. See, e.g., Robert A. Eisenbeis & Paul M. Horvitz, The Role of Forbearance and its Costs
in Handling Troubled and Failed Depository Institutions, in REFORMING FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES: TOWARDS REBUILDING A SAFE AND MORE
EFFICIENT SYSTEM 49, 52 (George G. Kaufman, ed. 1994).
53. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, BANKING CIRCULAR BC-212, at 1–2 (1986), available at
1986 OCC CB Lexis 11 (referring to March 11, 1986 joint statement announcing forbearance
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On the other hand, bank regulators face numerous more “perverse”54
forces and incentives impeding full use of their supervision and
enforcement powers.55 First, by its nature, regulatory action is public and
manifest, whereas regulatory inaction is inconspicuous. As one
commentator notes, “when regulators get tough, the people who stand to
lose get incensed, while the people who stand to benefit hardly notice.”56
Thus, inaction is the natural response of regulators wishing to avoid
sparking public anger and criticism. A related factor is regulators’ fear that
enforcement intervention with respect to a struggling bank may be
construed as evidence of regulatory incompetence in implementing the bank
monitoring and enforcement rules designed to avoid problems in the first
place. 57 Regulators concerned about their reputation and career advancement also prefer not to be seen as having problems develop on their
watch. 58 Third, inaction creates no immediate government expense, thus
permitting regulators to put off economic pain and delay reporting
budgetary costs.59 Finally, regulators face pressures from powerful special
interests. Political science and economic public choice theories suggest that
policy for qualified agricultural and oil and gas banks). The OCC further noted its belief that
“most have sound prospects for the future . . . [and that] these banks retain substantial strength.”
Id. 4. The program was later extended to any bank if it “demonstrated that its difficulties [were]
primarily attributed to economic problems beyond the control of management.” OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER, BANKING CIRCULAR BC-212 SUPP. #2, at 7 (1987), available at 1987 OCC CB
Lexis 6.
54. See, e.g., Carnell, Perverse Incentives, supra note 44, at 319.
55. GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF BANK
BAILOUTS 52–56 (2004) [hereinafter STERN & FELDMAN] (discussing fear of running afoul of
powerful interest groups, desire to appear competent, and career reputation as incentives for
regulators to forbear). See also Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 13, at 1011–12 (describing the
“political economy of regulation,” in which “regulators face significant political and practical
challenges that undermine their efforts to discipline” large complex financial institutions).
56. Richard Scott Carnell, The Culture of Ad Hoc Discretion, in ASSESSING BANK REFORM:
FDICIA ONE YEAR LATER 113, 115 (George G. Kaufman & Robert E. Litan, eds. 1993)
[hereinafter Carnell, Culture of Discretion].
57. See generally Arnoud W. A. Boot & Anjan Thakor, Self-Interested Bank Regulation, 83
AM. ECON. REV. 206 (1993).
58. See, e.g., Restructuring of the Banking Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Financial Institutions Supervision and Insurance of the H. Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs 994, 102d Cong. 994 (1991) (prepared statement of Prof. Edward J. Kane, Ohio
State Univ.) (“It pays regulators to use their discretion to cover up emerging problems and put off
painful adjustments to someone else’s watch.”). See also Carnell, Culture of Discretion, supra
note 56, at 115 (“By confronting problems, regulators risk blame for causing them.”); STERN &
FELDMAN, supra note 55 (noting desire to appear competent and career reputation as incentives
for regulators to forbear).
59. Carnell, Perverse Incentives, supra note 44, at 322 (emphasizing desire to delay apparent
budget cost as incentive to forbear). Costs from failed banking institutions include insured
depositors’ claims against the federal deposit insurance fund. Since the insurance fund is
maintained by assessments against the insured banks themselves, these costs typically are not
borne by general taxpayers. In the event that the insurance fund is inadequate to cover claims,
however, Congress has indicated that insured depositor claims will be backed by the “full faith
and credit” of the U.S. government. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(a)(1)(B) (2006). In other words, costs may
ultimately be imposed upon general taxpayers. See also infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
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organized large special bank interests may successfully co-opt government
decision-makers in order to extract private benefits at the expense of the
diffuse, less organized public. 60 Professor Jonathan Macey argues that
“nowhere does the model appear to be more robust than as applied to
banking,”61 adding that “agency capture” by special interests is more likely
in circumstances that generally prevail in bank regulation, “where each
constituency has its own regulatory agency, which is not responsible to
other interests.”62
Not surprisingly, incentives interfering with early regulatory
intervention decisions are particularly acute with respect to threatened large,
interconnected banks failures.63 Early intervention for large banks is likely
to face much more powerful special interest opposition than similar
intervention with respect to smaller banks. Moreover, regulatory
enforcement actions against large banks receive much greater publicity,
involve many more interested parties, and, thus, theoretically pose greater
risk of contagious harm to the banking sector. 64 Given the high stakes
involved in making the wrong decision, regulators may err in favor of
allowing the failing bank’s operations to continue rather than opt for early
enforcement.
The 2007–2009 economic crisis provides some evidence of class-based
regulatory forbearance with respect to large banks. Based on an empirical
study of formal capital enforcement actions between 1993 and 2010,
60. Making a related point, Professor Anna Gelpern adds that “[r]egulated entities develop a
vested interest in forbearance, and lobby hard to keep it going: it becomes part of the business
model.” Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1075 (2009)
[hereinafter Gelpern].
61. Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1277,
1278 (1989) [hereinafter Macey]. See also Joseph A. Grundfest, Lobbying in Limbo: The Political
Ecology of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 25, 28–29 (1990) (describing
U.S. League of Savings Institutions’ powerful 1980s influence, arguing that “it would be hard to
find a better example of the ‘capture’ hypothesis than the relationship that existed between the
League and the FHLBB, the agency responsible for regulating the S&L industry”) (footnote
omitted).
62. Macey, supra note 61, at 1285. Macey cites the Federal Reserve as an exception because it
is responsible not only for regulating bank holding companies and state banks, but also for
monetary policy. Id.
63. Similarly acute pressure to forbear may arise when multiple smaller banks face severe
threats at the same time. Most failing banks during the 1980s S&L crisis, for example, were
relatively small. At that time, forbearance pressures stemmed not from the size of the struggling
banks, but from the tremendous number of simultaneously threatened banks.
64. Some argue that such fears of contagion can be exaggerated. According to one report, for
example,
[a]fter-the-fact analysis of financial records indicates that the failure of Continental
Illinois [which received federal assistance in 1984] would not have wiped out the entire
financial capital of any respondent banks (that is, banks that used Continental Illinois to
manage their short-term funding and other operations) and therefore would not have led
many of them to fail.
STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 55, at 48.
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Professor Julie Anderson Hill found “a near-complete absence of formal
capital enforcement actions issued to the largest banks” despite an
otherwise sharp increase in the overall number of such actions. 65 One
possible explanation for the lack of enforcement action against large banks
may be simply that such banks were healthier. Given economic
circumstances at the time, however, this explanation does not hold up.
FDIC Chair, Sheila Bair, noted in May 2009 that “[o]ver the last 18 months,
large banks, as a group, have posed much greater risks to the banking
system than small banks have.” 66 Regulators began hundreds of enforcement proceedings against smaller banks, but no action was taken against
Bank of America and Citigroup, two of the nineteen largest banks, even
though they were on the brink of failure.67 Neither was any formal capital
enforcement action taken against Washington Mutual, the sixth-largest bank
measured by domestic deposits, before it ultimately failed.68
In any particular instance, it can be difficult to assess whether
forbearance is a wise regulatory action or a perverse response to outside
pressures and incentives. As Professor Anna Gelpern aptly notes:
[F]orbearance can work both as a crisis response measure and as a means
of denial. In the first instance, it creates a breathing space for other
response measures. In the second, it serves as cover for channeling scarce
resources to the regulated entities and their creditors. The difference
between the two uses of forbearance is often hard to tell and politically
determined.69

Whether regulators typically exercise forbearance with respect to
troubled banks because of perverse incentives, or based upon good faith
reasoning that inaction is the more appropriate course, data on the
effectiveness of forbearance policies in limiting ultimate losses to the

65. Hill supra note 36, at 648. Professor Hill notes that her findings are consistent with an
earlier study finding no PCA actions issued to major banks between 1993 and 2001. Id. at 666
n.154 (citing Phillip A. Wellons, Enforcement of Risk-Based Capital Rules, in CAPITAL
ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING, SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 284 (Hal S. Scott ed.
2005)).
66. Binyamin Appelbaum, Big Banks to Pay Larger Share of FDIC Levy Fees to Replenish
Fund Altered After Protest by Small Institutions, WASH. POST, May 23, 2009, at A13 (quoting
FDIC Chair, Sheila C. Bair).
67. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Bigto-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 744 (2010) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Reforming
Financial Regulation] (noting “non-enforcement” confidential memoranda of understanding
between regulators and Bank of America and Citigroup, but hundreds of actions against smaller
banks); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform That Could Solve the TooBig-to-Fail Problem and Align U.S. and U.K. Financial Regulation of Financial Conglomerates,
31 BANK & FINAN. SERVICES POL. REP. 1, 3 (2012) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Narrow Banks]
(noting “white glove treatment,” and no PCA actions, for the largest banks, but many PCA actions
and failures among smaller banks).
68. See discussion in Hill, supra note 36, at 690–92.
69. Gelpern, supra note 60, at 1075.

306

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

deposit insurance fund is not uniformly promising.70 Absent early intervention, circumstances at troubled banks often deteriorate, and many of them
ultimately fail. When regulators opt for forbearance rather than early
intervention, they may later face far more serious system-wide harm in the
event that the institutions ultimately collapse.71 By opting for inaction in
such cases, regulators ultimately lose the flexibility to tailor more specific
supervision and enforcement actions based upon a continuum of risk.
Instead, bank regulators later confronted with potentially imminent systemwide threats face a more difficult binary choice: bank receivership and
ultimate liquidation vs. emergency rescue or bailout.
ii) “Discount Window” Lending Parallels to Agency
Forbearance
The same forces and incentives that induce regulatory forbearance may
also prompt regulators to take affirmative steps to assist the continued
operation of failing banks.72 One such option is the extension of government loans through the “discount window,” a Federal Reserve Bank facility
authorized to make loans to eligible institutions. 73 The traditional policy
explanation for bank access to rapid, short-term Federal Reserve loans was
to bolster depositor confidence that account funds would be available for
withdrawal even if cash reserves were short, thus avoiding panic and
preventing bank runs. 74 In other words, the discount window’s general
function is to address temporary liquidity crises, not insolvency crises. In
addition to extending short-term—typically overnight—loans, the Federal
Reserve has also historically served as lender of last resort for banks

70. See, e.g., Emile J. Brinkman, Paul M. Horvitz &Ying-Lin Huang, Forbearance: An
Empirical Analysis, 10 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 27, 27 (1996).
71. See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text for discussion of deposit insurance claims,
and potential costs imposed upon general revenues.
72. This discussion, which focuses on the regulatory response, does not address provisions
allowing regulators to provide “open-bank assistance” as part of their resolution authority. These
are discussed at infra notes 232–39 and accompanying text.
73. See 12 U.S.C. § 347b (2006) (advances to member banks); id. § 347c (advances to
individuals, partnerships, corporations). See also PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 27, at
46–49 (describing three primary types of discount window lending: primary credit, secondary
credit, and seasonal credit). The discount window also complements monetary policy tools used to
regulate the supply and demand for funds. For a general discussion of Federal Reserve monetary
policy tools, see MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30354, MONETARY POLICY AND
THE FEDERAL RESERVE: CURRENT POLICY AND CONDITIONS (2010) [hereinafter LABONTE,
MONETARY POLICY]. For a general history of the Federal Reserve’s lending function, see
HOWARD H. HACKLEY, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., LENDING FUNCTIONS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS: A HISTORY (1973).
74. See, e.g., GEORGE G. KAUFMAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, LENDER OF LAST
RESORT: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 2–5 (1990), available at http://dallasfed.org/assets
/documents/research/papers/1990/wp9008.pdf (noting that the central bank “should lend freely to
curb short-run liquidity problems that are independent of underlying equilibrium solvency
problems” (emphasis added)).
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experiencing longer-term, but still temporary, economic difficulties. 75
Finally, though it had not invoked this emergency authority until the most
recent economic crisis, 76 the Federal Reserve has been authorized since
1932 to make loans to non-member individuals, partnerships, and
corporations under “unusual and exigent circumstances.”77
Modern central banks—the Federal Reserve included—generally
approach their “lender of last resort” functions according to principles
developed in a famous late-nineteenth-century banking treatise by Walter
Bagehot.78 Bagehot argued that central banks should only make fully collateralized penalty-rate government loans, which would then be used as a last
resort only by generally sound businesses unable to obtain quick access to
regular rate loans in the private market. Insistence on a solvent debtor
offered reasonable assurance that the loan would be repaid, and confidence
that the government would not be wasting resources on a private entity
likely to collapse in any event. In addition, the logic was that penalty rates
would reduce incentives for borrowers to engage in high-risk behavior—
often referred to as moral hazard—that might otherwise accompany a
below-market rate loan.
Consistent with these principles, the Federal Reserve’s discount
window historically has provided primarily short-term, overnight loans to
solvent banks. 79 Before the 1970s, the discount window had not been a
source of ongoing funds for troubled banks.80 Researchers have uncovered
75. PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 27, at 45.
76. See, e.g., An Examination of the Extraordinary Efforts by the Federal Reserve Bank to
Provide Liquidity in the Current Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial
Servs., 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., on the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented use of emergency powers).
77. Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-302, § 210, 47 Stat. 709,
7115 (1932) (adding § 13(3) to the Federal Reserve Act of 1913) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 343 (2006)) (“In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Federal Reserve [Board] . . .
may authorize any Federal reserve bank . . . to discount for any individual, partnership, or
corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange . . . [p]rovided, [t]hat . . . the Federal reserve bank
[obtains] evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate
credit accommodations from other banking institutions.” (emphasis added) (prior to amendment
by Dodd-Frank)). Dodd-Frank replaced the statutory language limiting use of this emergency
power to assist an “individual, partnership, or corporation” with substitute language now limiting
its use to a “participant in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility.” Dodd-Frank Act
§ 1101(a)(2)–(5), 124 Stat. 2113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343(A)). This change is an attempt to
hold the Federal Reserve more closely to its monetary policy functions; the Federal Reserve can
no longer use its emergency power “for the purpose of assisting a single and specific company
avoid bankruptcy.” Id. § 1101(a)(6)(iii).
78. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 26–36
(1897). See also MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 1867–1960 395 (1963) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ] (referring to
Bagehot’s Lombard Street as “the locus classicus of central bank policy”).
79. Michael D. Bordo, The Lender of Last Resort: Some Historical Insights 23 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3011, 1989).
80. FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 269 (noting Federal Reserve’s tradition against
continuous borrowing). See also Anna J. Schwartz, The Misuse of the Fed’s Discount Window, 74
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evidence of several prolonged periods since the 1970s and 1980s, however,
during which the Federal Reserve “contravened the ancient injunction to
lend only to illiquid banks, not to insolvent ones.” 81 Based on Federal
Reserve discount window lending data from 1985 through 1991, a House
Banking Committee staff analysis reported:
1.

90% of all institutions which received “extended” credit subsequently
failed.

2.

The Federal Reserve routinely extends credit to institutions with a
CAMEL 5 [the lowest] rating.

3.

A CAMEL 5 rated institution which borrowed from the discount
window remained open for an average period of 10 - 12 months.

4.

Borrowing from the discount window increases dramatically as an
institution’s financial condition deteriorates.82

The Federal Reserve also used its discount window for the first time in
more than seventy years to lend to both banks and nonbanks during the
2007–2009 crisis. 83 Many of these loans were arguably designed not as
deliberate measures to maintain failing banks, but instead to inject general
liquidity into financial markets as an exercise of the Federal Reserve’s
monetary policy.84 Although many of these loans had much longer dates to
FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., 58, 60 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz, Discount Window]
(citing Federal Reserve general principle reflected in Regulation A: “Federal Reserve credit is not
a substitute for capital and ordinarily is not available for extended periods”).
81. See, e.g., Schwartz, Discount Window, supra note 80, at 58. For a description of the most
notable instances of discount window lending during this period, see FDIC, AN EXAMINATION OF
THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND 1990S 243–44 (1997), available at http://www.fdic.gov
/bank/historical/history/vol1.html (reporting $3.6 loan from the discount window to Continental
Illinois in 1984). See also JOAN EDELMAN SPERO, THE FAILURE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL
BANK: CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM 47, 124–25 (1980) (describing
emergency use of Federal Reserve discount window in 1973 to rescue Franklin National Bank).
82. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, AN ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL RESERVE DISCOUNT WINDOW LOANS TO FAILED INSTITUTIONS 2 (Jun. 11, 1991). See
also Schwartz, Discount Window, supra note 80, at 59 (concluding based on Federal Reserve data
from the same period that “[a]t the time of [their ultimate] failure, 60 percent of [the banks
receiving Federal Reserve loans] had outstanding discount window loans”).
83. See MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FINANCIAL TURMOIL: FEDERAL RESERVE
POLICY RESPONSES, RL 34427 1 (2010) [hereinafter LABONTE FINANCIAL TURMOIL] (programs
“marked the first time in more than 70 years that the Fed had lent to non-members”); id. at 5–15
(describing unprecedented new lending programs and borrowers); id. at 32 ($1.4 billion increase
in Federal Reserve balance sheet from 2007–2009 crisis-related programs). See also Block,
Measuring Bailout Cost, supra note 8, at 152; Wilmarth, Narrow Banks, supra note 67, at 5–6
(reporting that “total amount of Fed emergency credit reached a single-day peak of $1.2 trillion in
December 2008. The Fed extended the vast majority of this emergency credit to large U.S. and
European banks and provided very little help to smaller institutions”).
84. See LABONTE, MONETARY POLICY, supra note 73, at 6–7. But see Jeffrey Manns, Building
Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1380–81
(2011) (“[E]xpansion of the Federal Reserve’s lending window into a de facto bailout fund during
the early stages of the crisis placed the Federal Reserve in the contradictory position of propping
up the financial institutions that it was supposed to regulate.”).
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maturity than traditional overnight discount window loans,85 they were not
meant to be long-term or continuing,86 and the Federal Reserve claims that
nearly all have been repaid.87 All the same, until details were released by
court order after a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit brought by
Bloomberg News,88 public information about the Federal Reserve’s 2007–
2009 emergency discount window lending was limited to aggregate
numbers; specific loan amounts and the identity of borrowers and
counterparties were kept secret. Released details now show that, contrary to
general discount window lending practices, numerous loans were made to
seriously troubled banks. By one report, for example, “Washington Mutual,
which was on the verge of collapse in September 2008, borrowed $2 billion
for several consecutive days before being taken over by J.P. Morgan Chase.
IndyMac, another mortgage lender, borrowed $500 million just before
regulators seized it in July 2008.”89
The impact of prolonged discount window support to insolvent or
otherwise troubled banks can be much the same as regulatory forbearance.90
In other words, government assistance to facilitate a failing institution’s
continued operations risks simply postponing the institution’s failure, thus
potentially increasing significant losses to deposit insurance funds, and
potentially creating losses to general federal revenues upon the institution’s
ultimate failure.91
c. Efforts to Limit Regulatory Forbearance: Prompt
Corrective Action (PCA)
Particularly during the 1980s and 1990s, a “culture of ad hoc
discretion” 92 to forbear allowed bank conditions to worsen, resulting in
extraordinary losses to the federal deposit insurance fund and to general

85. See Block, Measuring Bailout Cost, supra note 8, at 177 n.117.
86. Federal Reserve Chair Bernanke also stressed that most of the Bank’s direct loans were
over-collateralized and made with recourse to the borrower’s other assets in the event of
nonpayment. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., The Crisis and the Policy Response,
Speech at the Stamp Lecture London School of Economics (Jan. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm.
87. Letter from Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., to the Hon. Tim Johnson,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Dec. 6, 2011).
88. Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 601 F. 3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C.
v. Bloomberg, L.P., 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011).
89. Neil Irwin, Files Shed Light on Fed Lending Activity, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2011, at A12.
90. See supra notes 72–91 and accompanying text and infra notes 125–26 and accompanying
text.
91. Schwartz, Discount Window, supra note 80, at 66 (“Since 1985, prolonged discount
window assistance has generally terminated not with restructuring but with closure of the
insolvent banks. When banks are known to be insolvent, postponement of recognition of losses
that have occurred might well have increased current losses.”).
92. Carnell, Culture of Discretion, supra note 56, at 113.
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revenues when many of the insolvent banks ultimately failed.93 When the
federal deposit insurance fund proved insufficient to cover insured
depositor claims, Congress not only appropriated additional funds to cover
all insured deposits,94 but also funded bank rescues, thus protecting uninsured depositors and creditors.95 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
subsequently estimated that this regulatory policy of “forbearance may have
doubled the cost of the thrift bailout.”96
As it does so often in the aftermath of financial crisis, 97 Congress
reacted to the late 1980s savings and loan disaster with reforms
supplementing traditional prudential regulatory bank rules with new
“prompt corrective action” (PCA) requirements designed to limit agency
discretion to forbear, and to mandate certain early intervention measures.
With the PCA regime, Congress hoped to ensure more rapid and aggressive
intervention by regulators with respect to troubled banks before they
became insolvent, and to protect the federal deposit insurance fund and
general revenues against costs resulting from regulatory forbearance. 98
Consistent with principles of progressively more stringent supervision and
enforcement based on an increasing risk continuum, the PCA framework

93. OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, FDIC, DEP’T OF THE TREAS., & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, EVAL-11-006, OIC-CA-11-008, FRB OIG 2011-05, EVALUATION
OF PROMPT REGULATORY ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 10 (2011) [hereinafter INSPECTOR
GENERAL REPORT]. See also GAO, PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION, supra note 38, at 1 (referring
to critique of federal regulators for “failing to take timely and forceful action to address the causes
of bank failures and prevent losses to taxpayers and the deposit insurance fund” as motivating
Congress to enact 1991 legislation); H.R. REP. NO. 101-54, pt. 1, at 94 (1989) (identifying
“regulatory and statutory accounting gimmicks” as facilitating program of forbearance and
contributing to S&L crisis); CBO, COST OF FORBEARANCE supra note 44, at 3 (“Forbearance . . .
set the stage for rampant investment speculation and fraudulent practices, all of which added to
the ultimate cost of resolving the thrift crisis.”).
94. Although deposit insurance claims are not formally guaranteed by the government, a
statutory “sense of Congress” declares that “deposits up to the statutorily prescribed amount in
federally insured depository institutions are backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States.” CEBA, supra note 50, at 657. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1828(a)(1)(B).
95. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 10173, § 219(d), 103 Stat. 183, 263 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1825(d)).
96. CBO, COST OF FORBEARANCE, supra note 44, at 1 (estimating doubled resolution costs
from $66 to $127 billion).
97. For similar observations about reactive legislation in response to economic crisis, see
Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010); Erik K.
Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38
CONN. L. REV. 393, 418 (2006).
98. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, sec. 131,
§ 38(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2253 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o) [hereinafter FDICIA]. In addition to
these new prudential regulation-focused PCA rules, the FDICIA also added new “least-cost
resolution” (LCR) rules, addressing similar issues from the resolution perspective. Id. (declaring
legislative purpose “to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions at the least possible
long-term loss to the deposit insurance fund”). For discussion of LCR rules, see infra notes 249–
63 and accompanying text.
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places banks into five categories, ranging from strongest to weakest,99 and
increases discretionary and mandatory agency actions to be taken by
regulators as banks fall into progressively weaker categories.
Two key features distinguish PCA requirements from the discretionary
progressive risk-based tools previously available to regulators. First, in
order to limit regulators’ discretion to forbear, the PCA framework
automatically triggers specified bank activity restrictions. Beginning sixty
days after being classified as “critically undercapitalized,” for example, an
insured depository institution is prohibited from making any payment
of principal or interest on the institution’s subordinated debt.100 The PCA
framework also triggers mandatory regulatory enforcement measures. Bank
regulators, for example, are required to “appoint a receiver (or, with the
concurrence of the [FDIC], a conservator)” within ninety days of a
“critically undercapitalized” bank classification.101
Second, in contrast to the multi-factor risk assessment used for regular
bank examination and regulation,102 the PCA classification framework focuses almost exclusively upon risk measures related to adequacy of the
regulated institution’s capital.103 The problem with this emphasis on capital
adequacy is that capital tends to lag behind other early warning indicators of
potential bank problems.104 Given evidence that other leading indicators of
bank health—such as asset quality and liquidity—are far better early
indicators of bank distress, PCA’s reliance on capital adequacy as a

99. For PCA purposes, banks are classified as: (1) well capitalized; (2) adequately capitalized;
(3) undercapitalized; (4) significantly undercapitalized; or (5) critically undercapitalized. FDICIA
§ 131(a), 105 Stat. 2253 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b)(1)(A)–(E)) (adding new § 38(b)(1)(A)–
(E) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act). These capital-based classifications are distinct from the
broader uniform rating standards used by regulators in connection with general bank supervision
and enforcement. See supra notes 34–43 and accompanying text.
100. FDICIA § 131(a), 105 Stat. 2253 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(2)(A)) (adding new
§ 38(h)(2)(A) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).
101. Id. § 38(h)(3)(i).
102. See supra text accompanying note 41 (describing six-component CAMELS rating system).
103. FDICIA § 131(a), 105 Stat. 2253 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(c)) (adding new § 38(c)
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, identifying relevant capital standards). See supra note 99
(listing categories). Although the Act also initially required agencies to adopt standards for criteria
other than capital, non-capital standards were later made discretionary by the Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160.
104. See, e.g., David S. Jones & Kathleen Kuester King, The Implementation of Prompt
Corrective Action: An Assessment, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 491, 493 (1995) (finding PCA riskbased capital ratio a poor indicator for troubled banks and that “even if the current PCA
framework had been in place, corrective actions by supervisors still would have been largely
discretionary”); Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, The Use of Capital Ratios to Trigger Intervention
in Problem Banks: Too Little, Too Late, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 49, 57 (1996)
(“Reported capital ratios are lagging indicators of bank health, in part because some banks have
not fully reflected likely future losses in their loan loss reserve.”); id. at 51 (“Because capital is a
lagging indicator and examiners utilize information beyond capital ratios when taking supervisory
action, the PCA triggers rarely identify problem institutions before examiners.”).
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measure of bank health seems unfortunately misplaced.105 As noted by one
GAO report: “once a bank’s capital has deteriorated to the undercapitalized
level, it may be too late for the bank to recover.”106
Given relatively healthy financial conditions that prevailed for over a
decade after its creation, the PCA framework’s effectiveness had not been
tested prior to the Great Recession. When PCA was finally tested in 2007–
2009, a congressionally-mandated report 107 found that “[u]se of the . . .
PCA mechanism as an enforcement tool was . . . inconsistent,”108 that the
PCA did not prevent or minimize loss to the deposit insurance fund,109 and
that “[t]he vast majority of banks that underwent the PCA process from
2006 through the third quarter of 2010 had not returned to a condition of
financial stability by the end of this period.”110 One explanation for the PCA
framework’s failure to significantly reduce regulators’ exercise of discretion
to forbear is that many of the so-called “mandatory” provisions included in
the PCA framework include exceptions. Even the “mandatory” appointment
of a receiver for critically undercapitalized institutions, for example, is
subject to an exception allowing regulators to “take such other action as the
agency determines to be appropriate in lieu of such appointment.”111 As a
practical matter, such exceptions effectively convert so-called “mandatory”
rules into mere “presumptive safeguards,”112 leaving regulators with continued discretion to engage in regulatory forbearance. Even when regulators
apply PCA rules as intended, another reason for the framework’s limited
effectiveness is that by the time PCA mandatory agency actions are

105. The PCA framework’s overemphasis on capital adequacy might be explained in light of its
particular history. In passing the PCA provisions, Congress was more concerned with curbing
regulatory forbearance and preserving the solvency of the federal deposit insurance fund than it
was with systemic risk.
106. GAO, PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION, supra note 38, at 23. The report further concludes
that PCA’s exclusive focus on capital adequacy “does not take full advantage of early warning
signs of bank distress that other financial indicators . . . can provide.” Id.
107. Dodd-Frank Act § 202(g)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 1449 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382(g)(2)(A))
(requiring Comptroller General to study “effectiveness of implementation of prompt corrective
action by the appropriate Federal banking agencies”).
108. GAO, PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION, supra note 38, at 34. See also Kenneth Ayotte &
David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 472–73 (2010) (suggesting that
regulators routinely suspended PCA rules when systemically important companies stumbled). But
cf. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, supra note 93, at 20 (finding that regulators generally
implemented PCA provisions as required).
109. GAO, PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION, supra note 38, at 19.
110. Id. at 17.
111. FDICIA § 131(a), 105 Stat. 2253 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(3)(C)(ii)) (adding new
§ 38(h)(3)(C)(ii)).
112. See Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote To Perverse Incentives: The FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991, ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 342 (1993) [hereinafter Carnell, Partial
Antidote] (using the term “presumptive safeguards” to refer to “provisions that couple a
mandatory rule with some regulatory authority to make exceptions”). See also Carnell, Culture of
Discretion, supra note 56, at 116 (describing PCA limits on agency forbearance as “hardly
draconian,” and noting that “[o]nly a few of the rules allow no exceptions”).
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triggered by capital-based measures of bank weakness, the troubled bank’s
condition may be so severe that it cannot be saved.113
In sum, regulators for many reasons face strong incentives to delay
enforcement action with respect to large, interconnected banks. 114 Thus,
regulators may not even exercise their existing authority to impose
increasingly stringent prudential standards based on an increasing risk
continuum. In the end, the PCA framework has failed to fulfill its promise
of ensuring early regulatory intervention.115 As subpart B below illustrates,
similar dynamics prevail with respect to nonbank financial institutions.
And, as I will argue, Dodd-Frank reforms have done little to change these
dynamics.116
B. PRUDENTIAL NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTION REGULATORY
LANDSCAPE BEFORE DODD-FRANK
1. Limited Early Intervention Provisions for Nonbank
Financial Companies
As established in the preceding sections of this Article, bank regulators
at least theoretically apply progressively stricter regulatory enforcement
measures as bank health deteriorates. In principle, implementation of this
risk-based prudential regulatory regime should have the effect of reducing
systemic risk. Prior to Dodd-Frank, however, federal regulators had little or
no guidance or authority to address increasing systemic risks posed by
various nonbank financial institutions. Given no explicit authority,117 or, at
best, limited and uncertain authority, regulators confronted with potential
system-wide harms from the imminent collapse of major nonbank financial
institutions during the 2007–2009 crisis were left to develop ad hoc,
emergency responses. 118 The Federal Reserve in 2008, for example, invoked emergency authority not used since the Great Depression to broker
113. See supra text accompanying notes 102–110, particularly supra note 104.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 44–71.
115. Moreover, evidence from the 2007–2009 crisis suggests that—despite PCA mandates—
regulators sometimes choose not to implement PCA enforcement actions against the nation’s
largest banks in times of significant financial distress. See supra text accompanying notes 107–10.
116. See infra notes 158–59, 183–84, and 286–89 and accompanying text.
117. Certain 2008–2009 Federal Reserve and FDIC actions to assist struggling firms arguably
were outside the scope of even their emergency authority. See, e.g., Alexander Mehra, Legal
Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis,
13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221 (2010); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-100, FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE ACT: REGULATORS’ USE OF SYSTEMIC RISK EXCEPTION RAISES MORAL
HAZARD CONCERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO CLARIFY THE PROVISION 43–60 (2010)
[hereinafter GAO, SYSTEMIC RISK] (analysis of legal authority for FDIC emergency actions).
118. TREAS. REFORM REPORT, supra note 16, at 76 (noting that “the federal government’s
responses to impending bankruptcies . . . were complicated by the lack of a statutory framework
for avoiding the disorderly failure of nonbank financial firms”). See also Steven M. Davidoff &
David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009).
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and facilitate J.P. Morgan’s acquisition of investment bank Bear Stearns
after concluding that the latter’s “disorderly failure . . . would [threaten]
overall financial stability and would most likely have significant adverse
implications for the U.S. economy.”119 If Bear Stearns had been a commercial bank, 120 regulators would have had greater supervisory oversight,
authority to take “prompt corrective action” when financial problems
became apparent, clearer rules about which agency was responsible, and a
more clearly defined range of authorized resolution options.121 Shortly after
the Bear Stearns rescue, the imminent collapse of insurance giant American
International Group (AIG) posed similar potentially system-wide economic
harm. In the absence of regulatory authority over insurance companies,122
the Federal Reserve again developed an ad hoc plan to rescue yet another

119. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS 50 (2009). J.P. Morgan agreed to the acquisition only after receiving a $29 billion nonrecourse Federal Reserve loan, the practical effect of which was the federal government’s
guarantee to absorb $29 billion of losses on Bear Stearns’ riskiest assets. For a description of
negotiations and final terms of the Bear Stearns acquisition, see GARY SHORTER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL34420, BEAR STEARNS: CRISIS AND “RESCUE” FOR A MAJOR PROVIDER OF
MORTGAGE-RELATED PRODUCTS 3–7 (2008) [hereinafter SHORTER, BEAR STEARNS].
120. The Bear Stearns investment bank owned numerous broker-dealer subsidiaries. Although
broker-dealers were then subject to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight, there
was no regulation requiring or authorizing SEC oversight of investment banks. Bear Stearns had
elected to participate in the SEC’s voluntary “Consolidated Supervised Entities” (CSE) program,
however. See Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: Examining the Regulation of Investment Banks
by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities
and Insurance and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th
Cong. (2008) (testimony of Erik Sirri, Dir., Div. of Trading and Markets, SEC) (analysis of the
CSE program and Bear Stearns). In any event, even though SEC oversight rules include capital
adequacy standards, they differ from bank regulation and enforcement rules applicable to banks.
121. See, e.g., Risk Management and Its Implications for Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Securities and Insurance and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 26 (2008) (testimony of Professor Richard J. Herring) [hereinafter
Herring] (“If Bear had been a bank, the Fed, working with the FDIC, actually would have had a
highly appropriate tool for dealing with the problem.”) See also id. (“[W]ith the hastily
improvised bailout of Bear Stearns, it seems to me the Fed crossed a regulatory Rubicon without
the right weapons.”).
122. Congress declared in 1945 that regulation and taxation of insurance companies would be
governed by state law. Act of March 9, 1945, ch. 20, § 1, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (commonly known as
the McCarran-Ferguson Act) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1011). Adopting a policy sometimes
referred to as “reverse preemption,” the Act provided that federal law would not be construed “to
invalidate, impair, or supersede” state laws regulating insurance. Id. § 2 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012). Congress reiterated its commitment to state regulation of insurance in the Gramm-LeachBliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, tit. I, § 104, 113 Stat. 1352 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 6701) [hereinafter GLM Act] (declaring that McCarran-Ferguson Act “remains the law of the
United States”). Recent legislation provides limited new federal authority to monitor and regulate
insurance companies, including the creation of a Federal Insurance Office (FIO). Dodd-Frank Act
§ 502(a), 124 Stat. 1580 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 301). Despite these changes, the legislation
provides for “retention of existing state regulatory authority over the business of insurance.” Id.
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 313(k)).
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firm considered too-big-to-fail. 123 These ad hoc responses were later
supplemented with more systematic Treasury Department assistance
authority provided by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), enacted
as part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA).124
2. Discount Window as a Substitute or Supplement to
Forbearance
If regulators were powerless to take early intervention action as the
financial health of nonbank financial institutions deteriorated, perhaps it is
not surprising that regulators ultimately resorted to ad hoc emergency
actions requiring apparently binary choices: rescue or no rescue. One option
that was available during the recent crisis, however, was the Federal
Reserve’s authority to open its discount window to nonbank entities under
“unusual and exigent circumstances.” 125 Government lending to troubled
financial institutions permits them to remain afloat longer, often simply
delaying the institution’s inevitable collapse. In the end, the impact of such
discount window lending to nonbanks is similar to the discount window
lending impact discussed earlier with respect to banks.126 Additional losses
incurred during the failing institutions’ prolonged lives prior to their
ultimate demise increase costs to the federal deposit insurance funds and
ultimately to general taxpayers.
C. DODD-FRANK’S REGULATORY RESPONSE TO SYSTEMIC RISK
1. General Response to Regulatory Weaknesses Exposed by
Crisis
Broadly considered, Dodd-Frank’s systemic risk-related provisions
respond to two general classes of financial regulatory system weakness
exposed by the Great Recession. First, and perhaps most significant, the

123. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT
ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 79–83 (2010) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT
PANEL, AIG RESCUE] (detailing emergency assistance AIG).
124. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. No. 110-343, tit. I
(Troubled Asset Relief Program), §§ 101–136, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767–3800 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5211–5241). EESA authorized the Treasury Department to purchase troubled assets with three
“tranches” of funding totaling $700 billion. Id. §§ 101(a), 115(a). Originally scheduled to expire
on December 31, 2009, TARP was extended through October 3, 2010, pursuant to EESA authority
granted to the Treasury Secretary. Id. § 120(b). Total TARP authority was subsequently reduced
by $1.24 billion to offset the costs of program changes. See Helping Families Save Their Homes
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 202(b), 123 Stat. 1632, 1643, and further reduced to $475
billion by the Dodd-Frank Act § 1302, 124 Stat. 2133 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5225(a)).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 83–89 on the Federal Reserve’s use of discount
window lending during the 2007–2009 economic crisis.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 72–91. Moreover, for both banks and nonbanks, the
potential increased losses during periods of extended discount window lending to insolvent
entities are similar to the increased losses incurred through delays from regulatory forbearance.
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2007–2009 economic crisis dramatically illustrated that the financial
regulatory system’s historic emphasis on monitoring, supervision, and
regulation of banks127 had not kept up with modern financial markets.128 As
financial product innovations and deregulation over time dramatically
altered the financial industry landscape, the U.S. regulatory structure did
not keep pace.129 To the extent that they have been regulated at all, U.S.
nonbank financial institutions have generally been assigned to a primary
regulator based upon entity classification or charter type. 130 At the same
time, financial institutions may be subject to supervision by multiple
different regulators based upon particular functions, resulting in regulatory
overlaps and duplication.131
127. Commercial and depository banks historically have been subject to substantially more
stringent regulation than other industries on the theory that banks are more sensitive than other
industries to systemic financial risks.
Given the overall importance of banks to the economy and the level of trust customers
place in banks, few people would be surprised to find that governmental regulation and
oversight extend to many aspects of banking. In fact, since banks first appeared in the
United States, banking has been treated as an industry having strong public policy
implications.
KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTS 2
(5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter SPONG]. See also Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, U.S.
Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: A Comparison and Evaluation, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
143, 145 (2007) [hereinafter Bliss & Kaufman] (explaining special bank insolvency rules in lieu
of regular bankruptcy as based on the notion that “any interruption in [banking] activities . . .
would have a more serious adverse impact on the economy of the insolvent bank’s market area
than any interruption in the operation of other insolvent firms”).
128. See, e.g., GAO, FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 24, at 48 (“The U.S. regulatory
system . . . put into place over the past 150 years . . . has not kept pace with the major
developments that have occurred in financial markets and products in recent decades.”). See also
MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34412, CONTAINING FINANCIAL CRISIS 21–22
(2008) (“No federal agency has direct supervisory authority over hedge funds, nonbank lenders,
over-the-counter derivatives trading, private equity funds, all of which demand liquidity and can
become the trigger for systemic instability.”). Some of the then-existing gaps have been closed
with recent legislation. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, tit. IV, 124 Stat. 1570–80 (“Regulation of
Advisors to Hedge Funds and Others”); id. § 619, 124 Stat. 1620 (codified at 12 U.S.C § 1851)
(“Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private
Equity Funds”); id. tit. VII, subtit. A, 124 Stat. 1641–1754 (“Regulation of Over-the-Counter
Swaps Markets”).
129. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61, FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY
CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 6 (2004) [hereinafter
GAO, REGULATORY STRUCTURE].
130. For example, depository and commercial banks are regulated by a number of different
federal and state agencies, securities markets and broker-dealers by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), futures markets by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
and insurance companies by the states. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A
MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 3172 (2008) [hereinafter TREASURY 2008
BLUEPRINT] (providing a description of the respective roles of various regulatory entities).
131. TREASURY 2008 BLUEPRINT, supra note 130, at 5. See also GAO, REGULATORY
STRUCTURE, supra note 129, at 10 (“[C]ompetition among supervisory authorities poses the risk
that financial firms may well engage in a form of regulatory arbitrage that involves the placement
of particular financial services or products in that part of the financial conglomerate in which
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Second, the Great Recession revealed the limitations of a prudential
regulatory regime focused primarily on individual institutions with
insufficient consideration of systemic risks. 132 Prudential bank regulation
has traditionally emphasized “safety and soundness” rules, whose primary
object is to “ensure the safe and sound practices and operations
of individual banking institutions through regulation, supervision,
and examination.”133 The result was a micro-prudential regulatory structure
whose “field of vision” focused on “the financial conditions of individual
institutions in isolation.”134 Despite the operationally firm-specific nature of
micro-prudential financial standards, regulators historically were confident
that firm-specific rules worked simultaneously to address potential systemic
risk concerns, reasoning that they “make the system as a whole safe by
simply trying to make sure that individual banks are safe.” 135 In other
words, general financial stability was thought to flow from the collective
economic health of individual financial institutions.
2. Dodd-Frank’s Regulatory Response to Systemic Risk:
Commercial Banks
While Dodd-Frank focuses most of its systemic risk-based attention on
expanded monitoring, supervision, and enforcement authority with respect
to nonbank financial companies and BHCs, it also includes provisions
applicable to regular commercial banks. For example, Dodd-Frank requires
appropriate federal banking agencies to establish “minimum leverage

supervisory oversight is the least intrusive.”); GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 32 (2008), available
at
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/The%20Structure%20of%20Financial%20Supervision
.pdf (describing the U.S. financial system as a complex “Functional Approach, with some
institutional elements”). Moreover, as the GAO and others noted, “no agency or mechanism ha[d]
the responsibility for monitoring risks that cut more broadly across functional areas. . . . No
agency ha[d] the responsibility for analyzing the risks to the financial system as a whole . . . .”
GAO, REGULATORY STRUCTURE, supra note 129, at 9. This concern has since been at least
partially addressed by Dodd-Frank’s creation of a new Financial Stability Oversight Council. See
infra text accompanying note 140.
132. See, e.g., Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential
Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (2011) [hereinafter A
Macroprudential Approach] (“[T]he regulatory framework in place prior to the global financial
crisis was deficient because it was largely ‘microprudential’ in nature.”); Beverly Hirtle, Til
Schuermann & Kevin Stiroh, Macroprudential Supervision of Financial Institutions: Lessons from
SCAP 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 409) (2009) (before the crisis, “many
believed that the microprudential objective of strong individual institutions was sufficient to
address what are now recognized as macroprudential goals related to financial stability”).
133. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-23, BANK OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE: U.S.
AND FOREIGN EXPERIENCE MAY OFFER LESSONS FOR MODERNIZING U.S. STRUCTURE 28 (1996)
[hereinafter GAO, BANK OVERSIGHT].
134. A Macroprudential Approach, supra note 132, at 4.
135. MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER, ANDREW CROCKET, CHARLES GOODHART, AVINASH D.
PERSAUD & HYUN SHIN, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION xv (2009).
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capital requirements” and “minimum risk-based capital requirements.” 136
Congress also responded to the demand for greater macro-prudential
regulation by directing federal banking agencies to “develop capital
requirements applicable to insured depository institutions . . . that address
the risks that the activities of such institutions pose, not only to the
institution engaging in the activity, but to other public and private
stakeholders in the event of adverse performance, disruption, or failure of
the institution or activity.”137 Perhaps the most obvious solution to systemic
risks presented by large, interconnected or TBTF institutions would be to
limit the growth of such institutions, or even to require the breakup of
existing large institutions. Dodd-Frank made modest moves in this direction
by expanding the scope of deposit cap rules imposed on mergers and
acquisitions involving FDIC-insured institutions,138 and authorizing federal
regulators to impose concentration limits with respect to mergers and
acquisitions involving financial companies.139
3. Dodd-Frank’s Regulatory Response to Systemic Risk:
Nonbank Financial Institutions and Bank Holding
Companies (BHCs)
a. Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and
Heightened Regulation for “Covered” Financial
Companies
At the heart of Dodd-Frank’s prudential regulatory response to
systemic risk was creation of an interagency Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) with authority and resources to actively monitor financial
markets, identify financial stability risks, designate certain financial entities
as “systemically important” for purposes of imposing enhanced supervision,
and make substantive recommendations for heightened prudential
standards.140
Dodd-Frank’s most expansive new systemic risk-related regulatory
authority directs the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to impose
enhanced supervision and early remediation requirements on large,
136. Dodd-Frank Act § 171(b)(1)(2), 124 Stat. 1435 (codified at 12 U.S.C § 5371).
137. Id. § 171(b)(7).
138. Id. § 623. But see Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 13, at 990–91 (noting loopholes left
open even after the new deposit cap rules).
139. Dodd-Frank Act § 622, 124 Stat. 1632 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1852). But see Wilmarth,
Dodd-Frank, supra note 13, at 991 (noting exceptions likely to weaken the effectiveness of new
concentration limits).
140. Dodd-Frank Act § 111(a), 124 Stat. 1392 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321) (establishing
FSOC); § 112, 124 Stat. 1394 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322) (FSOC purposes and duties);
§ 152(a), 124 Stat. 1413 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5342) (establishing Office of Financial Research
(OFR)); § 153(a), 124 Stat. 1415 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5343) (noting OFR purpose as
supporting FSOC). See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying text regarding FSOC designation of
“systemically important” or “covered companies” for enhanced regulation.

2012]

A Continuum Approach

319

interconnected financial entities, whose failures are thought to present
significant potential threats to national financial stability. 141 While the
Federal Reserve has substantial discretion with respect to design and
implementation, the “high-risk” financial institutions to which its enhanced
prudential regulations apply are explicitly limited by statute to include: (1)
bank holding companies (BHCs) with $50 billion or more of total
consolidated assets; 142 and (2) large, “interconnected financial institutions.”143 Although the Dodd-Frank Act itself does not adopt the term,144
nonbank financial companies designated by the FSOC for enhanced
supervision or early remediation are commonly referred to as “systemically
important financial institutions” or “SIFIs.” As noted in one recent Federal
Reserve discussion paper, “the term ‘SIFI’ is now so widely used in
discussions and analyses of the financial system that it has essentially taken
on a generic status.” 145 Consistent with terminology adopted in recently
proposed regulations, this Article collectively refers to large BHCs and
SIFIs governed by the new enhanced regulation and early remediation rules
either as “covered companies”146 or “systemically important” companies.
b. Enhanced Prudential Regulation and Early Remediation
Mandates: Progressive Risk Principles
Two key operational mandates form the heart of Dodd-Frank’s systemic
risk-related prudential financial regulation reforms with respect to “covered

141. Id. § 165; id. § 166.
142. Id. § 165(a)(1). Dodd-Frank explicitly defines a BHC as having the same meaning as in § 2
of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Id. §§ 2(18)(B)(i), 102(a)(1) (both sections referring
to BHC definition in 12 U.S.C. § 1841). See infra text accompanying notes 166–75 (discussing
covered BHCs).
143. In addition to the enhanced supervision and early remediation mandates, separate DoddFrank provisions direct the Federal Reserve to prescribe risk management standards applicable to
designated “systemically important financial market utilities” (SIFMUs). See, e.g., Dodd-Frank
Act § 805, 124 Stat. 1809 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5464). Although Title VIII, “Payment,
Clearing, and Settlement Supervision,” also addresses systemic risk, its specific emphasis is the
“safety and efficiency” of clearing and settling payment arrangements, which are so critical to the
proper functioning of financial markets. Id. § 802(a)(1). These Title VIII payment system
provisions are beyond the scope of this Article.
144. See Dodd-Frank Act § 165, 124 Stat. 1423 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365) (using the term
“large, interconnected financial institutions”). See also id. § 805 (using the term “systemically
important financial market utilities”).
145. Daniel E. Nolle, U.S. Domestic and International Financial Reform Policy: Are G20
Commitments and the Dodd-Frank Act in Sync?, 2 n.4 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
International Finance Discussion Papers No. 1024, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve
.gov/pubs/ifdp/2011/1024/ifdp1024.pdf. See also, Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra 13, at 994
(“Dodd-Frank does not use the term ‘systemically important financial institution’ to describe a
nonbank financial company that is subject to the statute’s systemic risk regime, but I will
generally refer to such companies as SIFIs.”).
146. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594 (Jan. 5, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 252), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20111220a1.pdf.
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companies.” First, “in order to prevent or mitigate risks to the financial
stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial
distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected financial
institutions,” § 165 requires the Federal Reserve to establish enhanced
supervision and prudential standards for covered companies.147 Second, “in
order to minimize the probability that the company will become insolvent
and the potential harm of such insolvency to the financial stability of the
United States,”148 § 166 directs the Federal Reserve to establish regulations
“to provide for the early remediation of financial distress” of such covered
companies.149
These two sections include numerous explicit statutory references
that reflect a continuum of risk approach.150 For example, § 165 directs the
Federal Reserve to establish prudential standards that are “more stringent”
for covered companies than for others,151 and that “increase in stringency”
based on risk considerations. 152 Similarly § 166 refers to a “series of
specific remedial actions to be taken by a nonbank financial company . . .
that is experiencing increasing financial distress.” 153 More specifically,
§ 166 calls for requirements “that increase in stringency as the financial
condition of the company declines,” including requirements applicable
during “initial stages” and other requirements applicable during “later
stages of decline.”154
Dodd-Frank’s § 166 early remediation (ER) provisions have some
parallels to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991’s PCA requirements.155 Both are designed to ensure regulatory inter147. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(a), 124 Stat. 1423 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365) (emphasis added).
148. Id. § 166(b) (emphasis added).
149. Id. § 166(a) (emphasis added) (requiring Federal Reserve to prescribe early remediation
regulations in consultation with the FSOC and FDIC). The Dodd-Frank early remediation (ER)
rules bear some similarities to the 1991 PCA provisions. See supra notes 97–115 and
accompanying text (discussion of PCA provisions), and infra notes 155–59 and accompanying
text (discussion of parallels).
150. Regardless of its particular level of risk or “systemic importance,” however, any institution
designated for regulation under the special “systemically important” regime is required to prepare
a “plan . . . for rapid and orderly resolution in the event of material financial distress or failure,”
Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d)(1), 12 Stat. 1432 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365), frequently referred to
as the “living will” requirement.
151. Id. § 165(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
152. Id. § 165(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added); § 165(b)(3) (listing considerations) (requiring Federal
Reserve to include capital requirements and leverage limits). See also Daniel K. Tarullo, Member,
Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Remarks at the Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ.: Regulating
Systemically Important Financial Firms 5 (June 3, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20110603a.htm [hereinafter Tarullo Remarks] (describing DoddFrank mandate to establish progressive standards that “‘increase in stringency’ with the systemic
footprint of the firm, though . . . giv[ing] the Federal Reserve Board discretion in deciding how to
realize this goal”).
153. Dodd-Frank Act § 166(b), 124 Stat. 1432 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5366) (emphasis added).
154. Id. § 166(c).
155. See supra notes 92–115 and accompanying text.
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vention early in the process of the financial institution’s apparent economic
decline. Such early action presumably increases the likelihood that remedial
measures will effectively prevent the institution’s failure. Quite unlike the
PCA provisions, which limit regulator discretion by mandating specific
actions with respect to banks that fall within statutorily defined
risk categories,156 Dodd-Frank’s ER provisions merely require the Federal
Reserve Board, in consultation with the FSOC and FDIC, to “define
measures of the financial condition of the company,” and “establish
requirements that increase in stringency as the financial condition of the
company declines.” 157 These broad, and relatively vague, statutory directives offer minimal guidance regarding what these increasingly stringent
early remediation requirements should include, thus leaving regulators with
extraordinary discretion.158
Given that the PCA framework’s mandatory early intervention
provisions did not substantially limit forbearance on the part of regulators
facing strong incentives not to act,159 one suspects that Dodd-Frank’s highly
discretionary ER provisions may be even less effective. Here again, the
theory of early intervention based on a risk-based continuum conflicts with
reality. Dodd-Frank’s enhanced prudential regulation and early remediation
rules may not significantly alter the pre-Dodd-Frank forbearance dynamic
with respect to systemically important institutions.
c. Entities Posing “Grave Threats” to Financial Stability
Dodd-Frank supplements the Federal Reserve’s enhanced supervision
and ER authority with the additional power to impose limits on specific
activities of a covered company when the Federal Reserve Board
156. For example, bank regulators are required to appoint a receiver within 90 days of a bank’s
classification as “critically undercapitalized.” See supra note 101, and accompany text. See also
supra note 99 (describing five PCA risk-based classifications).
157. Dodd-Frank Act § 166(c)(1), 124 Stat. 1432 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5366) (financial
condition measures should include “regulatory capital, liquidity measures, and other forwardlooking indicators”); id. § 166(c)(2) (requiring standards that increase in stringency).
158. See id. § 166(c)(2)(A), (B) (demanding only that the increasingly stringent measures
include “requirements in the initial stages of financial decline, including limits on capital
distributions, acquisitions and asset growth; and (B) requirements at the later stages of financial
decline, including a capital restoration plan and capital-raising requirements, limits on transactions
with affiliates, management changes, and asset sales”). One recent comment described this
language as
the biggest legislative punt in the Dodd-Frank Act. Almost twenty years earlier,
Congress thoroughly created, in more than ten pages, a detailed system of actions and
restrictions for a functionally similar system [referring to PCA]. In the Dodd-Frank Act,
Congress provided—in half of a page—vague directions that can be directly traced to
FDICIA’s headers.
Jonathan M. Edwards, FDICIA v. Dodd-Frank: Unlearned Lessons About Regulatory
Forbearance, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 279, 290 (2011).
159. See supra notes 107–15 and accompanying text.
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determines that the company “poses a grave threat to the financial stability
of the United States.”160 Consistent with a continuum of risk approach, this
provision “ratchets up” the Federal Reserve’s intervention powers as risks
become more severe, and presumably more imminent. Restrictions that may
be imposed on covered companies under this section include: limits to the
company’s ability to merge with or acquire another company, restrictions
on the sale of financial products, conditions imposed on the manner of
conducting one or more business activities, and, in the extreme,
requirements that the company divest itself of assets or off-balance-sheet
items to unaffiliated entities. 161 On the surface, this provision—together
with enhanced supervision and ER—suggests promise for an effective,
gradually increasing government regulatory response as systemic risk
intensity heightens. Nonetheless, there are reasons to be skeptical that the
promise will ultimately be realized. As Professor Arthur Wilmarth notes
with respect to the divestiture rule, the provision is “unwieldy and
constrained by stringent procedural requirements.”162 Procedural obstacles
to regulatory action will be especially difficult to overcome for regulators
who already face strong forces and incentives against enforcing stringent
requirements.163 Wilmarth further observes that the Federal Reserve already
has similar authority to require a BHC to divest itself of nonbank
subsidiaries that pose serious “risk to the financial safety, soundness
or stability of [its] banking subsidiaries.” 164 Unlike the new Dodd-Frank
“grave threat” provision, the previously existing BHC divestiture authority
is not subject to stringent procedural requirements. Even without procedural
obstacles, the Federal Reserve apparently has never successfully used the
BHC divestiture provision.165 Here again, the principle of financial regulation based on a risk-based continuum may not be realized in practical
application of the new rules.

160. Dodd-Frank Act § 121(a), 124 Stat. 1410 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5331) (emphasis added).
The “grave threat” designation requires a 2/3 vote of the FSOC. Id. § 121(a). In addition, covered
companies are entitled to notice and a hearing. Id. § 121(b).
161. Id. § 121(a)(1)–(5). Divestitures can only be required as a last resort if the Board
determines that the other restrictions listed in (a)(1)–(4) are “inadequate to mitigate a threat to the
financial stability of the United States.” Id. § 121(a)(5).
162. Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 13, at 1024.
163. See supra notes 44–71 and accompanying text. See also Thomas M. Hoening, Pres., Fed.
Res. Bank of Kansas City, William Taylor Memorial Lecture: It’s Not Over ‘Til It’s Over:
Leadership and Financial Regulation 3 (Oct. 10, 2010), available at http://www.kc.frb.org
/speechbio/hoenigpdf/william-taylor-hoenig-10-10-10.pdf (noting that regulatory authorities
“almost certainly will find themselves facing an atomic force of resistance from those at risk”).
164. Wilmarth, Dodd -Frank supra note 13, at 1025 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1844(e)(1)).
165. Id. (citing Hoening, supra note 163).
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4. Covered Entities and “Cliff Effects”
a. Bank Holding Companies
On the one hand, Dodd-Frank’s enhanced regulation and early
remediation regime explicitly call for the application of increasingly strict
standards based upon a continuum of risk.166 Thus, financial entities classified as “systemically important” should at least theoretically be subject to
progressively more stringent rules within the enhanced regulation/early
remediation framework. At the same time, by carving out “covered
companies” deemed to be “systemically important” for purposes of
enhanced regulation and early remediation, Congress has made an initial
explicitly binary distinction. With respect to the “BHC covered company”
category, Congress itself drew a fixed statutory $50 billion boundary
separating entities that are subject to new heightened scrutiny from those
that are not.
By automatically designating BHCs with $50 billion or more of total
consolidated assets as subject to enhanced supervision and early
remediation,167 Congress has declared by fiat that such BHCs are systemically important, meaning that the failure of such a company would present
significant potential threats to national financial stability. This definition—
based upon size alone—appears inconsistent with current understandings,
otherwise reflected in Dodd-Frank,168 that size itself is not determinative as
a measure of potential systemic risks that might result from the firm’s
failure.169 Another critical component of any systemic risk assessment is the
degree of the firm’s interconnectedness with similar firms, counterparties,
and other market participants.170 One possible explanation for this limited

166. See supra notes 147–59 and accompanying text.
167. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1423 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
168. Id. § 112(a)(1)(A) (“The purposes of the [Financial Stability Oversight] Council are to
identify risk to financial stability . . . that could arise from the material financial distress or failure,
or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial
companies . . . .” (emphasis added)).
169. As one economist observed, “both policymakers and academicians have begun to
distinguish the size of a financial institution from the systemic importance it has by introducing
new terms focusing on what the potential systemic impact might be if that particular institution
fails.” Chen Zhou, Are Banks Too Big to Fail? Measuring Systemic Importance of Financial
Institutions, 6 INT’L J. OF CENT. BANKING 205, 206 (2010) (emphasis added).
170. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., INT’L MONETARY FUND, AND BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONAL MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS—BACKGROUND PAPER,
REPORT TO THE G-20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS 5 (Oct. 2009)
(reporting survey results of central banks and other governmental authorities concluding that after
size, “[i]nterconnectedness is clearly the second most important” systemic importance factor);
James B. Thomson, On Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Progressive Systemic
Mitigation, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 135, 144–45 [hereinafter Thomson] (proposing five
categories of systemic risk, including size and interconnectedness as categories one and two,
respectively).
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focus on size may be the belief that the holding company structure itself
already denotes an institution that is interconnected, and, in particular, that
the BHC’s large size suggests that it simultaneously bears other
characteristics of systemic importance. In other words, BHC size may be
used as a proxy for interconnectedness and other factors relevant to
determining systemic importance. On the other hand, some large BHC
structures may be far more complex and interconnected than others. Thus,
the “proxy” explanation for automatic BHC classification based on size is
not entirely satisfactory; it fails to account for differences among large
BHCs.
A more serious concern is that the distinction between entities that fall
on either side of the explicit $50 billion boundary is inconsistent with the
notion of progressive regulation based upon a risk continuum. As Federal
Reserve Board member Daniel Tarullo noted: “[T]he ideal approach would
be a continuous function, by which . . . additional requirement[s] would
vary precisely with the measure of the firm’s systemic importance,” adding
that that “[s]ystemic importance is not a binary determination, but one of
degree.” 171 Tarullo further notes that “it is generally better to avoid cliff
effects, whereby significant regulatory consequences ensue based on
relatively modest differences among firms.” 172 Yet, this is precisely the
effect of Dodd-Frank’s automatic designation of BHCs with over $50
billion consolidated assets as subject to enhanced supervision and early
remediation. A BHC with assets just in excess of the $50 billion threshold
will be governed by the enhanced standards, while a comparable BHC with
assets just below the threshold will not. Here again, progressive theory
meets binary reality. Moreover, unlike the SIFI designation, the automatic
BHC classification based upon size is a distinction over which the FSOC
and the Federal Reserve have no discretion.173
One result of this “cliff effect” is the incentive it provides for banks to
remain just below the $50 billion threshold.174 Tarullo acknowledges the

171. Tarullo Remarks, supra note 152, at 5–6 (emphasis added). See also Thomson, supra note
170, at 136 (arguing that one should regard “systemic importance as a continuum rather than as a
binary distinction”).
172. Tarullo Remarks, supra note 152, at 6.
173. The FSOC is authorized, however, to recommend a threshold higher than $50 billion for
the application of particular regulatory standards. Dodd-Frank Act § 115(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1403
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325).
174. For similar observations, see Viral V. Acharya, Systemic Risk and Macro-Prudential
Regulation (N.Y.U. Stern Sch. of Bus., Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research & Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper 7, 2011), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya
/public_html/ADB%20Systemic%20Risk%20and%20Macroprudential%20Regulation%20-%20Fi
nal%20-%20March%202011.pdf (noting incentives for “larger banks [to] simply break themselves
up yet retain pretty close in terms of their exposures to some common aggregate risky asset”).
Acharya further notes that a group of “individually small but collectively exposed” institutions
would not be considered systemically important under the $50 billion cutoff rule even though it
may present the same systemic risk as a similar business structured as a single BHC. Id.
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“cliff effect,” noting that there should not be significant differences for
entities just over and under the $50 billion level. As a result, he concludes
that “the supplemental capital requirement for a $50 billion firm is likely to
be very modest.”175 If correct, Tarullo’s assertion that heightened requirements on the systemic risk side of the magic $50 billion line are likely to be
modest raises questions about the need for the special BHC classification in
the first place.
b. Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)
Unlike covered BHCs, classification of a nonbank financial company as
subject to heightened Federal Reserve supervision is not automatic. Instead,
Congress left discretion with the FSOC to designate a nonbank financial
firm as a “covered company” based upon a determination by two-thirds
vote of the FSOC “that material financial distress at the U.S. nonbank
financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of activities . . . could pose a threat to the
financial stability of the United States.”176 For SIFIs, then, the magic line
separating covered from uncovered entities is less clear, but nonetheless
also creates a binary universe.
While the SIFI designation provision does not share the BHC
classification’s size-based cliff effect problem, the magic line separating
SIFIs from non-SIFIs for purposes of Federal Reserve enhanced prudential
regulation may present even more serious problems. Unlike BHCs, which
are subject to regular Federal Reserve Board supervision and enforcement
even if they fall below the $50 billion threshold, some nonbank financial
companies, such as investment banks and broker-dealers, for example,
absent a SIFI designation would be subject to varying degrees of
supervision and regulation by the SEC, and not the Federal Reserve. 177
Insurance companies generally are subject to state rather than federal
regulation,178 and still other nonbank financial companies have been subject
to limited or no regulation.179 In other words, for some nonbank financial
institutions, a SIFI designation can mean the difference between enhanced
175. Tarullo Remarks, supra note 152, at 6.
176. Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. 1398 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323). In a
preamble to proposed regulations, the FSOC interpreted the statutory language as a two-part
determination: whether material distress of the company or the nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of activities could pose a threat to U.S. financial
stability. Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 64264, 64268 (proposed Oct. 18, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. tit.
1310).
177. See supra note 130.
178. See supra note 122.
179. See GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR
CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL
REGULATORY SYSTEM 23, GAO-09-216 (2009) (referring to unregulated or less regulated
nonbank financial entities).
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federal prudential regulation and little or no regulation at all. Such an
approach is inconsistent with regulatory principles based on a risk
continuum.
D. REGULATORY RESPONSE SUMMARY: RISK-CONTINUUM
PRINCIPLES VERSUS BINARY REALITY
At least in theory, prudential bank regulation is based upon continuum
of risk principles. Bank examiners and regulators have substantial
discretion to intervene in numerous ways ranging from informal agreements
with bank managers to formal enforcement requirements that bank
managers take specific remedial actions as examiners and regulators
become aware of management control concerns or excessive risk problems
resulting from poor investment decisions. By definition, however,
regulatory discretion generally includes the exercise of discretion not to act.
Despite even the 1991 FDICIA “mandatory” PCA framework designed to
force early regulatory responses to bank problems before they become too
severe, regulators continue to face perhaps the most powerful pressures not
to act precisely when potential system-wide harm from forbearance are
likely to be highest. Even with the PCA “mandatory” framework in place,
regulators remain reluctant to take enforcement actions against—and may
even face pressures to assist—large struggling banks as problems
emerge.180 As large bank failures loom further along the timeline, regulators
ultimately face inverse pressures—sometimes referred to as the TBTF
dilemma—to act quickly to save the economy from imminent peril.181 A
related “pressure not to act” phenomenon, illustrated by the 1980s and
1990s savings and loan crisis, is the “too-many-to-fail” case, in which
regulators may not be inclined to take enforcement actions when too many
banks confront problems simultaneously. In the end, the long-run budget
cost of inaction can far exceed the immediate cost of enforcement action
in either the TBTF or “too-many-to-fail” scenario.182 Although prudential
bank regulators have a continuum of risk-based enforcement tools, the
practical problem is providing them with incentives to use the available
tools in appropriate cases at earlier stages. Otherwise, in a subsequent
emergency setting, regulators ultimately face a binary choice in any event:
allow the bank to fail or intervene with some type of government assistance.
With respect to systemically important nonbank financial companies
and BHCs, Dodd-Frank at least provides some type of risk-based regulatory
180. These forbearance issues are not raised in the case of crises that emerge suddenly and
without any economic warning.
181. Despite congressional declarations to the contrary, TBTF policies have stubbornly
survived. For a discussion of TBTF and its continued life even after the congressional TBTF death
certificate, see infra notes 243–63 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (estimated S&L crisis costs attributed to
regulatory forbearance).
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infrastructure for certain financial entities that were not previously subject
to clear financial regulation. Although Dodd-Frank generally adopts a
continuum of risk-based principles, it nonetheless also incorporates
unfortunate “cliff effects” that are inconsistent with the continuum
approach.183 Dodd-Frank also leaves many details to agency discretion and
imposes many procedural hurdles for regulatory action. At the same time,
Dodd-Frank does not substantially alter the dynamics that historically have
led to regulatory forbearance. Thus, regulatory forbearance is likely to
continue—or perhaps even increase.184
The next part of this Article turns from regulation to resolution. Notably
unlike the regulatory response, which is theoretically based on a continuum
of risk principles but often binary in operation, the resolution response has a
binary surface appearance, but in fact reflects more of a continuum
approach than is generally acknowledged. After first identifying
characteristics that distinguish regulation from resolution and examining
alternative definitions of the term resolution, Part II explores several
specific resolution response issues. Part III then develops the notion of a
private-public risk allocation continuum, first simply to acknowledge and
highlight the many—sometimes more hidden—existing mechanisms
through which the government may intervene in resolution-related
allocations of risk. At a minimum, I argue that transparency and equity
concerns make it important to acknowledge these mechanisms instead of
allowing anti-bailout fervor to force them further underground. Rather than
outright prohibition against certain regulatory actions, 185 the next policy
step should be to distinguish government resolution responses that have
policy value from those that do not, and to implement rules to ensure that
those with value are implemented fairly. Finally, identifying existing
continuum-based resolution mechanisms will permit more informed policy
assessments of the types of government risk allocation management devices
that might be appropriate under different categories of circumstances.

183. See supra notes 166–75 and accompanying text.
184. A recent empirical study of capital regulation enforcement actions from 1993 to 2010 may
have some bearing on the forbearance issue. The study found variations in enforcement levels
among bank regulation agencies, finding in particular that the Federal Reserve was more lax than
other regulators. Hill, supra note 36, at 689. As Professor Hill herself notes, the Federal Reserve’s
lower enforcement rates cannot definitively be attributed to perverse regulatory forbearance. Id.
Without overstating the case, I argue simply that Dodd-Frank’s enhanced supervision and early
remediation efforts are less likely to be effective to the extent Federal Reserve is more inclined to
forbearance than other agencies.
185. One illustration is Dodd-Frank’s explicit ban on the FDIC authority to acquire preferred
stock in the orderly liquidation resolution process. Dodd-Frank Act § 206(6), 124 Stat. 1459
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5386).
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II. THE RESOLUTION AUTHORITY RESPONSE TO SYSTEMIC
RISK
A. RESOLUTION DEFINED
1. Prudential Regulation and Resolution Compared
Systemic risk-oriented prudential regulation of large, interconnected
financial institutions focuses on preventing, limiting, or mitigating systemwide harm through ex ante supervision and enforcement standards. In
addition to supervision and enforcement, ex ante prudential rules may limit
growth and concentration of exceptionally large banks by restricting
acquisitions.186 Finally, regulators may broadly address systemic risks by
adopting a more macro-economically focused approach, taking the entire
system into account rather than limiting its emphasis to individual
institutions.187
Financial regulators have flexibility—and in some cases mandates—to
“ratchet up” supervision and enforcement as the regulated firm’s financial
health deteriorates.188 When the financial circumstances of a financial entity
become sufficiently dire, regulators switch from regulation to resolution
mode.189 In this ex post resolution phase, federal bank regulators are authorized to close banks and place them in receivership, 190 at the same time
taking care to limit or mitigate any system-wide economic shocks that
might be triggered by the resolution process.
Banks in the United States include a wide variety of institutional
structures; they may be state or federally chartered, and may or may not be
Federal Reserve System member banks. Based on their particular charters
and structures, banks are prudentially regulated by a complex mix of state
and federal regulatory agencies. 191 Regardless of their primary prudential

186. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
187. A focus on more system-wide concerns is especially evident in Dodd-Frank’s
macroprudentially-focused regulatory reforms. See discussion at supra notes 136–79 and
accompanying text.
188. See, for example, discussion of mandatory PCA measures, supra notes 97–115 and
accompanying text.
189. The Federal Reserve Board commented on the distinction between prudential regulation
and resolution in an introduction to proposed Dodd-Frank regulations, noting that the recent crisis
“demonstrated weaknesses in the existing framework for supervising, regulating, and otherwise
containing the risks of major financial companies [regulation], as well as deficiencies in the
government’s toolkit for managing their failure [resolution].” Enhanced Prudential Standards and
Early Remediation Requirements for Covered Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 595 (proposed Jan.
5, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252) (emphasis added) (introduction to proposed
regulations implementing Dodd-Frank § 165 enhanced regulation and early remediation rules).
190. Unlike bankruptcy, bank resolution is not a voluntary or elective process. The decision to
place a financial institution in receivership rests entirely with bank regulating agencies.
191. See supra notes 23–33, 131 and accompanying text. Despite its many changes, DoddFrank did little to alter the underlying unwieldy and complex U.S. bank regulatory structure. For
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regulator, insured banking institutions are resolved by the FDIC. The bank
resolution process technically begins when the insured bank’s chartering
institution or primary regulator sends a “failing bank letter” advising the
FDIC of the institution’s imminent failure,192 or when the FDIC exercises
its independent authority to seize a failing bank and appoint itself as
conservator or receiver.193
The FDIC defines “resolution” as “the disposition plan for a failed
institution, designed to (1) protect insured depositors and (2) minimize
losses to the relevant insurance fund, which are expected from covering
insured deposits and disposing of the institution’s assets.”194 As Professor
David Zaring more colorfully describes it, “[r]esolution authority is the
polite term for seizing failing financial institutions and either shutting them
down or selling them off for the best possible price.”195 So described, the
resolution process appears as a type of hospice care; the function of bank
resolution authority is to manage the dying process, keeping the patient, its
stakeholders, and the regional or national economy reasonably safe and
comfortable until the failing company’s inevitable demise. This strict notion
of resolution appears to leave no room for rehabilitation.
“Resolution” need not be so narrowly defined, however. After a
comprehensive global survey of resolution regimes, the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision noted that
[t]he terms ‘resolution’ and ‘resolution regime’ are understood as referring
to any action by a national authority, with or without private sector
involvement, intended to maintain financial stability and/or address
serious problems in a financial institution that imperil its viability . . .
where, absent resolution, the institution is no longer viable and there is no
reasonable prospect of it becoming so.196

The Basel Committee further reported that “[m]ost countries responded
that they have resolution regimes for failing financial institutions, although .
critical commentary, see Saule T. Omarova, The Dodd-Frank Act: A New Deal for a New Age? 15
N.C. BANKING INST. 83, 87–90 (2011).
192. For a description of the “failing bank letter” process, see FDIC., MANAGING THE CRISIS:
THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 1980–1994 56–57 (1998) [hereinafter FDIC, MANAGING
CRISIS], available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-02.pdf.
193. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4). With respect to nonbank financial entities, the resolution process is
triggered by a formal “systemic risk determination.” Dodd-Frank Act § 203, 124 Stat. 1450
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383) (procedural mechanisms for systemic risk determination with
respect to struggling nonbank “covered company”). For discussion of substantive and procedural
requirements for “systemic risk determinations,” see infra notes 275–86 and accompanying text.
194. FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 89, 97 (Glossary) [hereinafter FDIC, HANDBOOK]
(emphasis added), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook (lasted updated
Apr. 2, 2003).
195. David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 EMORY L. J. 97, 99 (2010).
196. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENTS,
RESOLUTION POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS – PROGRESS SO FAR 7 (2011) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs200.pdf.
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. . the term seems to have been interpreted in different ways. Consequently,
the scope and content of what countries refer to as their resolution regimes
vary considerably.”197
To my mind, the distinction between regulation and resolution in the
broadest sense is that the former primarily addresses risk limitation or
mitigation, whereas the latter focuses on the government’s role in making
risk allocation determinations. “Resolution,” for purposes of this Article,
refers broadly to the government’s involvement in managing the allocation
of otherwise private risk, with particular emphasis on government responses
to actual or threatened failure of one or more financial institutions.
Government involvement in private risk allocation can be plotted on a
rough private-public continuum, along which government intervention
becomes increasingly “public” as the government’s role changes from mere
background presence, to referee, to active participant in determining who
should bear the risk of loss from the business failures, to actual bearer of
loss.
In an interesting contribution to the literature, Professor Gelpern
suggested isolating a distinct financial law and policy space for a category
that she labels “containment,” arguing that what is really “[c]ontainment is
often conflated with financial regulation, crisis prevention and
resolution.”198 Gelpern argues that governments enforce regulations under
ordinary circumstances, but that ordinary enforcement may become
impossible during extraordinary moments of crisis.199 To paraphrase the argument, major financial crisis shifts the financial regulatory system away
from normal space into paranormal “containment” space. In this alternate
realm, “much of what appears as rule-breaking . . . is neither good nor bad,
but unavoidable.”200
Gelpern correctly notes the distinction between loss limitation (which I
refer to as regulation) and loss distribution, noting that containment
episodes entail the latter. For purposes of distinguishing containment from
resolution, however, Gelpern adopts a different—and, I think, less
common—definition of resolution as referring to the general economic
rebuilding and regulatory “reform” that often follows in the aftermath of
economic crisis.201 I quite agree that government emergency or “containment” efforts to stop the bleeding are distinct from rebuilding or
“resolution” as she defines it. For purposes of this Article, “resolution”
includes both what Gelpern refers to as “containment” and other
197. Id. at 7–8.
198. Gelpern, supra note 60, at 1055.
199. Id. at 1057 (observing that during a crisis, “strictly enforcing capital and accounting rules
may mean shutting down most banks and cutting off the credit essential to recovery”).
200. Id.
201. See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 60, at 1067. (“Resolution refers broadly to the restructuring
and reregulation that happen in the aftermath of financial collapse-after panic has abated, but
before the economy has returned to normal.”).
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government risk allocation-type interventions, perhaps even in noncritical
circumstances.
In the end, I share the sentiment and conclusion that rule-breaking may
be inevitable under emergency circumstances, and that there is value in
efforts “to carve out that part of emergency response whose operational
content can be described in advance.”202 On the other hand, to carve out
“containment” as a distinct category of government risk allocation
involvement would require yet another binary distinction, this time
identifying the magic boundary between the normal and paranormal. The
separate space for “containment” that Gelpern suggests would require
knowing the precise point at which struggling becomes true systemic
emergency.
2. Fuzzy Boundaries
a. Early Fuzzy Boundaries Between Regulation and
Resolution
Although the FDIC Handbook definition suggests a definition of
resolution that may not envision rehabilitation, 203 statutory language and
common usage of the term “resolution” among regulators and
commentators often broadly includes a variety of regulatory actions that
may facilitate continued operation of the failing bank. In other words,
although “regulation” and “resolution” are distinct phases and concepts, the
practical differences between the two can sometimes be fuzzy. One
illustration of this blurred boundary is regulatory forbearance, whereby
government officials exercise their prudential regulatory enforcement
discretion as a resolution tool to provide relief to large, failing financial
firms.204
Another illustration of resolution boundary “fuzziness” is the
distinction between conservatorship and receivership. Even though
conservators and receivers serve different functions, federal deposit
insurance laws often use the terms together, leaving perhaps the impression
that they share a common meaning. Unlike receivers, who are responsible
for liquidating or winding up a failed institution, conservators may be
“appointed to operate the institution, conserve its resources, and restore it
to viability.” 205 In fact, bank regulatory agencies acting as conservators

202. Id. at 1069. In fact, I have previously argued that Congress should establish certain ex ante
substantive standards and a procedural infrastructure for government interventions with respect to
private enterprise failure. Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing a Public
Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L. J. 951, 1008–30 (1992) [hereinafter Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts].
203. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 44–68, and infra notes 391–404.
205. See DAVID H. CARPENTER & M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34657,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INSOLVENCY: FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE

332

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

originally had broad power to take action “necessary to put the insured
depository institution in a sound and solvent condition,” and “appropriate to
carry on the business of the institution and preserve and conserve
[its] assets and property . . . .” 206 Moreover, unlike a receivership, a
conservatorship could be terminated and the previously struggling bank
permitted to “resume the transaction of its business” if regulators were
satisfied that this could “be [safely] done and that it would be in the public
interest. . . .”207
Despite the potentially “life” and “death” differences between
conservatorship and receivership, the statutory grounds for appointing
either a conservator or a receiver are the same. Perhaps most notably, the
grounds for appointing either a conservator or receiver do not require that
the institution technically be insolvent or actually in default. For example, a
conservator or receiver can be appointed on the grounds of the bank’s
“[inability] to pay its obligations or meet its depositors’ demands”208 (i.e., a
bank with liquidity rather than insolvency issues), or its “unsafe or unsound
condition[s] to transact business.” 209 To the extent that there is a shared
theme binding the various grounds for appointing a conservator or receiver,
it might colloquially be described as “trouble brewing.” Some “troubles”
might be resolved by careful monitoring and enforcement (i.e., regulation),
without moving into what might be considered true “resolution” mode.
Though conservators were common during the Great Depression, they were
rarely used thereafter until the 1980s, when Congress again turned to
conservatorships in response to the savings and loan (S&L) crisis.210 While
conservatorship authority remains on the “statute books,” 211 restrictions
imposed by subsequent statutory amendments make it very difficult, if not
impossible, to use for purposes of rehabilitating a failing bank.
b. Ex Ante Rules with Ex Post Functions and Ex Post Rules
with Ex Ante Effect
Viewed in the broad sense, resolution rules may be implemented
through ex ante or ex post programs, or a combination of the two. In some

MAC, AND DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 5 (2008) [hereinafter CRS, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
INSOLVENCY].
206. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(D). Exercise of conservatorship authority has been substantially
limited, however, by Least Cost Resolution (LCR) restrictions. FDICIA § 141(a), 105 Stat. 2273
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)).
207. 12 U.S.C. § 205(a).
208. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5)(F).
209. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5)(C).
210. See, e.g., FDIC, MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 192, at 116 (“[C]onservatorship was used
almost exclusively . . . in the resolution of thrifts.”). Id. at 125 (“Initially, the RTC had so many
S&Ls in conservatorship, it had to set priorities in its resolution schedule.”).
211. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c), (d) (appointment and powers of conservator); 12 U.S.C. § 205
(termination of conservatorship).
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cases, ex ante programs can serve ex post functions. Government-mandated
federal deposit insurance, for example, can be seen as an ex ante
government risk allocation or resolution program.212 Moreover, even though
largely designed for preventive purposes, certain ex ante regulations may
also serve ex post resolution functions. Risk-based capital adequacy
requirements, for example, work ex ante “to discourage excessive risktaking by making it more costly for the regulated firms. Ex post, they seek
to ensure that each firm has the capital cushion to withstand economic
shocks.”213
At the same time, some ex post programs or regimes can have
significant ex ante effects. For example, well-informed investors make
decisions about whether to invest and the type of investment based on the
claim status of their interest in the event of ultimate bankruptcy. As such,
bankruptcy rules shape private investment behavior in directions preferred
by government policy makers. In fact, one advantage of private bankruptcy
over Dodd-Frank’s new orderly liquidation regime as a risk allocation
mechanism may be the greater certainty it provides regarding the status of
claims.
B. MANAGING THE BANK RESOLUTION PROCESS
1. The Need for Resolution Flexibility
Under the narrow view of resolution as the process of winding up failed
institutions and paying off secured depositor claims, the most obvious FDIC
response to bank failure is first to oversee the sale of bank assets and
payments to secured creditors, and then to distribute remaining proceeds,
supplemented as necessary by federal deposit insurance funds and general
revenue, to cover insured depositor claims. The concern with this limited
approach, however, is that a hurried sale of failed bank assets might not
command the highest possible prices. In the end, the losses from such a
“fire sale” result in additional demand upon federal deposit insurance funds,
and potential costs to general taxpayers. 214 Recognizing that a straightforward bank liquidation and “fire sale” might be too costly to the deposit
insurance system, Congress historically has authorized the FDIC to arrange
for the sale of a failed bank to another bank, a mechanism referred to as a
purchase and assumption (P&A) transaction.215

212. See infra notes 359–69 and accompanying text.
213. Gelpern, supra note 60, at 1064.
214. Because federal deposit insurance is backed by the “full faith and credit” of the U.S.
government, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(a)(1)(B), any shortfalls in the deposit insurance fund would be
covered with general revenue.
215. See infra notes 221–29 and accompanying text.
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2. Basic FDIC Bank Resolution Methods
Insolvent depository banks are not eligible to file for bankruptcy under
federal bankruptcy laws applicable to most other businesses. 216 Given
special concern for the unique and potentially broad economic impact
of bank failures,217 insolvent depository bank resolutions and liquidations
instead are governed by a separate FDIC-administered regime. 218 The
FDIC’s three basic resolution methods include: (1) deposit payoffs, in
which the “FDIC as insurer pays all of the failed institution’s depositors
with insured funds the full amount of their insured deposits”;219 (2) insured
deposit transfers, in which the FDIC makes arrangements “with a healthy
institution that is willing to act as agent for the FDIC and to pay insured
deposits to customers of the failed institution”;220 and (3) P&A transactions,
“in which a healthy institution purchases some or all of the assets of a failed
bank or thrift and assumes some or all of the liabilities, including all insured
deposits.”221 A P&A transaction can be structured so that the healthy bank
assumes all deposit liabilities, including even those that are uninsured.222
P&A transactions are the most common of these resolution methods.223 Of
the approximately 140 FDIC-insured institutions closed in 2010, 94 percent
were resolved through P&A transactions in which the FDIC arranged for a
presumably healthy bank to acquire assets and liabilities of a failed bank.224
Only one of the banks closed in 2010 was resolved by insured deposit
transfer, and six were resolved by insured deposit payoff.225
216. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d).
217. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency
Regulation, 76 TEX. L. REV. 723 (1998) (noting the pivotal role of banks as justification for
government control of bank and thrift insolvencies instead of regular bankruptcy); Richard M.
Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
985, 986–87 (2010) [hereinafter Hynes & Walt].
218. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et. seq.
219. FDIC, HANDBOOK, supra note 194, at 5.
220. Id. at 41. Prior to 1991, the FDIC also had broad discretion to use “open bank assistance”
(OBA). See FINAN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SECURED
CREDITORS HAIRCUTS 22 (2011) [hereinafter FINAN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL]. OBA
resolution authority permitted the “FDIC as insurer [to] provide financial assistance to an
operating insured bank or thrift determined to be in danger of failing.” FDIC, HANDBOOK, supra
note 194, at 5. See infra notes 233–39 and accompanying text.
221. FDIC, HANDBOOK, supra note 194, at 19. In arranging P&A transactions, the FDIC often
historically facilitated or provided incentives for healthy bank acquisitions of failed banks through
loans, loan guarantees, assumptions of certain liabilities, or other assistance. Id. at 19–40.
222. Id. at 20. (“In a P&A transaction, acquirers may assume all deposits, thereby providing
100 percent protection to all depositors.”).
223. FDIC, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (2010) [hereinafter FDIC, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT]. See
also GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FDIC MANAGEMENT REPORT 2010 4 n.6, GAO-11-687R
(2011) [hereinafter GAO, MANAGEMENT REPORT].
224. Data derived from FDIC, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 223, at 140–47 (FDICInsured Institutions Closed During 2010) (app.).
225. Id. at 146–47. The FDIC reports that “[d]eposit payoffs are only executed if a bid for a
P&A transaction does not meet the least-cost test or if no bids are received.” Id. at 42. For
discussion of the least cost resolution (LCR) test, see infra notes 253–63.
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The key challenge for the FDIC in implementing P&A resolutions is
locating healthy banks willing to purchase the failing bank’s assets and
assume its liabilities.226 Not surprisingly, healthy banks are often reluctant
to assume risks associated with acquiring a failing bank. To overcome this
obstacle, P&A resolution rules authorize the FDIC to use a variety of
techniques to facilitate the acquisition. For example, P&A arrangements
may include federal loans or loan guarantees to support the healthy bank’s
acquisition of the failing bank.227 A more substantial acquisition incentive is
the FDIC’s authority to include “loss sharing” provisions as part of the
P&A arrangement. Pursuant to such loss sharing agreements, the FDIC
agrees to absorb a significant proportion of “[any] losses the acquirer
experiences in servicing and disposing of [a failed institution’s] assets
purchased and covered under the loss-share agreement.”228 To the extent
that bank regulators negotiating the P&A influence or pick and choose
among losses to share, the transaction begins to take on bailout
characteristics. The aura of bailout increases to the extent that the FDIC
provides loans, loan guarantees, or loss sharing arrangements to entice or
assist the acquiring bank, which, in turn, assumes any of the failed bank’s
uninsured deposits or liabilities. Potential government costs resulting from
such loss sharing agreements are risks first to the federal deposit insurance
fund, and ultimately to the general taxpayer. In these cases, uninsured
investors arguably receive “bailout”-type assistance at the expense of the
insurance fund or the public.
C. SYSTEMIC RISK AND BANK FAILURES
1. Conflicting FDIC Policy Tensions
Though small failing bank resolutions are reasonably straightforward,
conflicting policy considerations can complicate large, interconnected bank
resolutions. On the one hand, the FDIC is not specifically charged with
responsibility for preventing bank failures.229 Rather, its primary obligation
is to protect insured depositors as required by the federal deposit insurance
system,230 and to manage and protect the federal deposit insurance fund.231
226. The FDIC is empowered to take over activities of the bank in the interim, operating the
bank as a “bridge bank” until a P&A transaction can be arranged. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n).
227. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2).
228. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL AUDIT, FDIC CORPORATION FUNDS 2010 &
2009 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, GAO-11-4122 (March 2011) at 7. See also FDIC, MANAGING
CRISIS, supra note 192, at 193 (describing loss sharing as “a vehicle that allows the FDIC to better
manage some of the unique problems associated with the marketing of large banks”).
229. K.A. Randall, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Regulatory Functions and
Philosophy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 696, 702–03 (1966) [hereinafter Randall].
230. The FDIC, established by the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162,
provides insurance for accounts maintained at insured depository institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 1821
(2006). In 2008, Congress increased the maximum insurance coverage per account from $100,000
to $250,000. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 136, 122
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Yet, if the FDIC limits its concerns strictly to paying all insured depositor
claims at the lowest cost to the deposit insurance fund, it risks failing to
meet one of the most important underlying objectives of federal deposit
insurance: preserving public confidence in the banking system. In other
words, tension arises when the resolution method that best satisfies the
FDIC’s responsibility to satisfy insured depositor claims and minimize
costs to the federal deposit insurance fund conflicts with the public’s
interest in avoiding system-wide harm that might result from the bank’s
failure. In certain cases, regulators have determined that the public interest
would be better served by assisting the failing bank, allowing it to continue
operations or by satisfying both insured and uninsured claims. Although the
rules have ebbed and flowed over time, Congress has responded to this
tension with provisions authorizing “resolution” actions, including “open
bank assistance (OBA),” not otherwise strictly consistent with mere
protection of insured depositors and the insurance fund.232
2. Open Bank Assistance and the Evolution of Too-Big-to-Fail
a. Essential to the Community Determinations
Legislation enacted in 1950 provided FDIC discretion to extend OBA
in the form of loans, deposits, or asset purchases upon an FDIC
determination that continued bank operations were “essential to provide
adequate banking service in its community,” 233 often referred to as an
“essentiality finding.” In 1982, Congress extended the FDIC’s authority to
provide open bank assistance to failing banks, subject only to the limitation
that the assistance costs could not exceed amounts that otherwise would
have been reasonably necessary to liquidate and pay off the banks’ insured
depositors.234 As a practical matter, these cost limitations on FDIC authority
Stat. 3765, 3799. Although initially scheduled to expire at the end of 2009, the increased $250,000
coverage cap was extended through the end of 2013, Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 204(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1632, 1648–49, and later made permanent by the
Dodd-Frank Act § 335, 124 Stat. 1540 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E)).
231. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(a)(4), 1823.
232. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 229, at 699 (referring to bank assistance as incidental to the
overriding public interest).
233. An Act to Amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, ch. 967, § 13(c),
64 Stat. 873, 888 (1950) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added). For discussion of the history and
evolution of OBA, see FDIC, MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 192, at 151–69.
234. Garn St-Germaine Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 111, 96 Stat.
1469, 1470 (“No assistance shall be provided . . . in an amount in excess of that amount . . .
reasonably necessary to save the cost of liquidating, including paying . . . insured accounts.”).
Statutory language still “on the books” appears to continue FDIC discretion to provide OBA. 12
U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) (FDIC authority to make loans, purchase assets, assume liabilities, or make
contributions “to prevent default,” restore an institution in default to normal operation, or “when
severe financial conditions exist which threaten the stability of a significant number of insured
depository institutions or of institutions possessing significant financial resources, . . . to lessen the
risk to the [FDIC] posed . . . under such threat of instability”). As a practical matter, however,
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were easily overcome through liberal application of the “essentiality
rule.” 235 During the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the FDIC used the
“essential to the community” exception as legal authority for assistance to
at least four struggling banks.236 Irvine Sprague, an FDIC Board member
and Chair who participated in many “essentiality” determinations, described
the “essentiality” option as “life-or-death bailout authority,” 237 providing
the Board with “sole discretion to prevent a bank from failing, at whatever
cost.”238 Government assistance to keep a struggling bank alive effectively
extended protection beyond insured depositors to cover equity investors and
unsecured creditors.239 By “whatever cost,” Sprague clearly was referring to
the use of general tax revenue to protect such unsecured creditors,
stockholders, or other equity investors.
b. The Birth of Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF)
The so-called “too-big-to-fail” policy was born in this period of
relatively liberal Federal Reserve and FDIC bank “rescues.” Common use
of the TBTF moniker reputedly originated with 1984 House hearings
investigating the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company
“bailout,” then “the most significant bank failure resolution in the history of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.”240 Reacting to the Comptroller
of the Currency’s testimony that regulators would not allow the nation’s
largest “money center banks” to fail, Representative Stewart McKinney

subsequently enacted statutory restrictions virtually eliminate OBA. See infra notes 264–74 and
accompanying text.
235. According to one report, the FDIC protected over 99 percent of uninsured deposits in
failed institutions between 1985 and 1990. H.R. Rep. No. 330, 9, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 93
(1991). These cases were not necessarily predicated on an “essentiality finding,” however; the
FDIC was authorized to protect unsecured depositors if doing so would be less costly than a
liquidation and payoff of secured depositors.
236. FDIC, MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 192, at ch. 5, 154. (discussing FDIC essentiality
declarations for Unity Bank and Trust Company of Boston (1971); Bank of the Commonwealth of
Detroit (1972); First Pennsylvania Bank of Philadelphia (1980); and Continental Illinois National
Bank and Trust Company of Chicago (1984)). The FDIC’s liberal interpretation was vindicated by
a court order dismissing a First Pennsylvania shareholder’s claim that the agency’s “essentiality
finding” exceeded its statutory authority. Zinman v. FDIC, 567 F. Supp. 243, 247–48 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (concluding that “Congress intended [the essentiality exception] to be construed liberally to
effectuate the purposes of the Act and achieve stability in the banking community for sake of the
nation’s economy. The exercise of authority by the FDIC here was consistent with the flexibility
authorized by Congress.”).
237. IRVINE H. SPRAGUE, BAILOUT: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF BANK FAILURES AND
RESCUES 28 (1986). Sprague reports that although the law and legislative history provided no
directions for the FDIC’s exercise of its “essentiality” discretion, “[c]learly, . . . this authority was
not intended for widespread use.” Id.
238. Id. at 27.
239. Id. at 29 (“[i]f the bank is not allowed to fail, it is impossible to structure a transaction that
does not provide at least the possibility of some residual value to stockholders and creditors of the
failing institution.”).
240. FDIC, MANAGING CRISIS, supra note 192, at 545.
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interjected: “[L]et us not bandy words. We have a new kind of bank. It is
called too big to fail. TBTF, and it is a wonderful bank.”241 Describing this
colloquy, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission recently reported: “This
was a new regulatory principle, and within moments it had a catchy
name.” 242 In addition to being catchy, the pithy TBTF moniker grew in
political salience as a shorthand focal point for public “anti-bailout”
sentiment, ultimately spurring congressional determination to put an end to
any hint of a government TBTF policy.
3. Statutory “Systemic Risk” Rules and the Purported Death
of TBTF
After addressing the immediate S&L and thrift industry crisis with
rescue legislation in 1989, 243 Congress subsequently enacted the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), 244
which included both prudential regulation and resolution reform responses.
As noted earlier, Congress in part responded to public anger over
regulators’ lax supervision and excessive forbearance leading up to the S&L
disaster, by enacting a mandatory PCA framework designed to limit
regulators’ non-enforcement discretion.245 In a parallel response to public
anger over taxpayer-funded bank rescues, the FDICIA also imposed new
restrictions on regulators’ resolution authority to provide assistance
to failing banks.246 As he introduced the FDICIA, Senator Donald Riegle
explained that the bill’s central purpose was “to put an end to the too-bigto-fail policy by eliminating the practices that give rise to it.”247 Perhaps
foremost on this part of the agenda was eliminating the “essentiality”
exception, which many saw as a key culprit behind the TBTF monster.248 In
241. Inquiry into Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the H.
Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 300 (1984).
242. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 37 (2011) [hereinafter
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT]. The Commission is correct about the “catchy name,” but
incorrect in referring to TBTF as a “new regulatory principle.” Although the modern term was
coined later, evidence of TBTF-like thinking appears as early as the Great Depression. For
example, some have described railroads during the 1930s as TBTF both because of their critical
infrastructure functions and the major role of railroad securities in the overall economy. See, e.g.,
Joseph R. Mason and Daniel A. Schiffman, Too Big To Fail, Government Bailouts, and
Managerial Incentives: The Case of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to the
Railroad Industry During the Great Depression, in TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES
IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 49, 49–54 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004).
243. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 10173, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA].
244. FDICIA § 131(a), 105 Stat. 2253 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831).
245. See supra notes 97–115 and accompanying text.
246. FDICIA, § 141, 105 Stat. 2273 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823).
247. 137 CONG. REC. S2744 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
248. FDICIA § 141(a), 105 Stat. 2273 (codified at 12 U.S.C § 1823) (repealing the “essentiality
rule”). For discussion and analysis of the “essentiality rule,” see supra notes 233–39 and
accompanying text.
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addition, the 1991 legislation required the FDIC to exercise its resolution
authority only as necessary to provide coverage for insured deposits,249 to
choose the resolution method that was least costly to the deposit insurance
fund in providing coverage for insured depositors,250 referred to as the least
cost resolution (LCR) test, and not to choose any resolution alternative that
would protect uninsured depositors or other creditors at the expense of the
federal deposit insurance fund. 251 These cost restrictions were distinctly
tougher than prior rules requiring only that resolution costs not exceed those
that would have been reasonably necessary to liquidate the failed bank and
pay off insured depositors.252
In order not to tie regulators’ hands completely, however, the 1991
legislation adopted a new “systemic risk” exception.253 While it included
some remnants of the old essentiality rule, the 1991 “systemic risk”
exception made it both substantively and procedurally more difficult
to bypass otherwise applicable resolution authority restrictions. 254 Such
restrictions could be avoided only after a determination that compliance
with LCR and other such restrictions on agency resolution structure
discretion “with respect to an insured depository institution for which the
[FDIC] has been appointed receiver would have serious adverse effects
on economic conditions or financial stability.” 255 Once a systemic risk
determination was made in accordance with the new and more onerous
procedural requirements, the agency was authorized to “take other action or
provide assistance . . . as necessary to avoid or mitigate such effects.”256
Given the shared perception of many that the old “essentiality rule” was
simply TBTF in disguise, House and Senate sponsors of the FDICIA made
a joint statement after the legislation’s passage clarifying that “[t]he
systemic risk exception is not intended to perpetuate the practices
commonly known as ‘too big to fail’; the legislation responds to and largely
ends those practices.”257

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(i)) (emphasis added).
Id. (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)(ii)).
Id. (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E)).
See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
FDICIA § 141(a), 105 Stat. 2273 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)).
Id. Procedurally, the old “essentiality” rule could be exercised simply by FDIC Board
majority vote. The new 1991 systemic risk exception required a recommendation to the Treasury
Secretary based upon a two-thirds vote of both the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board. A
systemic risk determination could then be made by the Treasury Secretary in consultation with the
President. Id.
255. FDICIA § 141(a), 105 Stat. 2273 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i)(II)).
256. Id. § 141(a) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)).
257. Joint Statement on Systemic Risk Exception to Least Cost Resolution FDICIA, 137 CONG.
REC. S18819-02 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1991) (statement of Sen. Donald W. Riegle and Congressmen
Henry Gonzalez and Bruce Vento).
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4. Premature Reports of the Death of TBTF
Market perceptions of a public TBTF policy stubbornly persisted even
after passage of the 1991 LCR rules and other restrictions. In private
markets, companies perceived as TBTF continued to benefit from lower
capital ratios, lower cost of funds, and preferential treatment from credit
rating agencies.258 If anything, federal TBTF policies were expanded during
the 2007–2008 economic crisis. In 2008, for example, the FDIC used its
emergency systemic risk authority to create its Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program (TLGP), which guaranteed senior unsecured debt
instruments.259 In his 2009 testimony on proposed stress tests planned for
the nation’s largest banks, Federal Reserve Board Chair, Ben Bernanke,
emphasized that capital support would be available to sustain the nineteen
largest banks.260
Moreover, though prior applications of TBTF policy were focused
primarily on large commercial banking institutions, such policies were
effectively expanded during the 2007–2009 crisis to provide “rescue”
assistance to large struggling nonbank financial institutions.261 A substantial
portion of the federal “rescue” assistance to financial firms during the
2007–2008 economic crisis was not from the FDIC, but instead from
Federal Reserve bank lending.262 In fact—and oddly inconsistent with the
1991 FDICIA legislation’s overall restrictive spirit—the FDICIA actually
258. See generally Wilmarth, Reforming Financial Regulation, supra note 67, at 743–44;
STERN & FELDMAN, supra note 55, at 30–37.
259. See Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, 12 C.F.R. § 370 (2008); see also DARRYL E.
GETTER & OSCAR R. GONZALES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40413, THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION (FDIC): EFFORTS TO SUPPORT FINANCIAL AND HOUSING MARKETS
4–5 (2009); FDIC, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 25–26 (2009). This was apparently the first time the
FDIC guaranteed bank and BHC debt. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR
2011, at 28 (2010). The FDIC provided similar assistance to Citigroup and Bank of America
jointly with the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL,
NOVEMBER 2009 OVERSIGHT REPORT: GUARANTEES AND CONTINGENT PAYMENTS IN TARP
AND RELATED PROGRAMS 16–27 (2009).
260. Federal Reserve’s First Monetary Policy Report for 2009: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th CONG. 22 (2009) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve) (“[W]e are committed to ensuring the viability
of all the major financial institutions.”); see also Wilmarth, Reforming Financial Regulation,
supra note 67, at 1050 n.449.
261. Federal loan guarantees were used to ensure the successful acquisition of failing
investment bank Bear Stearns. Legal Developments: Second Quarter, 2008, Federal Reserve
Bulletin 73, 78–81 (Aug., 2008); see also SHORTER, BEAR STEARNS, supra note 119. In addition,
struggling insurance giant, AIG, received direct government loans through the Federal Reserve.
See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008). AIG also received
assistance through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), enacted as part of the Emergency
Stabilization Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-343, tit. I, §§ 101–136, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 5211–5241); see also BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40438, ONGOING
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP (AIG) (Mar. 16, 2009)
[hereinafter WEBEL].
262. See supra note 261.
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expanded the Federal Reserve’s emergency authority to lend to nonbanks,
allowing them to use the same types of collateral used by depository
institutions.263
D. DODD-FRANK RESOLUTION REFORMS
1. Federal Reserve Discount Window Lending
Although Dodd-Frank significantly expanded regulation and resolution
authority with respect to nonbank financial institutions,264 it simultaneously
imposed several new restrictions on regulators’ flexibility to respond to
failing financial institutions. For example, Dodd-Frank severely constrains
the Federal Reserve’s previously available emergency authority to lend to
any “individual, partnership, or corporation” under “unusual and exigent
circumstances,” subject only to the condition that such loans be
collateralized to the Federal Reserve’s “satisfaction.”265 Under new rules,
the Federal Reserve is authorized to extend emergency loans only to
“participant[s] in any program or facility with broad-based eligibility.”266
Moreover, any such Federal Reserve emergency lending program or facility
now requires prior approval of the Treasury Secretary.267 These restrictions
were clearly designed to prohibit the Federal Reserve from extending
emergency loans to specific institutions, as it did during the 2007–2009
economic crisis, for example, with respect to AIG.268
This new restriction will surely make it more difficult for the Federal
Reserve to make loans to large insurance companies such as AIG. On the
other hand, the Federal Reserve retains its regular authority to open its
discount window to financial institutions, including BHCs. Though DoddFrank includes rules regarding financial entities that cease to be BHCs,269
there are no rules regarding companies that elect to become BHCs in order
to obtain access to discount window borrowing.

263. FDICIA § 473, 105 Stat. 2386 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343). For a discussion of
implications and relative contradictory spirit to the rest of the legislation, see Walker F. Todd,
FDICIA’s Emergency Liquidity Provisions, 1993 ECON. REV. 16, 19–21 (1993).
264. See supra notes 140–79 and infra notes 275–89 and accompanying text.
265. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (prior to amendment).
266. Dodd-Frank Act § 1101(a), 124 Stat. 2113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343(A)).
267. Id. (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343(B)(iv)). Dodd-Frank further directed the Federal Reserve
to establish policies and procedures to “ensure that any emergency lending program or facility is
for the purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system, and not to aid a failing financial
company, and that the security for emergency loans is sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses.”
Id. (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343(B)(i)).
268. See OVERSIGHT PANEL, AIG RESCUE, supra note 123.
269. Dodd-Frank Act § 117, 124 Stat. 1406 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5327) (emphasis added).
This provision presumably is designed to prevent BHCs with over $50 billion in assets, which
would otherwise be subject to Federal Reserve enhanced supervision, from avoiding such
supervision by ceasing to be BHCs.
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2. Restrictions on FDIC Systemic Risk Exception Flexibility
Dodd-Frank also substantially limits FDIC discretion under the
systemic risk exception to the LCR requirements. An FDIC emergency
systemic risk declaration no longer authorizes the FDIC to take other action
or provide assistance as necessary to avoid or mitigate “serious adverse
effects on economic conditions or financial stability.”270 Instead, the FDIC’s
systemic risk exception to LCR requirements, as amended, authorizes the
FDIC to take other action or provide assistance only “for purpose of
winding up the insured depository institution . . . as necessary to avoid or
mitigate . . . [serious adverse] effects” on economic conditions or financial
stability. 271 In other words, the FDIC is no longer permitted to provide
specifically targeted assistance to individual banks in danger of default. The
underlying logic here is to diminish regulators’ power to single out isolated
“winners,” thus making it more difficult for those with greater access to
obtain special “rescue” treatment.
As a substitute for previously available OBA, Dodd-Frank added a
complex procedure through which the FDIC and Federal Reserve may
formally declare a “liquidity event.”272 Such a determination authorizes the
FDIC to “create a widely available program to guarantee obligations of
solvent insured depository institutions . . . during times of severe economic
distress . . . .” 273 Even after it establishes such a program, however, the
FDIC is unauthorized to issue any guarantees until after the Treasury
Secretary, in consultation with the President, makes a request of Congress
for a specified loan guarantee amount, and Congress approves the request
by joint resolution. 274 These procedural obstacles will make it extremely
difficult for the FDIC to move quickly to provide any type of transparent
individual bank assistance under emergency circumstances. Instead, it may
encourage the use of less transparent forms of assistance.
3. Dodd-Frank Resolution Response to Systemic Risk
a. Systemic Risk Determinations and Orderly Liquidation
Authority (OLA)
Prior to Dodd-Frank, the FDIC’s resolution authority was limited to
banks. Among the most dramatic Dodd-Frank features is a new OLA
regime, which operates as a substitute for the federal bankruptcy rules that

270. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (emphasis added) (as constructed prior to amendment by DoddFrank).
271. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G), amended by Dodd-Frank Act (2011) (emphasis added).
272. Dodd-Frank Act § 1104(a)–(b), 124 Stat. 2120 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5611) (requiring a
two-thirds vote of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the FDIC).
273. Id. § 1105(a) (emphasis added).
274. Id. § 1105(c).
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would otherwise apply to certain failing financial companies,275 including
BHCs and broker-dealers. 276 Dodd-Frank’s OLA provisions create procedures, beginning with a formal “systemic risk determination,” for
appointing the FDIC as receiver with authority to resolve nonbank financial
entities for which such a determination is made. 277 Not surprisingly, the
OLA regime includes many parallels to the federal banking rules applicable
to failing depository banks.278 After all, one of the major concerns motivating Dodd-Frank’s resolution response reforms was the out-dated nature of
federal banking regulation, which had not kept pace with the modern
financial markets.279 Expansion of the FDIC’s jurisdiction to resolve designated nonbank financial institutions recognizes the “bank-like” services and
financial instruments now offered by nonbank financial entities and the
potential risks to overall financial stability that might result in the event of
such a nonbank entity’s failure. At the same time, practical implementation
of the OLA regime is constrained by numerous procedural obstacles. First,
the process for financial companies must begin with a written “systemic
risk determination” recommendation to the Treasury Secretary, based upon
a two-thirds vote of the FDIC board of directors and a separate two-thirds
vote of the Federal Reserve Board, that the Secretary appoint the FDIC as
receiver for the failing institution.280 Second, the determination recommendation must specifically address statutorily enumerated factors, including:
275. For purposes of OLA, “financial company” includes: (1) bank holding companies (without
regard to size); (2) systemically important financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve
Board; (3) companies engaged predominantly in activities determined to be financial in nature or
incidental thereto by the Federal Reserve Board under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956;
and (4) certain subsidiaries of these three types of entities. Dodd-Frank Act § 201(a)(11), 124 Stat.
1442 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5381).
276. Insurance company insolvencies were—and continue to be—resolved on a state-by-state
basis pursuant to each state’s particular insurance insolvency rules. See infra notes 372–74 and
accompanying text.
277. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(a), 124 Stat. 1450 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383). For the definition
of “financial company” for OLA purposes, see supra note 275.
278. See supra notes 216–28. The FDIC noted these parallels in its introductory summary to
proposed OLA regulations. 75 Fed. Reg. 64173, 64175 (proposed Oct. 19, 2010) (“Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking Implementing Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act”) (“Parties who are familiar with
the liquidation of insured depository institutions under the FDI . . . will recognize many parallel
provisions in Title II [OLA].”), subsequently finalized, at 76 Fed. Reg. 41626, 41644 (July 11,
2011). For comparison of FDIC ordinary bank resolution and OLA authority, see generally
Hollace T. Cohen, Orderly Liquidation Authority: A New Insolvency Regime to Address Systemic
Risk, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143 (2012). For a comparison of OLA to ordinary bankruptcy, see
Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Dodd-Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers, 19 AM. BANK.
INST. L. REV. 287 (2011) [hereinafter Baird & Morrison].
279. See supra notes 127–31.
280. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1450 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383). Brokerdealer systemic risk recommendations require similar two-thirds votes of the Federal Reserve
Board and members of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id. § 203(a)(1)(B). Insurance
company determinations require a two-thirds Federal Reserve Board vote and approval of the
Federal Insurance Office Director, in consultation with the FDIC. Id. § 203(a)(1)(C).
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(1) whether the failing institution is in default or danger of default; (2) a
description of the impact such default would have on U.S. financial
stability; (3) the likelihood of a private sector alternative to federal
receivership to prevent default; and (4) an evaluation of why resolution
under the regular bankruptcy regime would be inadequate. 281 Third, the
Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the President, must begin the
process of appointing the FDIC as receiver after making his or her own
statutorily enumerated determinations, including findings that: (1) the
“financial company is in default or danger of default”;282 (2) the “failure of
the financial company and its resolution under otherwise applicable . . . law
would have serious adverse effects on financial stability in the United
States”;283 and (3) that orderly liquidation action “would avoid or mitigate
such adverse effects. . . .”284 In making these determinations, the Treasury
Secretary is instructed to “tak[e] into consideration the effectiveness of the
action in mitigating potential adverse effects on the financial system, the
cost to the general fund of the Treasury, and the potential to increase
excessive risk taking on the part of creditors, counterparties, and
shareholders in the financial company.” 285 In other words, the Treasury
Secretary’s systemic risk determination must balance considerations of
systemic harm that would result from resolving the failing institution under
the regular bankruptcy process against potential OLA and moral hazard
costs that could be triggered by resolution rather than private bankruptcy.
Finally, the OLA regime provides procedural protections, which include the
failing institution’s right to a confidential federal district court hearing to
oppose the government’s receivership petition.286
These significant mandatory procedural hurdles are likely to hinder
regulators’ ability to move quickly in response to rapidly emerging systemwide threats to financial stability. The particular irony of OLA’s procedural
obstacles is that one of the important underlying arguments for subjecting
banks—and presumably also nonbank financial companies—to a special
FDIC-administered insolvency regime in lieu of bankruptcy is the need for
speedy resolution in emergency circumstances “to expedite the resolution
process for banks and thus maintain confidence in the banking system.”287
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. § 203(a)(2).
Id. § 203(b)(1).
Id. § 203(b)(2) (emphasis added).
Id. § 203(b)(5).
Id.
Once the systemic risk determination is made for a failing company, the company either
consents to the FDIC’s appointment as receiver or the Treasury Secretary will petition the district
court for an order to place the company under FDIC receivership. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(i). The
failing financial company can oppose the government’s receivership petition through a
confidential federal district court hearing. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iii).
287. Rosalind L. Bennett, Failure Resolution and Asset Liquidation: Results of an International
Survey of Deposit Insurers, 14 FDIC BANKING REV. 1, 7 (2001). See also id. (“When resolution
of a failed bank is performed quickly and smoothly, benefits accrue to the economy and the
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Past experience with PCA rules has shown that regulators often fail to act
even in response to gradually emerging risks and without procedural
obstacles.288 This experience suggests that OLA’s required procedures may
make regulatory forbearance even more likely.289
b. Funding Orderly Liquidations
FDIC costs incurred in implementing the OLA are not to be funded by
general tax revenue, but instead from a separate “Orderly Liquidation
Fund.”290 This special fund is to be supported by covered financial company
repayments to the FDIC, as well as interest and other earnings from the
fund’s investments. 291 In addition, the FDIC is authorized to borrow by
issuing obligations for purchase by the Treasury Secretary.292 Lest there be
any doubt about the future of taxpayer-funded bailouts, the statute
repeatedly says: “no more.”293 In the event that the orderly liquidation fund
is insufficient to repay loans from the Treasury Department, the FDIC is
authorized to charge assessments against nonbank financial companies
supervised by the Federal Reserve and BHCs with total combined assets of
$50 billion or more. 294 Thus, costs of FDIC orderly liquidation actions
ultimately should be imposed not upon general taxpayers, but instead upon
a narrower subset of taxpayers—large financial institutions—thought to
disproportionately benefit from regulatory protection against systemic
risks.295

financial system.”); Hynes & Walt, supra note 217, at 990 (noting speed as a reason for
extraordinary FDIC control over bank resolutions).
288. See supra notes 102–15 and accompanying text.
289. Another possible reason that the OLA regime may not often be implemented in practice is
the harshness of its mandatory liquidation rules. See Mark A. McDermott and David R. Turetsky,
Restructuring Large, Systemically-Important Financial Companies: An Analysis of the Orderly
Liquidation Authority, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act, 19
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 401, 404 (2011).
290. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(n)(1), 124 Stat. 1506 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390) (establishing
“Orderly Liquidation Fund”).
291. Id. § 210(n)(2).
292. Id. § 210(n)(5).
293. See, e.g., id. at Preamble; id. § 112(a)(1)(B) (council’s purpose to eliminate expectations
that government will shield companies from loss in the event of failure); id. § 166 (authorizing
regulations for early remediation of a Federal Reserve-supervised bank holding company “except
that nothing in this subsection authorizes the provision of financial assistance from the Federal
Government”); id. § 204(a)(1) (orderly liquidation authority to be exercised so that “creditors and
shareholders will bear the losses of the financial company”); id. § 214(c) (“Taxpayers shall bear
no losses from the exercise of any authority under this title.”).
294. Id. § 210(o)(1) (providing risk-based assessments on bank holding companies with total
consolidated assets equal to or greater than $50 billion and on certain nonbank financial
companies).
295. In earlier work on bailouts, I classified similar funding through a subset of taxpayers
regarded as receiving disproportionate benefits as “special fund bailouts.” See Block, Measuring
Bailout Cost, supra note 8, at 165–66; see also Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts, supra note 202,
at 963–64.
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c. Mandatory Liquidation
Once the systemic risk determination is made and the FDIC appoints a
receiver in accordance with statutory procedures, there is no turning back;
the only resolution for a financial entity in the event of a “systemic risk
determination” is liquidation. As Dodd-Frank makes clear, the OLA’s
purpose is “to provide the necessary authority to liquidate failing financial
companies that pose a significant risk to the financial stability of the United
States in a manner that mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard.”296
The FDIC has largely been stripped of its “quasi-resolution” authority to
provide assistance to banks in danger of default, and instead is limited to
winding up and liquidating banks and nonbank financial institutions subject
to its resolution authority. Simply put, regulators are authorized only to
manage the patient’s death.
Though orderly liquidation is mandatory once a financial institution is
placed in receivership pursuant to a systemic risk determination, the FDIC
retains substantial discretion to manage the winding-up process and
otherwise structure the liquidation. For example, the FDIC is authorized to
make loans to the receivership estate, purchase its debt obligations, assume
or guarantee debts, and to arrange P&A-type transactions, which may
include loss sharing agreements.297 The FDIC is also authorized to establish
and fund a bridge institution to continue operations of the failed financial
company in receivership.298 In addition, though subject to restrictions designed to limit its authority to give preferential treatment to long-term
stakeholders, the FDIC has “discretion, upon appropriate determination, to
make payments or credit amounts . . . to or for some creditors but not
others similarly situated at the same level of payment priority.”299 Professor
Wilmarth argues that such authority to provide preferential treatment to
short-term creditors will create “at least two perverse results,” including “an
implicit subsidy to short-term creditors of SIFIs and . . . encourage[ment
for] SIFIs to rely even more heavily on vulnerable, short-term funding
strategies.”300 Wilmarth further argues that, despite congressional “no more
bailout” claims, this discretion “gives the FDIC considerable leeway to

296. Dodd-Frank Act § 204(a), 124 Stat. 1454–55 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384) (emphasis
added).
297. Id.; id. § 210(a)(1)(G) (General Powers). See supra notes 221–29 and accompanying text
(discussion of P&A transactions).
298. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(h), 124 Stat. 1496 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5385). Cf. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(n) (similar FDIC authority for ordinary bank resolutions).
299. Certain Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,626, 41,644 (July 15, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380) (final regulations implementing certain OLA provisions). The
regulations explicitly provide, however, that the FDIC cannot use its discretion to “give
preferential treatment to certain long-term senior debt . . . , and that subordinated debt and equity
will never qualify for preferential treatment.” Id. at 41,628.
300. Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 13, at 998–99.
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provide de facto bailouts for favored creditors of failed SIFIs.”301 Such de
facto bailouts, which favor some creditors over others, are potentially more
discriminatory than direct assistance to prevent the failure of a failing
financial institution. In contrast to a preferential treatment de facto bailout,
a direct assistance bailout that successfully prevents the financial
institution’s collapse presumably treats all stakeholders equally.
III. THE PRIVATE-PUBLIC RESOLUTION CONTINUUM
A. INTRODUCTION
A bizarre twist in the principle-reality divide with respect to the
regulation and resolution of systemically important financial institutions is
that prudential regulation theoretically envisions increasingly strict
enforcement along a risk-based continuum, but regulators in practice often
fail to implement such incremental enforcement with respect to large,
interconnected financial institutions. In contrast, resolution rules have
increasingly restricted regulators’ discretion to assist struggling financial
institutions, yet regulators in practice have often found ways to bypass such
restrictions. What the public—and perhaps Congress itself—fails to
appreciate is the extent of the government’s existing involvement in making
allocation of risk determinations with respect to private business failures. In
fact, allocation of risk devices can be plotted along a private-public
continuum. Some government interventions along this continuum cost real
tax dollars. Others threaten general tax revenues only to the extent that
government involvement requires federal employee time and other
administrative resources. Collective hackles go up when the public
perceives government-funded assistance or “bailouts” to large, private
firms. Yet, regulatory forbearance or other less visible forms of “bailouttype” intervention can provide comparable assistance to struggling firms at
equal or perhaps even greater federal budgetary expense. The public and
legislative obsession with prohibiting “bailouts” makes it more difficult to
ask the right questions in choosing appropriate resolution mechanisms
along this continuum. In the end, simply declaring an “end to bailouts” may
cause some bailout-like activity to go underground. Moreover, when truly
dire emergency looms, Congress is likely to renege on its “no more bailout”
promise in any event.
The sections that follow develop a taxonomy or classification system
for risk allocation mechanisms along a private-public continuum. At a
minimum, classification systems can provide the satisfaction of apparent
order in an otherwise chaotic world. Still, unless the resulting classifications
suggest different policy responses or offer greater clarity of analysis, the
categorization, labeling, or placement of any particular phenomenon on a
301. Id. at 999.
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grid or continuum adds little. Thus, an important first step before moving
forward with any risk allocation classification is to consider the significance
of the “bailout” label or of a particular risk allocation device’s location on
the private-public continuum. First, and most important, attaching the
“bailout” label to a particular intervention is an indication that government
is making an allocative judgment with regard to actual or potential business
loss—in other words, an exception to the general free-market norm. As
such, it suggests that a particular business or industry is receiving
preferential treatment. To the extent that government assistance is funded
with general revenues, businesses that are large or integrated enough to
have a potentially systemic economic impact receive assistance at the
expense of general taxpayers, including smaller businesses facing similar
economic woes without government assistance. Even absent the use of
government funds, so-called “private” bailouts that have been brokered or
otherwise facilitated by government officials provide preferential treatment
to assisted entities, which thereby benefit from government provided
services that are not generally available to other struggling businesses.
Such preferential treatment is not necessarily wrong, and may even be
necessary in particular emergency circumstances.302 The challenge is that
by its very nature, a bailout externalizes risk in the interest of a greater
common good; it may protect those who do not in principle deserve
protection. 303 At a minimum, such preferential treatment requires special
sensitivity to procedures ensuring that benefits received by the failing
business and burdens imposed upon those asked to bear the costs are
equitably distributed. Sensitivity to equitable allocation of burdens should
be required whether this risk externalization takes the form of direct federal
expenditures, regulatory forbearance, or other more covert forms of
government assistance.
B. THE PRIVATE END OF THE RISK ALLOCATION CONTINUUM
1. No Risk Allocation Mechanism is Purely Private
Before briefly exploring the range of private risk allocation alternatives,
one should begin by acknowledging that the notion of a purely private
risk allocation regime is a myth. 304 Even so-called “private” devices for

302. This is where Professor Anna Gelpern’s point about “containment” policy sometimes
requiring that rules be broken becomes relevant. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
303. As one Federal Reserve official conceded in connection with the bailout of Franklin
National Bank in the mid-1970s, sometimes “intervention in the interests of the public and the
economy as a whole can have the incidental effect of protecting large depositors from the proper
consequences of their risk-taking.” James H. Oltman, Failing Banks—The Role of the Fed, 27
ADMIN. L. REV. 317, 317, 319 (1975).
304. Describing what he refers to as “[t]he myth of laissez-faire,” for example, Cass Sunstein
observes that
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allocating risk depend upon a background political system and
infrastructure to support a stable environment in which markets can
flourish, and a background legal system through which private parties can
assert claims and resolve disputes. In addition to simply providing the
necessary infrastructure to support otherwise purely private risk allocations,
the government’s background presence is also ubiquitous as a risk
allocation manager with regard to many specific types of otherwise private
transactions.305 Examples of government as risk manager include: (1) corporate law, which generally entitles shareholders to limited liability;306 (2)
the bankruptcy regime, which establishes ex ante a hierarchy of stakeholder
claims against the debtor in the event of business failure; (3) workers’
insurance; and (4) product liability laws. Thus, even the “private” allocation
devices discussed in the subsections that follow must necessarily fall at
least slightly to the right of the purely private end on the private-public
continuum.
2. Ex Ante Private Risk Allocation
a. Private Insurance
Aside from specific private contract risk allocation clauses, the
allocation device that perhaps falls closest to the private end of the riskallocation continuum is private insurance. Private insurance pools risk by
collecting premiums from a group of policyholders, using the aggregate
proceeds to cover losses incurred by individual members of the group.
Members of the group with lower than average losses effectively subsidize
others with higher than average losses, thus permitting loss spreading
within the private insured group. Unlike most other financial institutions
subject to government regulation, private insurers are regulated almost
exclusively by individual states, as opposed to the federal government.307

[f]ree markets depend for their existence on law. . . . [M]arkets should be understood as
a legal construct, to be evaluated on the basis of whether they promote human interests,
rather than as a part of nature and the natural order, or as a simple way of promoting
voluntary interactions.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 5 (1997).
305. For an overview of the many different government systems or regimes that serve risk
allocation functions, see generally DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS
THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002).
306. Similar limited liability is provided to the limited partners in a limited partnership,
investors in limited liability companies (LLCs), and investors in other permissible limited liability
business structures.
307. See supra note 122 (describing state regulation of insurance).
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b. Hedging and Derivatives
Hedging and derivative transactions can be extremely useful risk
allocation vehicles to protect businesses against price or other changes that
may significantly affect profitability. Early generation derivative
transactions were primarily used by agricultural businesses to protect
themselves against changes in commodity prices. A cereal manufacturer
needing access to raw corn for manufacturing purposes, for example, would
enter into a derivative contract to offset potential corn price increases. If
prices increased, gain from the derivative contact could be used to offset
“loss” or additional expense incurred from the increased production
expense.308
Modern financial hedging and derivatives contracts now include
gambles on innumerable assets, financial indicators, or events in which the
investors often have no direct interest.309 Over the past decade, the volume
and variety of derivatives-type financial instruments has grown
dramatically.310 Although contracts sold on exchanges were regulated prior
to the recent economic crisis, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and credit
default swap markets were not. In 2008, SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox,
complained that “[t]he regulatory black hole for credit default swaps is one
of the most significant issues we are confronting in the current credit
crisis.” 311 Dodd-Frank’s more extensive ex ante prudential regulation of

308. Both the farmer, who is “helpless before the risks of weather and insects,” and the food
processor, “who faces the opposite risk,” may benefit from a hedging-type exchange, thus
lowering “total risk in the economy.” PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE
REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 306 (1998). The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 created the
Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA) to regulate domestic agricultural product futures
exchanges. Commodity Exchange, ch. 545 § 1, 49 Stat. 1491, 1491 (1936) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1974)). In 1974, Congress created the Commodity Future
Trading Commission (CFTC), and expanded authority to regulate virtually all commodities,
including financial instruments, traded on commodities markets. Commodity Futures Trading Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, §§ 101(a), 201(b), 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C. (1974)).
309. See generally Adam H. Rosenzweig, Imperfect Financial Markets and the Hidden Costs of
a Modern Income Tax, 62 S.M.U. L. REV. 239 (2009) (describing financial derivatives as
“permit[ing] willing counterparties to bet on a risky asset without investing capital in the asset
itself because [they] are nothing more than executory contracts between two parties based on the
value of some reference. . . . , the contract has no inherent financial value but rather derives its
value from the underlying reference”); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 20–26 (describing basic
types of derivatives).
310. Some attribute the explosive growth in derivatives markets to substantial deregulation by
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, tit. I, 114 Stat.
2763, 2763A465. See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 242, at 48.
311. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at SEC Roundtable
on Modernizing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Disclosure System (Oct. 8, 2008)
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch100808cc.htm).
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derivatives markets will be important for protecting investors.312 Nonetheless, the government’s involvement in risk allocation is very limited with
respect to hedging and derivatives contracts, leaving such transactions near
the private end of the private-public risk continuum.
c. Securitization
Securitization involves the bundling of loans from different banks or
lenders into packages for sale to investors. Pooling the loans into one
investment effectively diversifies risk or minimizes the impact of
occasional defaults. Among the most common securitization devices is the
pooling of multiple mortgage loans into mortgage-backed securities
(MBSs). In effect, mortgage-backed securities function as a type of
derivative. They can diversify not only default risk, but also interest rate
volatility risk. In fact, the opportunity to diversify interest rate risk may be
one major reason for the growth of mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
markets.313
Unfortunately, securitization transactions evolved to include complex
financial instruments in which increasingly risky loans could be hidden,
making such instruments difficult to understand and value. 314 As the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission noted in its report on factors
contributing to the recent Great Recession, securitization became “a boon
for commercial banks [and] investment banks.”315 This boon quickly turned
to economic crisis when real estate markets collapsed during the Great
Recession. 316 Prior to Dodd-Frank, securitization instruments including
mortgage and other asset-backed securities were largely unregulated.
Though it falls far short of establishing a comprehensive regulatory regime,
Dodd-Frank includes modest reforms regarding regulation of securitization
instruments. 317 Like hedging and derivatives trading, securitization func312. Dodd-Frank Act at tit. IV, 124 Stat. 1570–80 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(Regulation of Advisers to Hedge Funds) (§§ 401–419); id. at tit. VII (Regulation of Swap
Markets) (§§ 721–774).
313. See DARRYL E. GETTER, MARK JICKING, MARC LABONTE & EDWARD V. MURPHY,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34182, FINANCIAL CRISIS? THE LIQUIDITY CRUNCH OF AUGUST 5
2007 (explaining development of MBS market “in part because long-term fixed rate mortgages
held in banks’ portfolios place banks at significant risk if interest rates rise (in which case the
banks’ interest costs could exceed their mortgage interest earnings)”).
314. Hedging, and other involvement with MBS transactions played a significant part in the
downfall of investment bank, Bear Stearns, when the housing market began to collapse in 2007.
See BEAR STEARNS, supra note 119, at 2 (describing Bear Stearn’s “vertically integrated
involvement that ranged from purchase and operation of residential mortgage originators to
packaging and underwriting vast pools of mortgages into . . . MBS”).
315. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 242, at 44.
316. See supra notes 314–15.
317. In a provision colloquially described as a “skin in the game” rule, Dodd-Frank requires
banking agencies to prescribe regulations “to require any securitizer to retain an economic interest
in a portion of the credit risk for any asset that the securitizer, through the issuance of an assetbacked security, transfers, sells, or conveys to a third party.” Dodd-Frank Act § 941(b), 124 Stat.
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tions as a private risk allocation device, which belongs close to the private
end of the risk allocation continuum.
3. Ex Post Private Allocations
a. Private Rescue Efforts by Stakeholders
Private “rescue groups” may sometimes coalesce with little or no
outside prompting to save struggling businesses in which the groups have a
financial interest. Direct stakeholders in a troubled business understandably
may wish to cooperate in rescue efforts so as to protect their own creditor
interests. As a result, they may agree to provide emergency loans or
otherwise privately negotiate a restructuring of the struggling company’s
obligations to forestall the company’s bankruptcy. In 2009, for example,
CIT Group (CIT), a company specializing in financial advice and lending to
small and middle-market businesses, found itself struggling despite its
initial receipt of assistance through the U.S. Treasury Department TARP
program. 318 Unable to obtain additional TARP funding, CIT instead received $3 billion in emergency loans from bondholders “willing to throw
the foundering lender a financial lifeline” to forestall an imminent
bankruptcy.319 As it continued teetering towards bankruptcy, CIT received
another $4.5 billion in emergency loans from investors.320 CIT stakeholders
in this case made an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to arrange what is
referred to as an “informal workout,” which operates effectively as a private
bankruptcy arrangement.
b. Rescues by Competitors or Other Private Parties
Perhaps surprisingly, private rescue groups may form even among
competitors with no direct financial stake in the struggling enterprise. Given
the interlocking nature of many business activities and financial
investments, the failure of one institution can lead to “financial contagion.”
Thus, it may be in competitors’ interests to help one another in order to
avoid severe economic harm to a particular industry.321 During the early

1376, 1891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a). See also id. § 942 (requiring disclosures and reporting
for asset-backed securities).
318. The Treasury Department’s Office of Financial Stability (OFS) invested $2.3 billion in
exchange for CIT senior preferred stock under the TARP Capital Purchase Program. U.S. DEP’T
OF TREAS., OFFICE OF FINAN. STABILITY, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 97.
319. Binyamin Appelbaum, CIT Group Strikes Deal with Creditors to Avoid Bankruptcy,
WASH. POST, Jul. 21, 2009, at A11; see also Michael J. de la Merced, CIT to Get Financing from
Bondholders, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2009, at B7.
320. See Michael J. de la Merced, CIT Rejects Icahn Offer; Its Creditors Extend Loan, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2009, at B3.
321. Some economists even suggest that in certain cases, a linked network “may be optimal
both because of and despite the potential for contagion.” Yaron Leitner, Financial Networks:
Contagion, Commitment, and Private Sector Bailouts, 60 J. FIN. 2925, 2925 (2005). Leitner
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period before creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, the rescuing
hero role was often played by influential private bankers, such as J.P.
Morgan, Sr. and Jr. According to one report, “[w]hen the banking system
was swept with panic and illiquidity, it was Morgan who organized the loan
syndicates among major banks that came to the rescue. Morgan and his men
made the choices about which banks would be saved and which ones
allowed to fail.”322 In fact, the House of Morgan played a major role in
responding to virtually all of the significant economic crises of the era.323
Even if individual businesses share a common interest in avoiding
contagion, a large group will not contribute towards a collective good
unless it can overcome what is commonly referred to as the “collective
action” problem. Although individual banks would probably be delighted to
“free-ride” off assistance to a troubled bank provided by fellow
competitors, no one bank has the incentive to assist a weaker competitor by
itself. In his work on collective action, Mancur Olson observed that large
groups may fail to act collectively without coercion or outside inducements.
Members of such large groups have insufficient incentives to contribute
because they presume that others are already participating and that their
failure to contribute will go unnoticed.324 Even in the case of intermediatesized groups—a situation in which a member’s absence would be noticed—
Olson argues that “no collective good may ever be obtained without some
group coordination or organization.”325 Thus, the problem sometimes standing in the way of privately organized rescues is the lack of a central
facilitator or coordinator.
Before the Federal Reserve Bank was established in 1913, private banks
themselves formed clearing houses, which under normal circumstances
were used to settle accounts among banks. In times of crisis, however, the
clearing houses acted as lenders of last resort and provided other assistance
to weaker members of the group. During bank panics in the early twentieth
century, for example, the New York Clearing House not only provided
emergency funding to members, but also to non-member banks and

argues that the very threat of contagion “can motivate banks to help one another, even in cases in
which they could not precommit to do so.” Id. at 2926.
322. WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE
COUNTRY 269 (1987).
323. During the 1907 panic, for example, J.P. Morgan, Sr. not only assisted with his own funds,
but reportedly locked all of New York City’s major bank and trust presidents in his library until
they came up with resources to rescue the Trust Company of America, Lincoln Trust, and the
Moore & Schley brokerage house. RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN
BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 127–28 (1990); JEAN STROUSE,
MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER 586–87 (HarperPerennial 2000)).
324. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 50–51 (1965).
325. Id. at 50.
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trusts.326 When economic crisis occurred, the existing clearing house provided a ready structure, thus overcoming the collective action problem that
might otherwise have prevented banks from coming together to provide
emergency assistance to their competitors. The clearing house thus played
an important role as facilitator and coordinator—a role today played by the
Federal Reserve Bank, the FDIC, and sometimes the U.S. Treasury
Department.327
C. QUASI-PUBLIC RISK ALLOCATION MECHANISMS
1. The Private Tort Regime Versus Government Criminal and
Civil Collection Efforts
a. Private Tort Litigants
Under the common law tort system, the burden of loss for wrongful acts
is placed on the wrongdoer. Unless parties agree to settle their claims
without litigation, the government is at least minimally involved in
resolving the dispute. Other than court administration costs, however, no
government funds are used or risked. If the plaintiff is successful, the
disputed loss is allocated to the defendant; if not, it remains with the
plaintiff. Although the court is involved in choosing winners and losers, its
role in a tort action is to act as a fair and impartial arbiter of disputes
between the parties; it does not exercise allocative discretion, and is not
taking broader governmental or societal interests into account in its decision
making. Also, the court cannot choose its plaintiffs, nor can it turn any
away; the courthouse door is open to all. The government’s limited
administrative presence is the feature that converts what would otherwise be
a purely private allocation vehicle into one that is “quasi-public.”
b. Government as Litigator
Financial crisis can sometimes be triggered or fueled by the fraud,
manipulation, or other wrongdoing of private parties. Much of the 1980s
savings and loan crisis, for example, was allegedly attributed to “outright
fraud and insider abuse.”328 Banking and securities regulators have authority to pursue criminal charges for bank and securities fraud, and may seek to
collect penalties or damages.329 Government litigators may also pursue civil

326. See ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 57–64 (2007); FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 159.
327. For discussion of government brokered or facilitated “rescues,” see infra notes 347–58 and
accompanying text.
328. H.R. REP. NO. 101-54, pt. 1, at 294 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 90 (House
Report on the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989).
329. For example, Wall Street arbitrager, Ivan Boesky “[pled] guilty to insider trading . . . and
agreed to pay [a] $100 million” fine, setting up a special compensation fund for defrauded
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actions against wrongdoers to recoup losses on behalf of defrauded
investors. 330 The government’s involvement in such litigation places this
type of risk allocation device further in the public direction along the
private-public continuum than tort litigation initiated by private plaintiffs.
And, such action imposes the “prosecution” costs upon general taxpayers.
Still, to the extent that the government is successful in such cases, at least a
substantial portion of the burden of loss is allocated “privately” to parties
ultimately held responsible.
Emergency circumstances understandably require quick action, suggesting that the criminal law and the tort model are not viable tools for regulators faced with imminent potential systemic risk. Nonetheless, subsequent
government collection action can supplement any initial emergency response, ultimately imposing costs on wrongdoers. The question for government regulators and officials is whether they should dedicate public resources to such “clawback” collection efforts against wrongdoers. From a
purely general revenue perspective, the answer depends on a cost-benefit
analysis of anticipated government collections. More broadly, the assessment should consider deterrent effects resulting from forcing wrongdoers to
internalize costs. Even if government-collected funds are not added to general revenues, successful collection on behalf of private victims would presumably promote valuable public confidence and goodwill.
2. Private Bankruptcy Regime
Like tort actions, bankruptcy proceedings are court-supervised
resolutions of private financial matters. In both cases, government funds are
not spent or risked other than those needed to administer the system—a
system publicly available to all. If successful, Chapter 11 bankruptcy
reorganization is essentially a court supervised, but privately funded,
“rescue” of the insolvent debtor. Despite initial similarities, the
government’s more substantial role in bankruptcy-related risk allocation
determinations places private bankruptcy to the “public” side of torts on the
private-public risk allocation continuum. Unlike the common law tort
system, the bankruptcy regime is administered by special bankruptcy courts
governed by a federal bankruptcy code. As an initial matter, the mere fact
of a bankruptcy code in itself suggests the government’s greater
involvement in making allocation of risk or loss determinations in private
investors. Bloomberg Business News, Boesky Payout to Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 12, 1993, § 1,
at 39. See also Richard W. Stevenson, Keating Convicted of Securities Fraud in S & L’s Collapse,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at A1 (Charles Keating convicted on bank fraud charges in connection
with the Lincoln Savings & Loan Association failure).
330. See generally Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500 (2011)
(analyzing the conflicting interests and concerns of regulatory agency, private class action, and
bankruptcy as tools for allocating compensation to victims of financial fraud). Id. at 500–03
(discussing various actions to recoup assets from Bernard L. Madoff to compensate victims of
Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme).
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bankruptcy matters. Moreover, though the code does not predetermine the
status of all claimants, to the extent that the bankruptcy code does establish
a predefined hierarchy of creditor rights, Congress is making decisions
about relative distribution of losses. 331 In addition, the bankruptcy code
requires court approval of reorganization plans, major assets sales, and
other significant business decisions of the bankruptcy trustee or the
bankrupt “debtor-in-possession” during the bankruptcy process. Though
bankruptcy judges are bound to exercise their authority according to
code-specified standards,332 they retain significant autonomy and discretion.
Thus, judges in bankruptcy are more directly involved in substantive
allocations of private loss than judges in tort matters.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code explicitly provides rules for two major types
of business bankruptcy: (1) Chapter 7 liquidations, which terminate the
debtor’s business after selling off assets to satisfy creditor claims;333 and (2)
Chapter 11 reorganizations, which permit restructuring and potential
rehabilitation of the company.334 Perhaps the most significant Chapter 11
reorganization policy challenge is balancing the debtor’s—and presumably
also the public’s—interest in restructuring the failing business as a viable
concern against creditors’ interests in a fair distribution of payments under
circumstances in which the debtor is unlikely to satisfy all creditor claims in
full. With respect to the former, debtors are entitled to certain benefits
through the process, including: (1) the ability to raise capital by issuing new
“debtor-in-possession” equity to investors who will take priority over other
creditors;335 (2) subject to notice and hearing requirements, the right to sell
assets free of liens and liabilities;336 and (3) the right to an “automatic stay”
against most collection efforts and other legal claims.337

331. To the extent that the Bankruptcy Code’s allocation hierarchy is publicized ex ante, those
extending credit presumably are better informed regarding risk, and the market may be better able
to value debt and equity instruments. This assumes investor confidence that the Bankruptcy
Code’s claim priority rules will be enforced.
332. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b), 1129.
333. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (2006) (Chapter 7—Liquidation). The Code also includes special
bankruptcy rules for municipalities (11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946), family farms (11 U.S.C. §§ 1201–
1231 (2006)), and individuals with regular income (11 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1330 (2006)). Certain
classes of business debtors are not covered at all by the regular bankruptcy rules. The latter
distinct categories are considered at infra notes 372–90 and accompanying text.
334. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174 (2006) (Chapter 11—Reorganization). Chapter 11’s legislative
history reflects its purpose to permit a business to restructure “so that it may continue to operate,
provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its shareholders” on the
premise that “assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are
more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179.
335. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006). For a general discussion of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing,
see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present, and Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1905 (2004).
336. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006).
337. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006).
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The traditional path through Chapter 11 envisions a formal “plan of
reorganization,” which must meet statutorily enumerated requirements
designed to protect and prioritize different classes of claimants.338 Chapter
11 calls for the appointment of various creditor committees, with the idea
that these committees will adequately and fairly represent the interests of
different claim holders.339 Ideally, the goal is for all classes of claim holders
to approve the plan of reorganization.340 Once the plan has been accepted by
all classes of creditors, the plan must still be approved or “confirmed” by
bankruptcy court order.341 A reorganization plan—sometimes referred to as
a “cram-down”—can be approved over the objections of dissenting classes
of creditors, but only if it “does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and
equitable with respect to each class of claims . . . that is impaired under, and
has not accepted, the plan.”342
As an alternative to the “plan of reorganization” path through Chapter
11, debtors have increasingly turned to a procedure permitted under
Bankruptcy Code § 363, which allows the bankruptcy trustee—subject to
statutory notice and hearing requirements—to sell or lease the debtor’s
assets “other than in the ordinary course of business.” 343 Although this
“§ 363 sale” provision can be used by the debtor to sell selected assets
338. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (listing fourteen requirements for court approval of liquidation plan).
See also 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (required contents of reorganization plan). The bankruptcy code
requires only that claims within each class be “substantially similar.” 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a). It does
not require that all “substantially similar” claims be included within one class. Unless the holder
agrees to less favorable treatment, the reorganization plan must treat all claims within a particular
class alike. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4).
339. The process generally begins with appointment of an unsecured creditors committee, 11
U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), and additional committees upon request of a party in interest by court order
“if necessary to assure adequate representation of creditors or of equity security holders.” 11
U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2). The committee is ordinarily made up of “persons willing to serve, that hold
the seven largest claims against the debtor of the kinds represented on the committee.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 1102(b)(1) (committee of creditors). See also § 1102(b)(2) (similar language for equity security
holder committees).
340. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (requirements for approval by classes of claims).
341. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (listing fourteen requirements for court approval).
342. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). See also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (requirements of a “fair and
equitable” plan).
343. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006). This provision is also used for sales of selected debtor assets.
According to the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Data Base, which tracks bankruptcy
trends, § 363 sales of large public bankruptcies represented 9 percent and 2 percent of total such
bankruptcies in 1991 and 1992 respectively, becoming increasingly popular in the latter part the
decade, increasing into the current decade to a high of 38 percent. The data show a drop, however,
in 2009–2010. 363 Sales of All or Substantially All Assets in Large, Public Company
Bankruptcies, as a Percentage of all Cases Disposed, by Year of Case Disposition, UCLA
LoPucki Bankr. Res. Database, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/tables_and_graphs/363_sale
_percentage_graph_1_19_2012.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). The trend has been greeted by the
academic bankruptcy community with mixed reviews. See Daniel Keating, Automobile
Bankruptcies, Retiree Benefits, and the Futility of Springing Priorities in Chapter 11
Reorganizations, 96 IOWA L. REV. 261, 261 (2010); George W. Kuney, Let’s Make It Official:
Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale Process as an Alternative Exit from Bankruptcy, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 1265, 1266 (2004).
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during the bankruptcy process, the trend of interest for purposes of this
Article is the increasing use of “§ 363 sales” to dispose of the entire
insolvent debtor’s business.344 One concern with the lump-sum “§ 363 sale”
is that it might be used as device to bypass Chapter 11 creditor protections
and required court confirmation of the plan of reorganization; in other
words, the purported “sale” might be a “plan of reorganization” in
disguise—a plan sub rosa.345 Prepackaged “§ 363 sales” were very important in structuring the Chrysler and General Motors (GM) bankruptcies in
2009. The government’s involvement was so pervasive that the recent auto
industry Chapter 11 reorganizations represent allocation of loss
mechanisms much further in the public direction along the private-public
risk allocation continuum. As such, they are considered in a separate section
below.346
3. Publicly Facilitated Private Risk Allocation
It is almost impossible today to imagine any one private person with the
wealth, power, and force of personality to coordinate massive privatelyfunded emergency financial assistance as the House of Morgan did during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.347 In the absence of such
powerhouses, federal government officials have sometimes stepped in at
times of crisis—not to provide funding or assume any risk—but simply to
facilitate or broker private solutions. One notable illustration is the 1980
silver speculation and market scandal involving brothers, Nelson Baker and
William Herbert Hunt. The Hunts’ imminent default on silver investment
debts threatened to trigger massive silver position liquidations and a
potentially dramatic systemic chain reaction. Late night negotiations
ultimately led to a $1.1 billion emergency loan to the Hunts from
a consortium of private banks. 348 According to one telling of the story,
Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker was infuriated at reports of his
participation in negotiations through the night, “mainly because of the
suggestion that he had bailed out the Hunts, but also because of the
suggestion that so august a central banker should have been wandering
344. Despite some differences, sales in bankruptcy under § 363 are the private equivalent of
publicly-structured bank resolutions by purchase and assumption (P&A). See supra notes 221–28
and accompanying text.
345. The first apparent judicial reference to a “§ 363 sale” as a potential “plan sub rosa,” was in
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The
debtor and the Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11
for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of the plan sub rosa in
connection with the sale of assets.”).
346. See infra notes 434–69 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 322–23 and accompanying text.
348. For a colorful description of events, see STEPHEN FAY, BEYOND GREED: HOW THE TWO
RICHEST FAMILIES IN THE WORLD, THE HUNTS OF TEXAS AND THE HOUSE OF SAUD, TRIED TO
CORNER THE SILVER MARKET–HOW THEY FAILED, WHO STOPPED THEM, AND WHY IT COULD
HAPPEN AGAIN 225–42 (1982).
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about in his pajamas.”349 Volcker later testified that his involvement was
limited to keeping informed of developments. He insisted that “neither I nor
any Federal Reserve or Government official instigated or guided the
negotiation of the credit.”350 Directly contradicting Volcker’s description of
events, Andrew Brimmer, a former Federal Reserve Board member and
then public director of the largest metals future exchange, , reported that
Volcker “played a key role” in negotiations and “approved the
arrangement.”351 Brimmer, in fact, included the silver crisis as an illustration of intervention by the Federal Reserve that successfully “forestalled the
collapse of several broker-dealer firms, and . . . averted significant loan
losses by a number of banks.”352
Whatever the accuracy of reports that government officials were
involved in negotiating private loans for the Hunts, additional evidence
suggests that the silver episode involved more than a purely private rescue.
As structured, the emergency loan to the Hunts apparently violated special
credit restraint rules imposed by the Federal Reserve in order to slow the
volume of borrowing for speculative purposes. Volcker’s approval was
necessary to bypass those rules.353 This type of regulatory forbearance is an
illustration of what might be referred to as a covert bailout.354
Another modern instance of the government-facilitated private rescue
was the Federal Reserve’s 1998 intervention to broker a private rescue plan
for major U.S. hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management (LTCM).355
Given substantial intersecting relationships among LTCM and other banks
and financial firms, federal officials were concerned that LTCM’s
bankruptcy might have a disastrous economic impact. William
McDonough, President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, worked
with domestic and international bankers to broker the terms of a private
deal.356
349. Id. at 229.
350. Silver Prices and the Adequacy of Federal Actions in the Marketplace, 1979–80: Hearings
Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the H. Comm. on
Gov’t Operations, 96th Cong. 210 (1980) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of
Governors, Federal Reserve System).
351. Andrew F. Brimmer, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Central
Banking and Systemic Risks in Capital Markets, 3 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1989, at 3, 5, 10–11.
352. Id. at 16.
353. See, e.g., id. at 11 (explaining that the Hunt lending agreement violated Federal Reserve
credit restraint guidelines; such agreement could not have occurred without the Federal Reserve
Chair’s approval).
354. See Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts, supra note 202, at 968−72 (explaining the various
forms of covert bailouts); see also Block, Measuring Bailout Cost, supra note 8, at 206−28 (costs
of covert or hidden bailouts).
355. STEPHEN H. AXILROD, INSIDE THE FED: MONETARY POLICY AND ITS MANAGEMENT,
MARTIN THROUGH GREENSPAN TO BERNANKE 145−50 (2009) (describing Federal Reserve
involvement in efforts to save LTCM).
356. For a colorful report on LTCM’s rise and fall, see ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS
FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000).
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Publicly brokered, but privately funded, rescues of failing companies do
not involve substantial federal budget expenditures. Even so, public
spending is not a necessary characteristic of bailouts; some are even
“profitable bailouts.”357 One difference between government-facilitated and
profitable bailouts is that even though the latter impose no ultimate
financial burden on the taxpayer—and may even ultimately generate
government revenue—they put taxpayers at risk in ways that merely
government-facilitated bailouts do not. Had economic circumstances been
different in the profitable bailout case, the result might have been
significant federal revenue losses. How does a private rescue become a
public bailout simply because the government has facilitated the
transaction? And, does it really matter what we call it? The answer depends
in part on the concern behind the labeling. If the concern is simply federal
budget cost, then perhaps a government-facilitated rescue should not be
considered a bailout. My concern, though, is not limited to the risk of loss,
but also the risk of differential treatment. Unless the government always
acts as facilitator in cases of similarly situated companies or industries
faced with economic distress, the mere decision to intervene in the first
instance involves the government in picking specific winners and losers.
The government’s choice to facilitate the rescue of one company, but not
another, is effectively redistributive or reallocative. I contend that
government decisions to selectively facilitate or broker even privately
funded rescues of firms or industries are bailout-like interventions.358 To the
extent that government officials influence outcomes by engaging in
negotiations, the government exercises control over redistributive or
reallocative decision making, moving the government’s actions further in
the public direction along the private-public continuum.
D. SUBSTANTIALLY MORE PUBLIC RISK ALLOCATION DEVICES
1. Ex Ante Risk Allocation Through Mandatory Federal
Deposit Insurance
The federal deposit insurance system was perhaps the most significant
legislative reform enacted in response to the Great Depression.359 Rhetoric
in the deposit insurance legislative history emphasized ensuring safe banks
in which “citizens may place their hard earnings with reasonable expectation of being able to get them out again on demand.”360 Called upon to in357. See Block, Measuring Bailout Cost, supra note 8, at 163−64.
358. In earlier work, I defined “bailout” as “a form of government assistance or intervention
specifically designed or intended to assist enterprises facing financial distress and to prevent
enterprise failure.” Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts, supra note 202, at 960.
359. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (creating the FDIC).
Despite revisions over time, the federal deposit insurance system today retains its basic original
structure.
360. 77 CONG. REC. 3837 (1933) (statement of Rep. Henry Steagall, Banking Act co-sponsor).
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terpret the statutory meaning of “deposit” for purposes of federal deposit
insurance rules, the Supreme Court similarly noted that “Congress wanted
to ensure that someone who put tangible assets into a bank could always get
those assets back.” 361 In other words, federal deposit insurance serves a
“depositor protection” function even in the case of an isolated bank failure
with no anticipated systemic spillover effects. Absent deposit insurance, a
single failure could potentially destroy individual financial lives.362 In addition, the actual, threatened, or even merely rumored failure of any one bank
has the potential to trigger “bank runs” even on healthy banks. Thus, the
federal deposit insurance system, established in the aftermath of the Great
Depression, was also intended to restore public confidence and to maintain
financial stability.363
Even though insurance provides direct assistance only to depositors,
insured banks themselves are surely indirect beneficiaries. As a result, the
federal deposit insurance might be regarded as a type of “ex ante bailout.”
Taxpayers are perhaps more tolerant of federal deposit insurance than other
kinds of government-sponsored private business “rescues” because claims
are funded not with general tax revenues, but from insurance pools
collected through assessments on participating banks. 364 When insurance
pool funds are insufficient, the FDIC is authorized to impose additional
“systemic risk special assessments” on insured institutions, including even
prepaid assessments,365 and also has “backstop” authority to borrow up to
$100 billion from the Treasury Department.366 Even if general revenues are
361. FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 435 (1986).
362. But see Carter H. Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of
Its Antecedents and Its Purposes, 75 POL. SCI. Q. 181, 189 (1960) (arguing that “protection of the
small creditor against loss is incidental to the achievement of the primary objective”: to restore
“circulating medium to the community”).
363. See FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES, supra note 46, at 3 (contribution of federal deposit
insurance was “the restoration of public confidence in banks”); id. (FDIC mission over five
decades has been “to insure bank deposits and reduce the economic disruptions caused by bank
failures”). See also Gail Otsuka Ayabe, The “Brokered Deposit” Regulation: A Response to the
FDIC’s and the FHLBB’s Efforts to Limit Deposit Insurance, 33 UCLA L. REV. 594, 604–08
(1985–1986) (discussing depositor protection and financial stability/public confidence purposes of
federal deposit insurance).
364. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2006) (FDIC’s risk-based assessment rules). The FDIC maintains a
Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) available to depositors in the event that one of its insured banks
fails. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d) (2006). The FDIC is also authorized to use fund resources to cover
other expenses in connection with liquidation or resolution of an insured depository institution.
See also, supra note 32.
365. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(5). See, e.g., 74 Fed. Reg. 25, 689 (Special Assessments) (May 29,
2009). One report described a recently FDIC-imposed $45 billion in prepaid annual assessments
as a “plan financed by the industry to rescue the ailing insurance fund that protects bank
depositors” (i.e., a bailout of the FDIC itself). Stephen Labaton, Banks to Rescue Depleted
F.D.I.C., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, at A1.
366. 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a)(1). Given explicit statutory assurances in Dodd-Frank that its
provisions are not to be construed as limiting the FDIC’s § 1824(a) borrowing authority, DoddFrank Act § 210(n)(8)(A), 124 Stat. 1507 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390), Professor Arthur
Wilmarth argues that “the FDIC could conceivably assert authority to borrow up to $100 billion
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not used to cover depositor losses, mandatory federal deposit insurance
belongs much further in the public direction on the private-public risk
allocation continuum than publicly-brokered private rescues. Given that
banks are not free to opt out, the government in the case of deposit
insurance is significantly involved in making allocative choices.
One additional characteristic establishing the federal deposit insurance
system’s place even further along the private-public continuum is that
taxpayer revenues are potentially at risk in the event that bank assessments
are insufficient to cover depositor claims or to repay FDIC loans from the
Treasury Department. General revenues are at risk first because FDIC
insurance obligations are backed by “full faith and credit” of the federal
government,367 and second, because even uninsured investors believe that
they have implicit government guarantees in the event of substantial loss.
Several precedents give investors good reason to assume this implicit
guarantee. For example, Congress responded to the late 1980s savings and
loan crisis by providing direct assistance to failing banks and covering the
losses of uninsured as well as insured claimants.368 More recently investors’
persistent belief in implicit guarantees with respect to Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac ultimately proved accurate when the government placed the
two mortgage giants in conservatorship and took preferred stock interests in
both companies.369
2. Mandatory Contingent Capital
Mandatory contingent capital is a new concept receiving increased
attention as a way to avoid pressures for publicly-funded bailouts by more
directly imposing risk of loss from large systemic institutions on
stakeholders.370 Unlike ordinary corporate debt instruments, which provide
from the Treasury under § 1824(a) for . . . financing an orderly liquidation of a SIFI outside the
funding parameters of the OLA.” Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 13, at 1000–01 (emphasis in
original). If so, notwithstanding Dodd-Frank, the FDIC might be able “to protect a SIFI’s
uninsured and unsecured creditors as long as such protection ‘maximizes’ the value of the SIFI’s
assets or ‘mitigates the potential for serious adverse effects to the financial system.’” Id.
367. See supra text accompanying note 59.
368. FIRREA, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of the 12 U.S.C.A.).
369. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr.,
on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and
Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm; see also N.
ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34661, FANNIE MAE’S AND FREDDIE MAC’S
FINANCIAL PROBLEMS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1−2 (2008). For general discussion of
the implicit government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) guarantee, see Carol J. Perry, Note,
Rethinking Fannie and Freddie’s New Insolvency Regime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1760–61
(2009); see also David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2008).
370. Dodd-Frank reflects this increased congressional interest in contingent capital. Though it
imposes no contingent capital requirements, Dodd-Frank mandates an FSOC study of “the
feasibility, benefits, costs, and structure of a contingent capital requirement.” Dodd-Frank Act §
115(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1404 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325 (2010)). See also id. § 115(b)(1)(F)
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investors with absolute claims against the corporation, contingent capital
instruments would be structured as convertible subordinated debt. These
subordinated debt instruments are designed to automatically convert into
common stock based upon certain pre-defined indicators of financial
distress. For example, contingent capital might automatically convert to
common stock when the financial entity or bank is designated as “critically
undercapitalized.” The triggering event would effectively change contingent
capital investors’ status from debtors with claims against the failing
institutions to equity owners who bear the speculative downside risk of loss
upon corporate failure.371
3. Insolvencies Not Subject to the Private Bankruptcy Regime
a. Insurance Company Insolvencies
Congress has identified distinct categories of business debtors entitled
to use only limited parts of the regular federal bankruptcy code, or not
entitled to file for federal bankruptcy at all. For example, although DoddFrank added some new federal government regulatory jurisdiction over
designated “systemically important” insurance companies,372 the Act nonetheless left primary regulatory authority over the insurance to the states.373
Similarly, Dodd-Frank preserves primary state government jurisdiction over
insurance company insolvencies, with the exception that the FDIC has
backup authority to place an insurance company into orderly liquidation if
the appropriate state agency has not filed appropriate judicial action to
liquidate an insurance company within sixty days of a “systemic risk
determination.”374
b. Bank Resolution Principles
Like insurance companies, insolvent banks are not eligible to file for
bankruptcy under either the Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 federal bankruptcy
laws applicable to other businesses. 375 Unlike most insurance company
insolvencies, which are generally governed by state law, bank insolvencies

(authorizing FSOC to make prudential standard recommendations, including a contingent capital
requirement). For an excellent article arguing the case for contingent capital, see generally Coffee,
supra note 13.
371. But see Wilmarth, Reforming Financial Regulation, supra note 67, at 760–61 (arguing that
investors would be reluctant to invest in contingent capital, suggesting however that such
requirements might be more feasible if used to compensate senior managers and other key
employees).
372. Pursuant to Dodd-Frank procedures, insurance companies can be classified as SIFIs
subject to enhanced prudential regulation by the Federal Reserve.
373. Dodd-Frank Act § 502(a), 124 Stat. 1585 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 313(k)) (noting
“[r]etention of [e]xisting [s]tate [r]egulatory [a]uthority . . . over the business of insurance”).
374. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(e), 124 Stat. 1454 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383).
375. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d).
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are governed by a special federal insolvency regime, which functions as an
alternative to the federal bankruptcy code.376 Special insolvency rules for
banks are often justified as necessary because of the unique and vital role
that banks play in providing access to liquid funds, extending credit, and
serving as clearing house for processing employee paychecks and other
payments in connection with financial transactions upon which the
economy depends. The underlying fear is that “any interruption in
[banking] activities, . . . would have a more serious adverse impact on the
economy of the insolvent bank’s market area than any interruption in
the operation of other insolvent firms.” 377 In addition, special FDICadministered bank insolvency rules are arguably justified by the FDIC’s
unique responsibility to preserve the federal deposit insurance fund, its
particular banking expertise, and its status as the dominant creditor in most
bank failures.378
c. FDIC Resolutions or “Public Bankruptcies”379
Separate insolvency mechanisms established for distinct classes of
business involve substantially more government intervention than other
quasi-public risk allocation devices.380 In the case of banks, the most significant difference between the special FDIC-administered resolution regime
and the private bankruptcy regime is the level of government control.
Although the private bankruptcy process is supervised by the federal courts,
the judge’s role is limited to that of referee. Bankruptcy judges have the
power to approve or disapprove various transactions and hear claims to
settle disputes among claimants based on statutory priority of claim rules,
but they do not have authority to make substantive decisions about how
losses should be allocated among stakeholders.
Perhaps the most significant evidence of the government’s greater
control with regard to bank insolvencies is the requirement that bank
resolutions be government initiated; a bank cannot choose to file for
bankruptcy. The FDIC has authority to take receivership interests in
failed banks,381 establish and operate “bridge banks” using the failed banks’
assets, and ultimately transfer ownership of the “bridge banks” to new
376. See supra notes 216–28 (discussion of FDIC resolution methods).
377. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 127, at 145.
378. See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now that it Matters Again, 42 DUKE L. J. 469,
475 (1992). See also id. 478–81 (describing history of the U.S. special bank insolvency regime).
379. Given that banks are ineligible to file under the federal bankruptcy code, the term
“bankruptcy” technically cannot apply to them. The analogous label for purposes of the bank
insolvency regime is “resolution.” I sometimes loosely refer to these resolutions as “public
bankruptcies,” thus distinguishing them from “private bankruptcies” governed by the federal
bankruptcy code.
380. See supra notes 331–45 for discussion of private bankruptcy and its place on the privatepublic continuum.
381. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a).
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private owners. 382 Unlike a bankruptcy trustee, the FDIC as receiver has
authority to arrange a P&A transaction without seeking court approval,383
and to make judgments about claims with minimal judicial oversight. 384
According to one observation, the “FDIC enjoys a level of control that a
dominant creditor could only dream of obtaining in bankruptcy.”385
Dodd-Frank has now expanded the FDIC’s resolution authority to cover
not only banks, but also nonbank financial companies if the Treasury
Secretary ultimately makes a “systemic risk determination” with respect
to such a company. 386 Though there are technical differences, the OLA
process triggered by the “systemic risk determination” is generally modeled
after the FDIC’s bank resolution regime. 387 In other words, the FDIC as
receiver now has substantially more control over such nonbank financial
company insolvencies than a trustee in bankruptcy or a bankruptcy judge.
One particular concern with respect to the new OLA authority is that it
leaves room for the FDIC to prefer some claimholders over others. 388
Despite the general statutory requirement that similarly situated claimants
be treated alike, the FDIC has discretion to violate this requirement if
necessary in order to maximize asset value, maximize present value return
or minimize loss from the sale of any assets, or initiate or continue
operations essential to the receivership or any bridge financial company.389
As Professor Arthur Wilmarth concludes, these essentially discretionary
statutory exceptions to the “equal treatment” of claimants rule provide the
FDIC with significant “leeway to provide de facto bailouts for favored
creditors.”390

382. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m), (n).
383. Hynes & Walt, for example, note that the FDIC in a bank resolution can complete a P&A
transaction “long before a judge can conceivably hear an objection. Even if a creditor’s objection
is timely, the law significantly restricts the grounds upon which a creditor can complain about the
sale.” Hynes & Walt, supra note 217, at 989.
384. See id. at 998–99.
385. Hynes & Walt, supra note 217, at 989.
386. See supra notes 275–89.
387. See supra notes 217–32. A detailed discussion of specific differences is beyond the scope
of this Article.
388. See, e.g., Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 13, at 997–98 (“FDIC may give preferential
treatment to certain creditors as long as every creditor receives at least the amount she would have
recovered in a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 of the federal Bankruptcy Code.”); Baird &
Morrison, supra note 278, at 304 (“[FDIC] has broad authority to favor some creditors over others
with equal priority.”). See also supra notes 299–301, and accompanying text.
389. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(b)(4), 124 Stat. 1476 (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5390).
390. Wilmarth, Dodd-Frank, supra note 13, at 999.
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E. TOWARD THE PUBLIC END OF THE PRIVATE-PUBLIC
CONTINUUM
1. Forbearance and Exemptions from Statutory and
Regulatory Requirements
Ordinarily, statutory and regulatory prudential rules function as
forward-looking mechanisms to maintain economic stability and mitigate or
prevent substantial economic harm. As a practical matter, however,
Congress sometimes enacts statutory exceptions—and regulators sometimes
exercise their authority to grant exceptions or their discretion not to enforce
otherwise applicable regulations—as ex post response tools to assist
struggling firms whose failures might pose threats to the overall
economy. 391 Such exemptions or regulatory forbearance potentially may
offer just as much publicly funded assistance as the more direct “bailouts”
that have so angered the public. For example, exempting regulated entities
from otherwise required taxes or fees results in immediate government
costs measurable in foregone revenue.392
Though they involve no immediate general revenue expenditure, other
types of regulatory forbearance or exemption can also effectively function
as “covert” bailouts with significant budgetary impact. For example,
deliberate decisions not to enforce minimum capital and related prudential
bank requirements against certain banks during the late 1980s S&L crisis
facilitated the continued operation of many banks otherwise doomed to fail
in any event. The additional losses incurred by these banks while on “life
support” added substantially to the ultimate budget cost of the subsequent
government S&L rescue.393
Assuming that prudential rules promote a legitimate public interest, the
failure to enforce them necessarily deprives the public of the regulations’
intended benefits. Though the price sometimes may not be obvious or
readily measured, this denial of public benefits, in itself, imposes real costs.
Imposing such costs cannot be justified as a policy matter when regulatory
inaction stems from regulators’ perverse incentives not to act even when
regulatory enforcement would better promote the public interest. On the
other hand, regulators sometimes in good faith determine that
countervailing public values from nonenforcement exceed the public
interest otherwise served by the regulation. In other words, rule breaking
under emergency circumstances may be necessary to protect against
potentially devastating harm that would exceed the public interest value
otherwise served by the regulation.394
391.
392.
393.
394.

See, e.g., supra notes 44–68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 420–27 and accompanying text on tax forbearance.
See supra note 96 (budgetary costs of savings and loan forbearance actions).
See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text for discussion of emergency
“containment” measures.
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I contend that non-enforcement or explicit exemptions, even those
supported by government officials’ plausible, good faith judgments, are
government interventions that belong toward the public end of the risk
allocation continuum. Statutory rules purporting to end bailouts and TBTF
by restricting the more direct or open types of government assistance in
times of economic crisis may simply result in shifting such assistance to
more “covert” forms.
Even when the public interest argument is legitimate, government
officials’ use of discretion to forbear, grant explicit exemptions, or offer
special treatment nonetheless empowers such officials to choose winners
and losers. Recognizing this type of action (or inaction) to assist private
failing firms as bailout-type government interventions would be an
important first step toward greater transparency. Such transparency, in turn,
should lead to greater scrutiny of regulators’ decisions to assist particular
private businesses, allowing the public to raise questions about the equities
involved with respect to particular winners and losers. In addition, an
accurate assessment of aggregate budget costs from bailout-type
interventions should include consideration of these more indirect or hidden
forms of assistance. The sections that follow explore instances of indirect
government assistance through special treatment or exemptions.
2. Special Treatment or Exemptions from Banking and
Securities Rules
a. Conversions to Bank Holding Company (BHC) Status
In addition to providing support via regulatory inaction, regulators
sometimes assist failing firms with measures that are more proactive, yet
still opaque, relative to more direct “bailouts.” 395 One example from the
Great Recession is the Federal Reserve’s expedited approval of investment
or noncommercial banks’ requests to become BHCs. 396 Ironically, such
firms had previously been careful to avoid BHC classification because it
would subject them to full supervision by the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, limit permissible activities to those “closely related
to banking,” 397 and restrict certain transactions among the BHC and its
affiliates.
395. See, e.g., supra notes 348–54 and accompanying text (Federal Reserve approval of private
“rescue loan” for silver investors, Nelson Baker and William Herbert Hunt even though the loan
otherwise violated special credit restraints designed to slow speculative trading volume).
396. A BHC is defined simply as a company, generally referred to as a parent, with control over
at least one bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). Although a BHC can be a single corporation with
control over a single bank, BHCs are often large conglomerates of multiple affiliated businesses.
397. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (prohibiting BHC from acquiring a voting interest in any
company that is not a bank). An existing entity that becomes a BHC must divest itself of nonbank
voting interests within two years. Id. § 1843(a)(2). In addition, the Federal Reserve Board was
directed to promulgate regulations identifying permissible activities “so closely related to banking
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The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (the GLB Act), enacted in 1999,
dramatically expanded permissible BHC nonbanking activities with a new
provision allowing BHCs to elect to be financial holding companies
(FHCs).398 As reported by the Federal Reserve Board, the new FHC rules
removed legal barriers “that had previously constrained the ability of
banking organizations, securities firms, and insurance companies to affiliate
and compete with each other.”399
While this expansion of permissible activities made BHC classification
somewhat more attractive, a noncommercial or investment bank’s
conversion still came at a price. Even if the newly-converted BHC elected
to become a FHC, its activities would still be restricted to those activities
considered “to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial
activity.” 400 In addition, the new BHC would become subject to Federal
Reserve Board supervision and restrictions on transactions between bank
and nonbank members of the BHC group. Notwithstanding these
constraints, several investment banks and other financial conglomerates
during the 2007–2009 crisis, most notably Morgan Stanley and Goldman
Sachs, made expedited requests to become BHCs so that they could borrow
from the Federal Reserve discount window and be eligible to participate
in other government assistance programs. 401 The Federal Reserve’s rapid
approval of these requests was widely regarded as a signal that Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs would not be allowed to fail.402

as to be a proper incident thereto.” 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). See Bank Holding Companies and
Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y) 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b) (regulations listing permissible
closely related nonbanking activities). See also Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, supra note 242, at
362–63 (noting Goldman Sach’s thirty-year history of opposing Federal Reserve supervision).
398. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 102-106,
§ 103(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1346 (codified in part at 12 U.S.C. § 1843l(1)(C) (BHC election to
become a FHC).
399. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FINANCIAL
HOLDING COMPANIES UNDER THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT 1 (2003).
400. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(k)(1)(A). See also id. § 1841(k)(4) (identifying specific activities
considered financial in nature). The Federal Reserve Board may even permit an FHC to engage in
nonfinancial activity that “is complimentary to a financial activity and does not pose a substantial
risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or the financial system generally.” Id.
§ 1841(k)(1)(B).
401. Fed. Reserve Sys., Press Release, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/press/bcreg/20080921a.htm (Sept. 21, 2008) (citing “unusual and exigent circumstances” and
“emergency conditions” to explain expedited approval of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
BHC conversions).
402. See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 242, at 362–63 (describing
Federal Reserve’s speedy BHC conversion approvals as sending signal that Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs would survive); Saule T. Omarova, Adaption and Resiliency in Legal System:
From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1750–57 (2011) [hereinafter Omarova, Gramm-Leach-Bliley]
(describing conversions of investment banks Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and GMAC into
bank holding companies). See also DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR
ON THE GREAT PANIC 217 (2009) (describing Morgan Stanley and Goldman’s Sachs makeover as
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Another BHC conversion approval during the recent crisis was for the
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), once a General Motors
(GM) in-house lending arm, but later an independent corporation, which
served as the primary lender to GM customers and dealers. The Federal
Reserve notably approved GMAC’s request to become a BHC even though
it fell short of the minimum regulatory capital initially demanded by
the Federal Reserve as a condition of approval.403 Moreover, the Federal
Reserve clearly indicated that it considered GMAC’s conversion to BHC
status as part of the larger overall rescue plan for GM.404
b. Transactions Between BHC-Owned Banks and Their
Nonbank Affiliates: Exceptions to Federal Reserve Act
Restrictions
One concern with the Federal Reserve’s BHC conversion request
approvals during the Great Recession was potential threat to safety and
soundness of the federal deposit insurance fund. To the extent that an
uninsured, nonbank member of the BHC group engages in high-risk
business activities, transactions between the uninsured BHC affiliate and
the FDIC-insured BHC group bank increase the latter’s exposure to
potential loss. As a practical matter, the nonbank’s relationship with the
insured bank affiliate provides the nonbank with access to the federal
deposit insurance “safety net.” 405 One long-standing statutory “line of
defense” or “firewall” created to prevent this extension of the federal
“safety net” to nonbank affiliates of insured depository institutions is
Federal Reserve Act § 23A,406 which restricts specified “covered transacBHCs, which “gave them the Fed’s promise of protection and a permanent source of lending in a
crisis”).
403. Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies and Notice to Engage in Certain
Nonbanking Activities, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20081224a1
.pdf (Dec. 24, 2008) [hereinafter GMAC Approval Order] (approved GMAC BHC conversion
request). See also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE UNIQUE
TREATMENT OF GMAC UNDER TARP 23 (2010) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT PANEL, GMAC REP.].
404. GMAC Approval Order, supra note 403, at 4 (noting unique issues raised by GMAC’s
historical relationship with GM and its role as the primary source of GM customer and dealer
financing); id. at 5 (noting Federal Reserve’s considering “steps taken by the Department of
Treasury to provide assistance to GM and thereby help ensure the viability of a major business
partner of GMAC and GMAC bank.”). See also infra notes 455–60 and accompanying text
(Treasury Department assistance to GMAC as part of larger GM “bankruptcy bailout”).
405. See Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,560 (Dec.
12, 2002) (codified, as amended, at 12 C.F.R. pt. 223) (introduction to Federal Reserve Act § 23
regulations, noting that the provision is “designed to protect against a depository institution
suffering losses in transactions with affiliates . . . [and to] limit the ability of a depository
institution to transfer to its affiliates the subsidy arising from the institutions access to the Federal
safety net”). Another purpose of the provision is “to promote competition by reducing the
likelihood that banks would favor certain customers over others.” OVERSIGHT PANEL, GMAC
REP., supra note 403, at 24.
406. Banking Act of 1933 § 13, 48 Stat. 183 (amending 1913 Federal Reserve Act to add
§ 23A) (codified, as amended, at 12 U.S.C. § 371c). In 1987, Congress added § 23B, which
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tions” between BHC bank subsidiaries and their nonbank affiliates. These
include, for example, BHC bank subsidiary loans or extensions of credit to
nonbank affiliates or BHC bank purchases of securities issued by nonbank
affiliates.407 As one commentator noted, after the 1999 GLB Act’s dramatic
expansion of permissible BHC nonbank affiliations and activities, “section
23A effectively became the principal statutory firewall protecting the
depository system from subsidizing potentially risky activities of
nondepository financial institutions, and in a broader sense, safeguarding
the foundational U.S. principle of separation of banking and commerce.”408
An important component of the federal government’s rescue assistance
during the 2007–2009 economic crisis, which received far less public
attention than the more direct ad hoc rescues and Treasury Department
TARP “bailouts,”409 was the Federal Reserve Board’s extensive exercise of
its statutory authority to exempt BHC “covered transactions” from the
strictures of § 23A.410 In other words, the Federal Reserve used its § 23A
exemptive authority during the crisis to breach the firewall otherwise
protecting FDIC-insured banks against the losses of nonbank affiliates. One
illustration from early in the Great Recession is the Federal Reserve’s use
of emergency lending authority to facilitate J.P. Morgan’s acquisition of the
failing investment bank, Bear Stearns.411 One challenge to the acquisition
structure was that it involved several § 23A prohibited “covered
transactions,” including J.P. Morgan Bank extensions of credit to nonbank
Bear Stearns, and J.P. Morgan Bank purchases of Bear Stearns’s derivatives
portfolio and associated hedges. Thus, an additional integral element of the
negotiated acquisition agreement, without which J.P. Morgan would not
requires transactions between bank members of the BHC group and its affiliates transactions to be
on market terms. CEBA, supra note 50, at tit. I, § 102(a), 101 Stat. 564 (amending 1913 Federal
Reserve Act to add § 23B) (codified, as amended, at 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1).
407. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7). More generally, see § 371c(a)(1) (restrictions on transactions). See
also id. § 371c(b)(1), (2) (definition of “affiliate”). In a significant change of prior policy, DoddFrank explicitly added derivatives transactions with affiliates to the “covered transaction”
definition “to the extent that the transaction causes a member bank or subsidiary to have credit
exposure to the affiliate.” Dodd-Frank Act § 608(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1608 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 371c(b)(7)(G)). A more detailed analysis of covered transactions between affiliates is beyond
the scope of this Article.
408. Omarova, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, supra note 402, at 1687. In response to this concern, the
1999 GLB Act amended the “covered transaction” definition to include transactions between FHC
banks and their financial affiliates. For a discussion of these provisions, see id. at 1696–97.
409. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
410. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(f)(2) (authorizing the Federal Reserve Board to grant exemptions upon
“finding the exemption to be in the public interest and consistent with the purposes [of § 23A]”).
411. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (Federal Reserve “unusual and exigent circumstances” lending authority).
An Examination of the Extraordinary Efforts by the Federal Reserve Bank to Provide Liquidity in
the Current Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 111th Cong. 8
(2009) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.)
(testifying about Bear Stearns, noting that “prior to 2008, credit had not been extended under this
[unusual and exigent circumstances] authority since the 1930’s”). For further discussion of the
Bear Stearns “rescue,” see supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
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have purchased Bear Stearns, was the Federal Reserve’s agreement to
provide J.P. Morgan with the necessary § 23A exemptions.412
In fact, the Federal Reserve quietly used its § 23A exemptive authority
throughout the 2007–2009 crisis, intervening to provide what I refer to as
“covert” bailout-type assistance to numerous large financial firms. Among
others, the Federal Reserve granted § 23A exemptions to Citigroup, Bank of
America, and Wachovia, thereby permitting bank subsidiaries to engage in
securities financing transactions with broker-dealer affiliates, or to purchase
auction-rate securities (ARS) from nonbank affiliates.413 Another illustration is the Federal Reserve’s grant of several § 23A exemptions allowing
FDIC-insured GMAC (subsequently renamed Ally Bank) to fund
automobile company affiliates’ business activities through transactions
that would otherwise have been prohibited by § 23A.414 Remarkably, the
Federal Reserve granted one of these GMAC exemptions without imposing
collateral requirements or duration limits usually demanded as conditions
for § 23A exemptions, arguably making “it clear that the macro-economic
goal of saving the U.S. automotive industry justified a complete override of
section 23A.”415
The Dodd-Frank Act included several provisions designed to expand
and strengthen § 23A restrictions on transactions between FDIC-insured
banks and their nonbank affiliates.416 Under the new rules, the Federal Reserve Board’s finding that a § 23A exemption is in the public interest and
consistent with the purposes of § 23A 417 will not ultimately result in an
exemption unless the Board notifies the FDIC of its finding, and the latter
fails to object within sixty days on the grounds that the “exemption presents

412. See Omarova, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, supra note 402, at 1746–48 (describing Federal
Reserve grant of three separate J.P. Morgan § 23A exemption requests in connection with Bear
Stearns acquisition).
413. See, e.g., Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec’y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd. to
Carl Howard, Gen. Counsel, Citigroup (Oct. 23, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve
.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2007/20071023/20071023.pdf (Citigroup § 23A
exemption to engage in securities financing transactions); Letter from Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Sec’y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd. to H. R. Rodgin Cohen, Esq. (Dec. 29, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2008/20081229
/20081229.pdf (Wachovia Bank § 23A exemption to purchase auction-rate securities of affiliate,
noting that proposal is a “result of the ongoing turmoil in financial markets”); Letter from Jennifer
J. Johnson, Sec’y of the Bd. Fed. Reserve Bd to Patrick S. Antrim, Esq., Ass’t Gen. Counsel (Jan.
23, 2007), available at, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct
/2007/20070123/20070123.pdf (Bank of America § 23A exemption for securities lending program
with broker-dealer affiliate).
414. See, e.g., Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec’y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd. to
Richard K. Kim, Esq. (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs
/legalint/federalreserveact/2009/20090521/20090521.pdf (Ally Bank § 23A exemption to permit
customer loans to purchase automobiles from unaffiliated dealers).
415. Omarova, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, supra note 402, at 1760.
416. For a general description of these changes, see id., at 1763–68.
417. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(f)(2) (required Federal Reserve finding for § 23A exemptions).
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an unacceptable risk to the Deposit Insurance Fund.”418 In other words, the
FDIC has effective veto power over Federal Reserve Board § 23A
exemptions.
Despite these new statutory hurdles, the Federal Reserve retains its
basic § 23A exemptive authority. As a practical matter, these new
limitations are unlikely to substantially restrain regulators’ future use of
§ 23A exemptions as a tool to provide indirect bailout-type assistance in
times of severe economic distress. As Professor Saule Omarova observes,
to the extent the § 23A firewall “inevitably disappears in time of financial
stress, tightening individual requirements of the statute is not likely to make
the firewall strong enough to withstand the next crisis.”419
3. Tax Forbearance
Forbearance actions with the potential to impose measurable budgetary
cost are not limited to financial regulators. When the government intervenes
in private markets in times of financial distress by extending tax breaks to
struggling businesses or investors, the “costs” in revenue foregone are just
as real as comparable direct government expenditures. To the extent that the
government relinquishes its claim to tax revenues, the government itself is
effectively assuming a portion of the otherwise private risk of loss.
Although they received far less public attention, tax breaks were an
important part of the government’s response to the Great Recession. For
example, financial institutions with significant losses from sales of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac preferred stock were given special tax breaks
allowing them to deduct such losses from their ordinary income—a
deduction that was not otherwise permissible under regular tax rules.420
Another substantial tax break used to assist struggling firms during the
recent crisis was a dramatic loosening of rules otherwise restricting an
acquiring company’s ability after an “ownership change” to offset its
income with the net operating losses (NOLs)421 of an acquired company.422
Absent special tax relief, for example, the transfer of old GM stock to new
GM, a new entity created for purposes of GM’s restructuring in

418. Dodd-Frank Act § 608(a)(4)(A), 124 Stat. 1610 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371c(f)(2)).
419. Omarova, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, supra note 402, at 1691.
420. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 301(a), 122 Stat.
3765, 3802 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5261 (2006)); see also id. § 301(b)(2) (defining eligible
preferred stock to include Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock held by a qualified financial
institution on September 6, 2008, or sold or exchanged on or after January 1, 2008, and before
September 7, 2008).
421. See 26 U.S.C. § 172(c) (defining NOL as “the excess of the deductions allowed . . . over
gross income”); id. § 172(a) (general rule permitting two-year NOL carryback and twenty-year
NOL carryforward).
422. 26 U.S.C. § 382(a), (b). See also id. § 382(g) (defining “ownership change” as any
increase by more than 50 percentage points of any 5 percent shareholder, within a specified testing
period).
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bankruptcy,423 would have been considered an “ownership change,” triggering Internal Revenue Code § 382 loss limitation rules, thus preventing new
GM from using old GM’s losses. Congress responded with a statutory
amendment permitting new GM to use old GM’s NOLs.424
The Treasury Department also provided substantial assistance to
struggling companies through liberal use of its authority to interpret the
§ 382 NOL limitation rules. One such Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
notice, apparently written with Citigroup in mind, liberally interpreted
§ 382 to allow NOL deductions that otherwise would have been
impermissible.425 Reacting to the “Citigroup” and other similar notices, one
tax expert commented, “I’ve been doing taxes for almost 40 years, and I’ve
never seen anything like this, where the IRS and Treasury acted unilaterally
on so many fronts.” 426 A similar IRS notice issued during the recent
economic crisis was the Treasury Department’s special tax ruling
facilitating Wells Fargo’s acquisition of the failing Wachovia by allowing
Wells Fargo to deduct otherwise impermissible Wachovia NOLs against its
own income.427

423. See infra notes 49–69 for further discussion of GM bankruptcy.
424. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1262, 123 Stat.
115, 225, 343–44 (loss limitation not applicable to ownership change “pursuant to a restructuring
plan” that was “required under a loan agreement or a commitment for a line of credit entered into
with the Department of Treasury” under EESA). Though the statute did not mention GM by name,
its narrow terms made it clear that it was drafted to provide additional General Motors bailouttype relief. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Even After the Deal, Tinkering Goes On, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A20 (reporting new “tax break specifically intended for the failing auto
giant General Motors”). See also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-18-09, ESTIMATED BUDGET
EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE “AMERICAN RECOVERY AND
REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009” (Feb. 12, 2009) (estimating cost of GM provision at approximately
$3.2 billion revenue foregone from 2009–2019).
425. I.R.S. Notice 2010-2, 2010-2 I.R.B. 251; see also CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JANUARY
OVERSIGHT REPORT: EXITING TARP AND UNWINDING ITS IMPACT ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
20 (2010) (describing notice as “additional subsidy to Citigroup and a loss to the taxpayers”).
426. Binyamin Appelbaum, Tax Deal is Worth Billions to Citigroup; Deal Made to Recover
Bailout Firms Exempted from Rule When U.S. Sells its Stake, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2009, at A1
(quoting Robert Willens). More recently, when AIG finally reported a nearly $20 billion quarterly
profit after earlier receiving substantial ad hoc and TARP government assistance, see supra note
122–24, former appointees of the TARP Congressional Oversight Panel noted that $17.7 billion of
the “profit” came from liberal tax breaks allowing its otherwise impermissible NOLs, and referred
to the tax break as a “stealth bailout.” Jim Puzzanghera, Former Bailout Watchdogs Criticize AIG
Tax Break, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2012, at B5.
427. See Amit R. Paley, A Quiet Windfall for U.S. Banks: With Attention on Bailout Debate,
Treasury Made Change to Tax Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2008, at A1 (quoting the Jones Day
law firm as saying that the ruling “could be worth about $25 billion for Wells Fargo”). For a more
detailed discussion of the Wells Fargo tax break and its implications, see Block, Measuring
Bailout Cost, supra note 8, at 218−20.
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4. Government Loan, Loan Guarantees, Stock Purchases, and
Nationalization
a. Federal Loans and Loan Guarantees—Equity Purchases as
“Loans”
Direct bailout-type assistance to struggling businesses has often taken
the form of federal loans or loan guarantees.428 As an alternative to direct
lending, the government can effectively provide cash “loans” to struggling
corporate entities by purchasing an equity interest in the corporation’s
preferred stock. In such cases, the government does not intend to maintain a
long-term equity interest. As a practical matter, the government equity
purchase functions as a loan, which is repaid upon the corporation’s
subsequent redemption of the stock for cash, or when the government
otherwise sells the stock.429 Although the recent TARP “bailout” program
originally called for the government to purchase “bad assets” from
struggling banks, thereby leaving the banks with only their healthy assets,
the Treasury Department ultimately “abandoned its original strategy, . . .
deciding instead to invest money directly into [the struggling
institutions].”430 In the end, much of the government’s assistance to struggling banks during the Great Recession actually took the form of such
government preferred stock purchases.431
Consistent with its anti-bailout rhetoric, Dodd-Frank not only
significantly limited regulators’ authority to make emergency loans,432 but
further prohibited the government from taking “an equity interest in or
becom[ing] a shareholder of any covered company or any covered

428. In 2008, for example, the Federal Reserve made an initial $85 billion loan to avoid the
imminent collapse of American International Group (AIG). Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press
/other/20080916a.htm. See also WEBEL, supra note 261. Earlier instances of emergency
government loans include Chrysler, Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1980) (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.), and Lockheed.
Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178 (1971) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1841−1852).
429. For example, the government was effectively “repaid” some of its assistance to GM when
the Treasury Department sold some of its GM stock in a GM initial public offering (IPO). See
GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: AS TREASURY CONTINUES
TO EXIT PROGRAM, OPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE COMMUNICATION ON COSTS EXIST 8, GAO12-229 (2012) [hereinafter GAO, TARP EXIT] (describing Treasury Department’s unwinding part
of its GM assistance by participating in a GM IPO). See also Block, Measuring Bailout Cost,
supra note 8, at 198.
430. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: VALUING TREASURY’S
ACQUISITIONS 4 (2009).
431. One of the largest TARP programs, for example, was the Capital Purchase Program (CPP),
through which the Treasury Department purchased senior preferred equity and subordinated
debentures. OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY FINANCIAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009 14–15 (2009).
432. See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text.
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subsidiary.”433 Though the Federal Reserve is no longer authorized to make
emergency loans to individual institutions, it can still make loans to eligible
institutions through the regular discount window. In effect, the Dodd-Frank
restrictions have simply made it more difficult for others in similar
circumstances to do the same, thus raising the issue on unequal access.
b. Government as Creditor in Private Bankruptcy
When the government itself is a creditor of the bankrupt debtor, its
role in the bankruptcy proceeding is more than simply administrative.434 In
particular, the auto industry bankruptcies during the recent economic crisis
provide an excellent illustration of the extent to which the government’s
creditor role can alter bankruptcy dynamics and accomplish results more
akin to direct government assistance to a private failing firm than to
bankruptcy.435 Prior to the Chrysler and GM bankruptcy filings, the Bush
administration Treasury Department had already provided both companies
with TARP loans, 436 which were conditioned on a deadline by which
Chrysler and GM were required to submit viable restructuring plans. 437
When the required viability plans, which included requests for additional
assistance, were ultimately submitted to the Obama administration,
President Obama announced that “neither goes far enough to warrant the
substantial new investments that these corporations are requesting.”438 At
the same time, the President proclaimed that “[w]e cannot, and must not,
433. Dodd-Frank Act § 206(6), 124 Stat. 1459 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5386) (prohibiting FDIC
use of orderly liquidation authority to take “an equity interest in or become a shareholder of any
covered company or any covered subsidiary”). Though this provision is included in the orderly
liquidation title, it represents more broadly, I think, hostility to and backlash against the
government’s acquisition of bank equity interests through its 2008 TARP rescues.
434. For purposes of this discussion, references to the government as creditor are limited to its
claims other than tax claims against the bankrupt debtor, e.g., debtor obligations on federal loans
and other non-tax obligations.
435. For detailed discussion of the 2008 auto industry crisis and development of reorganization
plans, see STEPHEN COONEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40003, U.S. MOTOR VEHICLE
INDUSTRY: FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND RESTRUCTURING (2009) [hereinafter CRS,
MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY]; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE
USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE
INDUSTRY 7–23 (2009) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT PANEL, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY REP.].
436. Chrysler had also previously received federal government assistance in the late 1970s.
Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 1324 Stat. 1324. For an
excellent review of this earlier auto industry “bailout,” see ROBERT B. REICH & JOHN D.
DONAHUE, NEW DEALS: THE CHRYSLER REVIVAL AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM (1985).
437. See CRS, MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY, supra note 435, at 8–10, 27–29, 41–48 (description
of viability plan, executive compensation, labor renegotiations, and other Chrysler and GM TARP
loan conditions).
438. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on the American Automotive
Industry, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 199 (Mar. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Remarks],
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-theAmerican-Automotive-Industry-33009. See also OVERSIGHT PANEL, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
REP., supra note 435, at 10–13 (describing President Obama’s interagency Task Force on the Auto
Industry findings on submitted viability plans).
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and we will not let our auto industry simply vanish.”439 Though falling short
of a direct declaration of systemic importance, these and other government
statements suggest a “too important” or “too-big-to-fail” reasoning behind
the auto industry rescue measures. The President gave Chrysler and GM
limited additional time to continue work on restructuring, but nonetheless
anticipated that such continued efforts might not succeed. Hinting at the
resolution response ultimately used to rescue the two failing auto
companies,440 he noted that both
need a fresh start to implement the restructuring plan they develop. That
may mean using our bankruptcy code as a mechanism to help them
restructure quickly and emerge stronger. . . . . What I’m talking about is
using our existing legal structure as a tool that, with the backing of the
U.S. Government, can make it easier for General Motors and Chrysler to
quickly clear away old debts that are weighing them down so that they can
get back on their feet and onto a path to success . . . .441

Exactly as anticipated by these remarks, the government in the end used
the existing private bankruptcy legal regime to structure Chrysler and GM
reorganizations that bore little or no resemblance to ordinary Chapter 11
bankruptcies. As a practical matter, these bankruptcies were “functionally
equivalent” to similar government assistance provided to other private
failing firms through ad hoc interventions, or as part of the overall so-called
TARP “bailout” program.442
In anticipation of Chrysler’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, U.S.
officials led negotiations with Italian auto manufacturer, Fiat, the United
Auto Workers Union (UAW), and the Canadian government to arrange a
prepackaged § 363 bankruptcy sale of “old” Chrysler’s assets to “New
Chrysler,” a “shell” entity created solely for purposes of the bankruptcy
sale.443 On the same day that Chrysler filed its bankruptcy petition,444 the
White House announced that “as a result of the sacrifices by key
stakeholders and a substantial commitment of U.S. government resources,”
the government had reached agreement with Chrysler, Fiat, and key

439. Obama Remarks, supra note 438.
440. See OVERSIGHT PANEL, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY REP., supra note 435, at 35 (explaining
decisions of both companies to file for bankruptcy were prompted by the government’s negative
reaction to their viability plans).
441. Obama Remarks, supra note 438 (emphasis added).
442. See supra notes 117–24.
443. See supra notes 343–46 and accompanying text (discussion of § 363 sales in private
bankruptcy). For a short description of the auto industry bankruptcy details, and the difference
between § 363 sales and traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy, see Stephen B. Selbst, General Motors
and Chrysler: The Changing Face of Chapter 11, COMMERCIAL LENDING REV. 3 (Nov.–Dec.
2009) [hereinafter Selbst].
444. Voluntary Petition at 1, In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09
B 50002 (AJG)).
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stakeholders regarding the terms of a Chrysler § 363 bankruptcy sale.445
Remarkably, the sale closed only forty-two days later.446 In exchange for
working capital and other financing, the U.S. government took an 8 percent
equity interest in “New Chrysler” and the right to select four independent
directors. 447 Other important components of the Chrysler bankruptcy and
§ 363 sale included: (1) forfeitures by “Old Chrysler” shareholders of their
equity interests; (2) substantial waivers by second-lien debt holders; (3)
funding of retiree and medical benefits trusts with an unsecured note and a
55 percent equity interest in New Chrysler; and (4) a 20 percent New
Chrysler equity interest to Fiat in exchange for technical know-how, with
Fiat rights to acquire an additional 15 percent upon meeting specified
performance standards.448
General Motors filed for bankruptcy shortly after Chrysler.449 Prior to
filing, GM had already borrowed substantial amounts from the Treasury
Department through the TARP program.450 In exchange for this prior financial assistance, the Treasury Department had received various claims,
including warrants to acquire GM common stock. Immediately after GM’s
bankruptcy filing, the government also extended new “debtor-inpossession” priority loans to “old GM.” Shortly thereafter, “old GM”
transferred substantially all of its assets in a prepackaged § 363 bankruptcy
sale, with substantial financing from the U.S. and Canadian governments.
As part of the transaction, the U.S. government assigned its debtor claims
and warrants to acquire GM common stock in exchange for cumulative
preferred GM shares and an over 60 percent interest in GM common
stock.451 Remarkably, the Treasury Department reported in recent financial
statements that it considers the GM stock received in exchange for these
assignments of claims and warrants in the bankruptcy sale as “recoveries of
the original loans for subsidy cost estimation purposes.”452 In other words,
because the § 363 exchange effectively extinguished the government’s
445. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Obama Administration Auto
Restructuring Initiative Chrysler-Fiat Alliance (Apr. 30, 2009) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov.the_press_office/Obama-Administration-Auto-Restructuring-Initiative/.
446. OVERSIGHT PANEL, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY REP., supra note 435, at 13.
447. Id. at 14. The Canadian and Ontario governments also made contributions in exchange for
a 2 percent interest. Id. Its pre-bankruptcy TARP loans made the U.S. government a regular
Chapter 11 creditor. More importantly, the government’s substantial post-petition financing made
it a “debtor-in-possession” (DIP) with special bankruptcy code priority. 11 U.S.C. § 364.
448. OVERSIGHT PANEL, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY REP., supra note 435, at 14.
449. Voluntary Petition at 1, In re General Motors Corp., 409 B.R. 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(No. 09–50026 (REG)).
450. See supra note 124.
451. The remainder of new GM’s common stock was distributed to a UAW trust and to old GM
unsecured creditors. See OVERSIGHT PANEL, AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY REP., supra note 435, at
19–20 (describing GM § 363 sale). The government also was entitled to appoint new GM
directors.
452. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 2011 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT 72 (2011).
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claims for repayment of prior “bailout-type” loans, the government
considers those loans “repaid.” This description is technically accurate to
the extent that the government relinquished its formal “creditor” status. At
the same time, however, the § 363 sale effectively converted the
government from creditor to majority equity owner. More simply put,
GM had become a government-owned company.453 Any claim under these
circumstances that GM had repaid its obligations to the government is
misleading and even disingenuous.
Although not explicitly part of the § 363 bankruptcy sale or the
government’s prior assistance to GM, a series of related transactions with
GMAC should be considered part of the overall GM rescue plan. 454
Originally an in-house GM financial services arm established to provide
financing to customers and dealers, GMAC was later spun off as
an independent entity.455 Over time, GMAC expanded into other financial
markets, to become the nation’s fourteenth largest bank holding
company. 456 When GMAC faced imminent bankruptcy during the 2008
economic crisis, the Treasury Department provided an initial $5 billion
capital contribution through the TARP program in exchange for GMAC
preferred stock. 457 As a result of several complex transactions involving additional substantial capital infusions,458 and conversions of various
government-held GMAC interests into common stock, 459 the Treasury
453. The U.S. government no longer holds a majority equity stake in GM. As a participant in
GM’s November, 2010 initial public offering (IPO), the Treasury Department sold enough of its
GM stock at $33 per share to reduce the government’s equity interest in GM from 61 percent to 26
percent. See Michael J. de la Merced & Bill Vlasic, U.S. Recovers Billions in Sale of G.M. Stock,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at A1. As a result of these IPO stock sales, the government recouped
some of its GM “bailout costs.” Nevertheless, the government reportedly will need to sell its
remaining GM stock at an average price of $53 per share to “break even” on its investment in GM.
Id.
454. In fact, the Treasury Department defended its assistance to GMAC “as crucial to
supporting its extensive investments in GM and Chrysler.” OVERSIGHT PANEL, GMAC REP.,
supra note 403, at 66.
455. OVERSIGHT PANEL, GMAC Rep., supra note 403, at 1.
456. Id. As a non-depository institution, GMAC did not initially meet the statutory definition of
a BHC. See supra notes 403–404 and accompanying text (regarding GMAC’s conversion to BHC
status).
457. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Investment in
GMAC (Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages
/hp1335.aspx.
458. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Additional
Investment in GMAC LLC (May 21, 2009) (announcing $7.5 billion Treasury Department
investment) available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg154.aspx.
Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Restructuring of
Commitment to GMAC (Dec. 30, 2009) (announcing $3.8 billion contribution of new capital),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg501.aspx.
459. For a detailed description and analysis of Treasury Department GMAC capital
contributions and conversions of government-held GMAC interests into common stock, see
OVERSIGHT PANEL, GMAC REP., supra note 403, at 36–46. GMAC “rebranded its corporate
entity” and changed its name to Ally Financial, Inc., effective May 10, 2010. See Aparajita Saha-
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Department ultimately came to own 74 percent of GMAC’s common stock,
making GMAC a government-owned company.460
Both of the recent auto industry § 363 bankruptcy sales generated
significant controversy. The Chrysler sale in particular contained several
unusual features that many found troubling, including Fiat’s receipt of a
substantial managerial and equity interest without any cash contribution,
first-lien holder repayments of only thirty cents on the dollar, and unsecured
supplier creditor repayments in full, leaving other unsecured claim holders
with little likelihood of payment.461 Stated more generally, the complaint
was that the “federal government used the value of its prepetition
emergency loans and its [debtor-in-possession] loan and political power to
buy Chrysler and distribute its value as it saw fit among the creditor
constituencies.” 462 Several Indiana state employee pension funds, which
held Chrysler first-lien secured debt, objected to Chrysler’s § 363 sale on
the grounds that it violated statutory creditor protections by paying junior
claim holders and unsecured trade creditors without paying secured
creditors in full.463 In a decision subsequently upheld by the Second Circuit
and the Supreme Court, the bankruptcy court rejected the pension funds’
argument that the § 363 sale was really a de facto or sub rosa plan of
reorganization, which should not be permitted to bypass creditor protection
and court confirmation requirements otherwise applicable to reorganization
plans.464
Controversy over whether the GM and Chrysler § 363 sales should
have been treated as de facto reorganization plans465 and debate over what

Bubna & Nathan Becker, GMAC Posts Profit; Renaming Itself Ally, WALL. ST. J., May 4, 2010, at
C4.
460. At the time of the Congressional Oversight Panel’s GMAC report, the Treasury
Department’s stake in GMAC common stock was 56.3 percent. OVERSIGHT PANEL, GMAC REP.,
supra note 403, at 411. The government’s common stock interest in GMAC increased to 74
percent when it later converted additional preferred shares into common stock. See Press Release,
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Converts Nearly Half of its Ally Preferred Shares to
Common Stock (Dec. 30, 2010) (announcing conversion of $5.5 billion preferred into common),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/pages/tg1014.aspx.
461. See, e.g., Selbst, supra note 443, at 4.
462. Id. (footnote omitted).
463. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 93 (Bank. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.
2009), aff’d per curiam sub nom, Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 556 U.S.
960 (2009) vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009), remanded sub nom. In re Chrysler LLC, 592 F.3d
370 (2d Cir. 2010).
464. 576 F.3d 108, supra note 463, at 118. In a series of unusual rulings, the Supreme Court
allowed the Chrysler sale to go through, but vacated the Second Circuit’s opinion. See Fred N.
David, Interpreting the Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Chrysler Bankruptcy and its Impact on
Future Business Reorganizations, 27 EMORY BANK. J. 25 (2010) (interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s temporary stay, vacating the stay, and subsequently vacating and remanding to the Second
Circuit).
465. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization After Chrysler
and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305, 308 (2010) (“Viewed another way, the
approved transaction was not a sale at all, but a disguised reorganization plan . . . .”); Mark K. Roe
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these precedents auger for the future of Chapter 11 bankruptcy undoubtedly
will continue.466 In the meantime, the important point for purposes of this
Article is that the 2009 auto industry bankruptcies were arguably
functionally equivalent to other government “bailout-type” assistance
during the same period through TARP loans and other ad hoc rescue
measures.467 This functional equivalence is especially striking in connection
with the overall auto industry rescue itself, in which the government took a
61 percent equity interest in GM after a forced, prearranged § 363
bankruptcy sale, and a 74 percent equity stake in GMAC in exchange for
more direct government loans. Though it took no position on whether the
government should have provided rescue assistance to GMAC, the
Congressional Oversight Panel established to review and report on TARP
loans and related activities,468 noted the different approaches taken to assist
auto companies GM and Chrysler as opposed to GMAC. With regard to
GMAC, for example, the Panel found that
Treasury missed opportunities to increase accountability and better protect
taxpayers’ money. Treasury did not, for example, condition access to
TARP money on the same sweeping changes that it required from GM and
Chrysler; it did not wipe out GMAC’s equity holders; nor did it require
GMAC to create a viable plan for returning to profitability . . . .
Moreover, the Panel remains unconvinced that bankruptcy was not a
viable option [for GMAC] in 2008.469

In assessing government assistance policies adopted during the most
recent economic crisis, it is important to acknowledge that the end result in
these bankruptcies was not substantially different from other governmentfacilitated economic rescues. When the same substantive end result can be
achieved through multiple avenues, it is important to examine any
inconsistencies in the process, and determine why one was chosen over the

& David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 759−60 (2010)
[hereinafter Roe & Skeel] (Sale “determined so many plan terms that are typically governed by
§ 1129 that it was a sub rosa plan of reorganization . . . .”). But see Stephen J. Lubben, No Big
Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 532 (2009) (arguing that
GM and Chrysler § 363 sales were “entirely within the mainstream of chapter 11 practice for the
last decade”). For earlier discussion of § 363 sales as potential sub rosa plans, see supra 343–45
and accompanying text.
466. See Roe & Skeel, supra note 465.
467. Several commentators have referred to the 2009 auto industry Chapter 11 bankruptcies as
“bailouts.” See, e.g., id. at 728 (noting about the auto industry collapse: “Never before had the
government used bankruptcy to bail out a major industrial corporation.”); Levitin, supra note 8, at
487 (“The way the Treasury handled GM and Chrysler provoked significant protest because the
Bankruptcy Code was used to facilitate what was properly perceived as a bailout.”).
468. EESA § 125(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3791 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5233).
469. OVERSIGHT PANEL, GMAC REP., supra note 403, at 4. See also id. at 83–88 (assessing
Treasury Department explanations for not using Chapter 11 bankruptcy and § 363 sales similar to
those used for Chrysler and GM in connection with GMAC).
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other. This is especially important in the interest of horizontal equity—the
idea that those similarly situated should be treated alike.
5. Government-Controlled Corporations
Nationalization, of course, constitutes the extreme public end of the
private-public risk allocation continuum. Many countries have adopted this
approach to imminent major bank collapses by temporarily nationalizing
failing banks. 470 In the United States, the most overt nationalization
response to the recent economic crisis was the placement of mortgage
giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in conservatorship.471 Though previously privately owned and operated, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—federally chartered entities that
are “limited [in] their activities to certain economic sectors deemed worthy
of public support, and [given] certain advantages to help accomplish their
public purposes.” 472 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in particular were
“created to provide liquidity and stability in the home mortgage market,
thereby increasing the flow of funds available to mortgage borrowers.”473
Given that GSEs are federally chartered, their nationalization in times
of significant economic distress may not be surprising. On the other hand,
government takeovers of other types of private business would likely strike
most observers as extraordinary. Although officials did not refer to them as
such, several government interventions during the Great Recession certainly

470. See, e.g., David Jolly, Austria Takes Over Bank as it Teeters on the Brink, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2009, at B9; Carter Dougherty, Sweden’s Fix for Banks: Nationalize, N.Y. TIMES, JAN.
23, 2009, at B1; Sarah Lyall, Iceland, Bankrupt and Looking for Help, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008,
Nov. 2, 2008, at A6 (referring to Iceland’s takeover of two the the country’s three largest banks).
See also Randall D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform, 2010
B.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 445, 459–60 (discussing EU countries passing or considering special
resolution regimes to take over failing banks during recent economic crisis).
471. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 1117, 122 Stat.
2654, 2683–88 (creating new Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) within the Treasury
Department as independent regulator with authority to take control of the housing-related GSEs);
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treas., Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury
and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7,
2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx
(announcing FHFA conservatorship over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, thus transferring complete
control from the shareholders to the government). For general discussion of the implicit GSE
guarantee, see Carol J. Perry, Rethinking Fannie and Freddie’s New Insolvency Regime, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1752, 1760–61 (2009).
472. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GSES: RECENT TRENDS AND POLICY, GAO/TOCE/GGD-97-76, at 1 (July 1997). Special advantages available to GSEs include tax exemptions,
SEC registration requirement exemptions, special access to Treasury Department lines of credit,
and investor perceptions of implicit government guarantees. Growing Role of GSEs in the
Nation’s Credit Markets: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities,
and Gov’t. Sponsored Enterprises, Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong. 7-30
(1997) (statement of James L. Bothwell, GAO, Chief Economist).
473. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE HOUSING GSES 10
(May 2001).
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had the flavor of nationalization. For example, GM’s 2009 bankruptcy was
structured to provide the U.S. government with a controlling equity interest
in the recapitalized GM.474 While the Treasury Department no longer owns
a controlling interest, it retains a substantial proportion of GM stock, and
still holds a controlling interest in GMAC, now renamed Ally Bank.475 In
addition, some have argued that financial instruments and stock received by
the government in exchange for its financial assistance to Citigroup and
Bank of America during the recent crisis at least temporarily gave the
government controlling stakes in the banks, thus functioning as a “weird,
shadow nationalization.”476
I contend that is important to recognize transactions that have the
practical effect of nationalizing or otherwise providing the government with
a substantial equity stake in a private business for what they are. In other
words, they should be regarded as government interventions located on the
far public end of the private-public risk continuum. I do not mean here to
make any judgments about whether such transactions are good or bad under
any particular circumstances of financial distress. I argue simply that we
should treat functionally equivalent types of government intervention or
assistance alike so as to provide similar access—as well as comparable
substantive and procedural rights and protections—to all relevant parties,
including general taxpayers. Different intervention categories along the
private-public continuum can raise different sets of policy issues. With
regard to nationalization in particular, the U.S. government has little past
experience addressing the host of issues regarding the scope of the
government’s corporate management role when it owns a substantial equity
stake in an otherwise private business. One lesson from the recent economic
crisis is that policy makers should anticipate the possibility of such
government interventions. Policy makers should not pretend that the
government cannot and should not use its regulatory and other authority in
extreme cases to take an equity interest in an otherwise private firm.
Instead, they should begin to address potential policy questions during a
time of sober reflection rather than in ad hoc crisis mode.

474. See supra notes 451–53 and accompanying text.
475. See supra note 459.
476. Edmund L. Andrews, Nationalization Hinted in Rescues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at B1
(quoting Karen Shaw Petrou, consulting firm Federal Financial Analytics managing partner);
Marvel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government in the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX.
L. REV. 1293 (2011). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE:
ONGOING CHALLENGES, AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES RELATED TO GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO
PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES, GAO-10-719 20-35 (2010) (describing different levels of
government officials’ involvement in private corporate management depending upon type and
amount of the government’s debt or equity interest received in exchange for financial assistance).
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CONCLUSION
According to some reports, public anger over 2008 bipartisan bailout
legislation was so intense that “lawmakers from both parties who backed it
remain[ed] haunted by the vote.” 477 This anti-bailout political climate so
dominated congressional consideration of financial reforms that post-DoddFrank resolution authority—at least on the theoretical surface—now offers
regulators little leeway to take any action other than overseeing liquidation
of systemically important financial institutions. In other words, government
“rescue” assistance to individual large banks or systemically important
financial institutions in danger of default is no longer sanctioned.
In contrast, the post-Dodd-Frank financial regime places considerably
more faith in regulatory responses to systemic risk.478 In principle, prudential financial regulations are designed to increase in stringency along a riskbased continuum. These principles have a long history for depository
institutions and commercial banks. Dodd-Frank’s expanded prudential
regulatory authority over large BHCs and systemically important nonbank
financial companies also theoretically incorporates prudential regulation
requirements that increase with risk. On the other hand, the statutory
provisions themselves include some unusual and unfortunate cliff effects,
which interrupt the flow of the risk-based continuum.
Regulators may be reasonably diligent in regulating small to mediumsized financial institutions by increasing monitoring and enforcement as
bank health deteriorates. On the other hand, regulators face various
incentives to resist early intervention as problems become apparent at large,
interconnected financial institutions.479 Regulators’ inclinations to lax enforcement, delayed intervention, or even loans through the Federal
Reserve’s discount window for large, troubled, and interconnected banks
facilitate continued operation of such struggling financial institutions. In the
event that the troubled institution reaches the point of imminent collapse,
regulators face a binary choice: allow the bank to fail and suffer whatever
systemic harms might result, or go through the complex systemic risk
477. Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Bank Bailout is Potent Issue for Fall Races, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2010, at A1. In fact, such “deep-seated resentment . . . factored into the antiWashington, anti-incumbent sentiment so prominent in [the 2010] midterm elections, in which a
yes vote on TARP has proven to be its own toxic asset.” Brady Dennis, TARP at Two: Officials
Assess Bailouts, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2010, at A16 (referring to the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) enacted as part of the 2008 so-called “bailout” legislation, supra note 124.
478. For similar observations about the emphasis on regulation rather than resolution, see
Coffee, supra note 13, at 797 (describing Dodd-Frank as “invest[ing] heavily in preventive
regulation and supervision to prevent a future crisis,” while placing restrictions on resolution
authority and attributing this imbalanced focus to public anger over bailouts); see also id. at 802
(arguing that, “[a]lthough greater regulatory oversight [as provided in Dodd-Frank] is certainly
desirable, . . . exclusive reliance upon it is unrealistic”).
479. See supra notes 44–71 and accompanying text. Even “mandatory” prompt correction
action (PCA) measures have not been very effective at stimulating early intervention actions for
struggling banks. See supra text accompanying notes 107–16.
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determination procedure, thus placing the bank in receivership and
foreclosing any further efforts to preserve the entity. In fact, the procedural
obstacles to making a systemic risk determination may make delayed
enforcement intervention even more likely for large financial companies.
Congress has unfortunately tied regulators’ hands by enhancing
prudential regulatory risk-based measures designed to prevent or mitigate
system wide economic crises, but simultaneously limiting resolution
authority. My concern on the resolution side is that efforts to limit
resolution authority may backfire as a practical matter. Faced with severe
economic crisis, but restricted in their resolution authority, regulators may
simply go “underground,” less transparently providing types of assistance
to struggling banks that they might provide more openly if Congress had
not narrow-mindedly imposed limits. Moreover, Congress is either ignoring
or failing to see the many ways in which government is already involved in
allocation of risk and resolution of business difficulties.
Finally, when the next really big crisis arises, Congress is unlikely to
stick to its “no bailout” pledge in any event. As I argued before,
political “no more bailout” assertionseven those ultimately included in
statutory textsimply are not credible as pre-commitment devices.
Statutory declarations can always be amended. As much as Congress
would like to eliminate any “too-big-to-fail” policy, the reality is that there
mayand probably willcome a time when the failure of a particular
firm or industry would be so economically devastating that Congress
would step in to save it, despite earlier protestations to the contrary.480

On the other hand, my concern on the regulation side is that enhanced
prudential regulation, laudable though it is, may not be the hoped for
panacea in preventing or mitigating systemic risk. If the past is any
indication, regulators are unlikely to be aggressive in exercising their new
powers to heighten supervision and enforcement as risk increases along a
risk continuum. Moreover, the new enhanced prudential regulations result
in arbitrary cliff effects inconsistent with a risk continuum principle.
Though I favor new and enhanced prudential regulation, the real challenge
to financial regulation and resolution reform is providing incentives for
regulators to use their existing and enhanced prudential regulatory powers
rather than restricting their resolution authority. This Article has exposed
the ironic contrast between prudential regulation and resolution authority.
The former is theoretically based on a risk continuum, but in reality
implemented in a far more binary fashion. On the other hand, resolution
authority is theoretically limited to largely binary options but in reality can
be plotted along a private-public risk allocation continuum. I contend that it
is important to acknowledge and preserve a continuum approach on both
sides of the equation. Despite improvements, the financial regulatory
480. Block, Measuring Bailout Cost, supra note 8, at 154.
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regime remains fragmented and unprepared to respond rapidly and
coherently to the next economic crisis. This fragmentation can result in
inconsistencies and inequities in resolving the potential failure of different
businesses or industries. Properly calibrating an appropriate solution to
different types of economic risk requires a more nuanced account of the
various levels of risk on the road to “systemic” in order to better identify
danger points and provide mechanisms to ensure that banking regulators are
unified in their approach.481 Financial regulation reforms should also focus
on altering the current regulatory dynamic and structure to eliminate
regulator incentives to forbear enforcement at early signs of trouble at large
financial institutions. Such reforms should include lobbying restrictions to
reduce large financial firm opportunities for regulatory capture, which often
results in special “white glove” treatment for large banks.
With regard to resolution authority reforms, I believe that it is important
for legislators to be more honest with themselves about the extent to which
government is already involved. Rather than impose rigid restrictions on
regulators’ resolution authority, the better approach would be to
acknowledge the different possibilities along the private-public continuum
and carefully assess elements that should be relevant in deciding which of
the various resolution methods is best under particular circumstances. In the
end, the most important objective is a prudential regulatory and resolution
approach to systemic risk that is transparent and equitable both for failing
firm stakeholders and the general public.

481. Though I believe that it would be sensible to consolidate the various bank regulation
agencies into a sole agency, such discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.

